WHAT
JAPAN THINKS

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Nov. 6 1921

WHAT JAPAN THINKS

BY

K. K. KAWAKAMI

JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS

JAPAN AND WORLD PEACE

WHAT JAPAN THINKS

EDITED BY

K. K. KAWAKAMI

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PREFACE

THE articles put together between these covers have been chosen by the editor with a view to presenting what may be called representative opinions of representative Japanese on the foremost questions of the world to-day, such as the Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations, imperialism and liberalism, democracy and autocracy, militarism and navalism, armament and disarmament, race equality and race discrimination, the "white peril" and the "yellow menace." The Japanese side of the Yap controversy is also fully presented.

Of the fourteen articles composing this book all but two are culled from newspapers, magazines, and books published in Japan or China. Most of them were originally written in Japanese for Japanese publications, and were later translated into English for various English publications in the Orient.

The value of these articles lies in the fact that they were, with a few exceptions, addressed primarily or exclusively to the Japanese. None of them was prepared especially for this book. They were not written for foreign consumption. Their respective authors had no eye upon the American or European gallery. They show just what the Japanese are talking among themselves on the vital problems of the world and their bearing upon Japan.

Some of the views expressed in the following articles may be found unpleasant to sedate readers in America and Europe. The editor has not shrunk from such views, believing that in the end straightforwardness is more conducive to clear understanding than evasive diffidence.

In selecting these articles from the mass of current literature in Japan, the editor purposely avoided articles written by "professional" statesmen or diplomats, whose utterances are usually characterized by what the journalistic wit of America gracefully calls "pussyfooting." They are often deliberately superficial or platitudinous, often too subtle or too vague to be of much value as a measure of real public sentiment. The editor has, however, taken an article from the pen of Premier Hara, the "Great Commoner," a second by Marquis Okuma, the "Grand Old Man," and a third by Baron Goto, the "Roosevelt of Japan." Because of their great distinction and widespread reputation, the world is eager to listen to them, whatever they may have to say.

From a literary point of view these articles, whether originally written in English or translated from the Japanese, leave much room for improvement. But the editor, conscious of his own limitations, has resisted the temptation to rewrite them. He has, however, taken the liberty of making such emendations as he thought absolutely necessary in order to avoid overtaxing the imagination of the reader. Only to that extent is he responsible for the English of this book. He presents this volume not as

a work of literature, but as a symposium of opinions of grave international significance which, due to the vehicle by which they were originally conveyed, have remained more or less unknown to Europe and America.

Acknowledgment is due to the editors or publishers of the journals and books, in which these articles originally appeared, for permission to reprint them in the present form.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

New York, May, 1921.

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WHAT JAPAN THINKS

CHAPTER I

A World Unsafe for Democracy

By Isoh Yamagata

Mr. Yamagata is the editor of the *Seoul Press,* an English daily paper in Seoul, Korea. He was a collaborator in the preparation of Professor James Murdoch's monumental "History of Japan During the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse." This article appeared in the *Seoul Press* in October, 1920.

WHEN the phrase, "the world safe for democracy," was first used by Mr. Wilson, it received an almost hysterical applause, and as long as it served its war purpose in France and England it was freely quoted in those countries. Tattered and threadbare though it has become, it still echoes around the world. And after all how well it sounds! In it are rolled up all those half-formed hopes and immature formulas with which idealists delude themselves, but toward which, if we are not too officious in endeavoring to manage evolution for ourselves, we may be developing.

The staggering certainty is, however, that evolution is a great force working over our heads; something far too stupendous for us to more than dimly apprehend, and with a momentum which we can cer-

tainly not stop and probably can hardly modify. It presupposes law in the universe, but law of such a bewildering complexity that we, with our slightly evolved mentalities, can but touch the hem of its garment. And in this evolution nothing is plainer than that the individual counts for almost nothing. When he becomes too obstreperous, Nature's spear point is ready, and he either falls back into his proper place, or is hit by the spear and falls and is cast aside.

In the "cosmological perspective" that Haeckel wrote of, the human individual is of not much greater worth than the ant, the fly, or the elephant. His real strength lies in unity and an obedience to law—in his ability, indeed, to enter into the rhythm of the whole and willingly become one note in the big music. The great bandmaster does not tolerate small individual tootings that are not in the score, and a music-loving audience leaves when this occurs.

The agitators who are preaching democracy and freedom in various parts of the world to-day are out of harmony with Nature's teachings and are themselves shackled men. They believe they are free—in reality they are like sheep, for they are all following a few leaders who have the mental virility to hypnotize them with their fine-sounding phrases. Their words may be their own, but their ideas are manufactured for them by the arch-hypnotists of democracy. If one of these agitators were seized with a bad attack of palsy or St. Vitus's dance, in which all of his fingers and toes and other members wished to go their own free and individual ways, he

would speedily, so far as his own personality was concerned, become an ardent advocate of autocracy, and long for the restoration of power to his sovereign brain. An individual with shaking head, twitching arms, jerking legs, and a stuttering tongue would be absurd if he got up to recite Whitman's "I am the captain of my soul." His arms and legs might assert that they were of equal rank, and his tongue might decide at the last moment on some other poem. This would be disconcerting to him, as well as painful and unpleasant to his audience.

The analogy is not as far-fetched and absurd as it appears, for during the late war it was only because the St. Vitus germs of individualism had not yet gotten the upper hand in Britain, France, and America that these countries, together with Japan—who has so far retained the captaincy of her soul—were able to raise conscript armies, put things on an autocratic basis, submerge the individual, and finally conquer Germany. Simple honesty requires the admission that, without becoming monarchical in practice, if not in form, the United States Government could never have given the help which the lordly and supercilious Briton now so derides.

But surely one may ask, if in time of crisis and stress an autocratic government is necessary to the accomplishment of great ends, why in time of peace should it not be equally efficacious? As a matter of fact it is, and Japan and Germany, as the latter country was before 1914, prove it. One knows that it is highly reprehensible to see any good in Germany,

and in daring to do so one must be willing to face ostracism by the greater part of society. Still, as things are, one doesn't lose much by this, for tiresome and unoriginal people with their cut-and-dried opinions may bore exceedingly, even though they be highly respectable and of the proud majority. It is futile to deny that Germany with her imperialism and her unity had built up a marvelous state, and the time may come, with the rising tide of Bolshevism threatening to engulf the world, when even her enemies may wish that she were as strong and powerful as in the days when it required the combined force of many nations to subdue her.

After all, we might as well recognize the fact that, in spite of the upward trend of evolution, we are still merely human beings built on a substratum of neolithic man. Even in this twentieth century, after the tragic lessons of the last few years, we are still considerably lower than the angels, and being so we need strong rulers rather than the democracy and individualism that are being preached by all the devotees of the great god Fashion.

Balzac, one of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth century, makes one of his characters in "The Country Doctor" say:

"The disease of the present day is superiority. There are more saints than niches; and the reason is obvious. Losing the monarchy we lost honor, losing the religion of our fathers we lost the Christian virtues, and through our fruitless attempts at government we have lost patriotism.

"Power is, as it were, the heart of a State. Nature, in all her creations, shuts in the vital principle to give it greater stamina; so with the body politic.

"Abolish the peerage, and at once every rich man becomes a privileged person. Instead of a hundred (peers), you have ten thousand, and you enlarge the sore of social inequalities.

"The triumph of the bourgeoisie over the monarchical system, which has for its object the increase, in the eyes of the people, of the numbers of the privileged class, will find the inevitable end in the triumph of the masses over the bourgeoisie. When that struggle arises, its weapon in hand will be the right of suffrage, given without restriction to the masses. He who votes, discusses. Authority when discussed does not exist. Can you imagine a Society without authority? No, well then, authority means force, and force rests on a judgment rendered."

Even though the cosmic laws are beyond our understanding, clear hints are given us as to our course. We may not know the harbor we are bound for, but if we follow the channel marked out by the buoys we shall escape the shallows and the rocks.

We see that independence is unwelcome when it invades the nerves of the individual. It works out in a similar way in the family, and a father, if he be wise and thoughtful, governs his children. They are not allowed, with their immature brains, to decide important questions for themselves. The unwelcome scrubbing, the necessary dose of castor oil,

the prompt spanking that follows too much individuality on the part of an enterprising youngster, are all highly imperialistic, and to the youngster, wholly to be condemned. But even the most ardent upholder of democracy would probably prefer this family as neighbors to one in which the children were brought up according to the Montessori method or one of the new fads in which "self-determination" is the slogan.

Great corporations, great shipping companies—indeed, all important undertakings—must be ruled by one master. There is no time for the talk and disputations which would paralyze effort if there were not a supreme head.

All the great nations have been built on imperial foundations, and the phenomenal growth and development of modern Japan were possible only because she was united and had as a ruler a great, farseeing, and unselfish monarch, one of the great men of history. Is it possible, with the noble old *samurai* training of the past, the spirit of which enabled her to become what she is, that twentieth century Japan will repudiate that training and follow the false gods of democracy and "freedom"? The condition of Russia to-day is exactly what Balzac said would happen when the masses ruled. Do the Japanese liberals believe that America is a haven of rest and peace, and that democracy is justifying itself there? Let them investigate conditions there minutely, and they will find that a "world made safe for democracy" works out as a world made safe for crime, dishon-

esty in government, and a general waste and inefficiency that are appalling, and that democracy though it be, the United States has had to adopt autocratic methods in every supreme crisis in her history in order to spell Success.

Moreover, in many American university circles at present, there is a very decided reaction against democracy, although this movement is denied or ignored by those who wave the flag of freedom so wildly. This movement was voiced last year in "The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma" by Henry Adams, with a striking preface by his brother, Brooks Adams. In this, the latter says, "for physical reasons, which are capable of mathematical proof, it is clear that democracy must ultimately disintegrate in chaos." The *Atlantic Monthly* reviewer of this book says that "it is refreshing to have some one say bluntly what he thinks, and not temper the wind of his criticisms to a sensitive public. What is more, the state of the world, including America, is such at the present time that no one can lightly put aside the thesis that the democratic dogma has suffered serious degradation."

A disintegrating, crumbling process seems to have begun all over the world. Individualism, with its pernicious and deceptive doctrine of freedom, is undermining all that civilization has so slowly and with such huge travail built up. This vaunted freedom is a freedom that invariably degenerates into license, and accords liberty to criminals; a freedom for looting, burning, and a general *bouleverse-*

ment of all that real government has hitherto stood for. It must of necessity work out in just this way, because human things have still within them all the springs of selfish energy that enabled their prehistoric ancestors to survive. A true democracy can never exist until altruism has really become the animating impulse of every individual. And justice to the "lower" classes is by no means incompatible with the most autocratic form of government. Indeed, this justice might be far more quickly and wisely secured by such a government than by one in which individuals, with their own selfish purposes to serve, may obstruct just legislation, or by one in which the legislators, bought by the labor vote, accord far too much freedom to the workers and make of them a class which eventually is certain to become the worst of tyrants.

In regard to Japan and democracy, there are many foreigners, even Americans, who believe that her very existence still depends upon her remaining a military and imperialistic nation. Her courtesy and forbearance are too great—one remembers the parable of casting pearls before swine—and perhaps if more of the spirit she is credited with, rather than less, were manifested, there might be a sudden quiet reigning in the ranks of foreign missionaries, business men, newspaper editors, etc., who are spreading their malignant anti-Japanese propaganda.

But for her army and navy and great military leaders, Japan would have become an English or Russian outpost, and instead of being the sturdy and

efficient race that they are, the Japanese to-day might have become a subject race bearing the yoke of a European rule.

The enemies of Japan, and they are numerous, would be glad to see socialism undermining the empire's strength, and it is not so long ago that a man who is now an attaché at one of the embassies in Tokyo came over here, nominally as a teacher, but in reality to report to his government how far socialism in Japan could be counted upon as an ally in case of war.

Before the missionaries, the teachers, the doctors, the men who boast of having carried papers and photographs out of Korea between the double soles of their shoes, to be used by them as proofs of Japanese atrocities in that country—before the newspaper editors who are ceaselessly carrying on their nefarious work and who preach against Japan's militarism and imperialism chiefly to incite the young and immature against the existing order of things—before these agitators do further harm, let them be unceremoniously hustled out of the country—or, to use more dignified language, deported as undesirables. They will perhaps be happier, live more luxuriously, and be under a less severe mental strain on the banks and braes of their own bonnier lands, and Nature will doubtless fill the vacuum that their departure causes.

Let the men of the younger generation in Japan realize that they may be the ones who will last hold civilization in their grasp—to preserve or to crush

forever. If they would be world saviors, let them curb a little their responsiveness and eagerness in following Western thought, and beware the snares and pitfalls that are so cleverly set for them around the clay feet of the Goddess of Liberty.

CHAPTER II

The Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations

By Professor Rikitaro Fujisawa

Professor Fujisawa was born in 1861 in Niigata, Japan. He was educated in the University of Tokyo, University College of London, and the Universities of Berlin and Strassburg. The last-named institution conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Since 1887 he has been Professor of Mathematics in the Imperial University of Tokyo. He was Japan's delegate to the Second International Conference on Mathematics, Paris, 1900, and also to the International Commission on the Teachings of Mathematics, 1910. Although a mathematician by training, Dr. Fujisawa has written many articles on international politics. He is a facile writer both in Japanese and in English. This article was published in the *Asian Review,* Tokyo, for April and May, 1920, under the title of "The Feaji Doctrine."

I

IN a certain aspect history repeats itself; in a certain other aspect history never repeats itself. History will repeat itself in the sense that the future, in spite of the best efforts of the world's greatest and wisest men gathered together at the Peace Conference, has in store some sort of world calamities commensurable with, or even eclipsing, the World War which we have just gone through. History will not repeat itself in the sense that the next world calamity will not be a war as we now conceive it or,

even if it be destined to be a war, it will not be caused by the military genius and daring despotism of a Napoleon or by the avarice of autocratic militarism of the Prussian type led by the morbid vaingloriousness of a Wilhelm Hohenzollern.

Nature is cynical and not seldom plays a trick by attacking humanity from the quarter least expected, while mankind is busily engaged in entrenching itself against the recurrence of the danger experienced a little while ago. Paris has still fresh remembrance of the long-range Berthas. A few hours' railway journey from the seat of the conference brings its participants to the scene of the horrors and devastations wrought by German brutality. As a natural consequence, the wisdom and sagacity of the peace movement will be handicapped, if not blinded, by the vivid memories of the shocks and emotions felt during the war and the enduring sufferings and distress of bereavement which will long survive the war, and by the horrible sight of the devastated regions all around. In the dizzy eyes of the too ardent advocates of any peace movement, the danger of arrogant militarism outshines all other sources of danger which are, in reality, equally appalling and disastrous, to the detriment of sober meditation and sound judgment. Let those who are jubilant over the formulation of the constitution of the League of Nations be reminded of the very many perilous isms silently glaring from behind the walls of the great banqueting hall at the Quai d'Orsay. Capitalistic Imperialism, even subject to Drago limita-

tions, is as cruel and detestable as Bolshevism, though it may not appear so terrifying as the latter, simply because it works in an indirect, roundabout way. Besides isms like the two just mentioned, whose existence in our midst is well known, there are isms still in an embryo stage like Adventism which, we are told, will some day crush Russian Bolshevism. Again it does not lie beyond the scope of our imagination to think of Ultrabolshevism, compared with which the Bolshevism of Lenine and Peter may appear humane and tame. Another example of such an ism is Dictatorism. It exists in a great nation which may unwittingly own the potentiality of becoming the greatest nation upon the earth, monopolizing the privilege of interpreting fineries such as right, justice, freedom, and so forth in a manner as suits its own convenience and in a way conforming to its exalted and advantageous position among the comity of nations, denying the other nations even the right of criticizing such interpretations, and unconsciously but aggressively setting itself up as the dictatorial arbiter in all disputes among nations. It is a facsimile of the world domination dreamed of by the pre-war German chauvinists, attained not by *might* but by the apparently pacific means of one-sided or hypocritical *right* backed by might camouflaged. Viewed from the historical standpoint, it is the eighteenth century spirit of "enlightened despotism" clothed in the garment of the twentieth century fashion of "safe for democracy." Over and above these, there are still other dangerous isms imper-

vious to our myopic vision, or perhaps yet to be born, for which human inventiveness will some day be called upon to find fit names. Let us be always conscious of the indisputable truth that we live amidst a universe of unknown forces pregnant with fathomless good or evil and immeasurable happiness or woe.

We have but a vague idea of how far we can possibly penetrate into the mystery of the future. At the same time, we feel certain that the future has in store innumerable surprises. Human foresight, even discounting unlooked-for occurrences, is subject to a limit prescribed by earthly wisdom, in spite of our ignorance as to where in the sequence of time this limit lies. People are apt to think that tinned food will be preserved forever free from mildew, while our appetite instinctively shuns dusty tins in a dark corner of a grocer's shop. As my mind was flying to and fro among very many such instances of human incongruities, my fancy happened to perch for a while upon the visionary spectacle of so many illustrious Peace Delegates lately assembled in Paris, some sipping from, and some others smacking their lips over, cups of French wine of the Napoleonic age. Meanwhile my thought went astray to Rhine wine bottled with scrupulous care and not to be uncorked till the next world peace conference. And as the climax of my whim, I was utterly bewildered in speculating on what would in the end become of California wine in a hermetically sealed bottle never to be broken.

Anything created by mankind can be destroyed by mankind. As long as there exists harmony among the primary causes which led to the creation of a certain thing, that thing will exist. But no sooner than this harmony is disturbed, it will cease to have real existence. The very conception of the League of Nations presupposes that the atmosphere of the self-sacrificing, conciliatory spirit should pervade the whole world. Self-denial on the part of an individual is occasionally met with, though very rarely. Self-denial on the part of a nation is something which we can even hardly dream of. The smooth working of the League of Nations presupposes self-denial to a greater or lesser extent on the part of the most powerful nations. Is this humanly practicable? The only possible answer to this enigma is to be found in the words of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George: "Let us try it. Let us try it seriously and in earnest." Here *a priori* arguing is not of the slightest avail. We have to attack the problem inductively, whereby we have to admit in advance that, in this respect, we are moving in the times of Roger Bacon and not so far advanced as the days of Francis Bacon. Even the most optimistic proponent of the League of Nations must recognize that it is merely an experiment. The most carefully prepared covenant cannot work miracles. The next question is: Is the prospect more or less hopeful? Were we allowed to indulge in the silly habit of prophesying, we cannot help thinking of human weakness appealing to omens in such a case. Even taking into due

consideration the extremities to which party interests may lead, it does not seem to bespeak a happy augury for the world peace movement that there should be, in a responsible body of the distinguished politicians of a country often identified with the cradle of the conception of the league of nations, a man who wantonly talks of going to war with a friendly Power at a self-made provocation.

While we desire most whole-heartedly the success of the League of Nations, we cannot help thinking that its very conception shows inherent frailty in a futile attempt to go far beyond the boldest stretch of imagination. By so doing, it loses much of its efficacy by attenuation. What can be achieved by the League of Nations within the period, during which we may reasonably expect it to remain effective, may be more rationally and, indeed, more efficiently, accomplished by adopting a principle, for which I was striving to seek a name which will forestall misinterpretation. Etymological considerations are of no avail, as any name so derived is unfailingly prone to misconstructions one way or other. So, in homage to, and as souvenir of, the disinterested labors of the Big Five at the Paris Conference, I took the initial letters *a, e, f, i, j,* of their names, and these letters were arranged by repeated trials so as to conform to phonetic ease, resulting in the permutation *feaji.*

II

The Feaji principle or doctrine is the general name

given to the "regional understanding" in the wording of the proposed Covenant of the League of Nations, without reference to any particular specified region. The principle avows the political predominance of a Power or a combination of at most two Powers best qualified for maintaining order and for furthering progress and civilization in a region determined by geographical considerations following the line of absolute impartiality. Viewed from another angle, it vindicates the noninterference, in matters relating to a particular region, of Powers other than the one which, by reason of geographical propinquity, coupled with its national strength and just aspirations, is naturally and worthily entitled to be looked upon as the dominating guardian Power in this region.

The Feaji principle applied to the Western Hemisphere is no more or less than the Monroe Doctrine itself. If, in the definition of the "Monroe Doctrine" to be found in any lexicon or dictionary, the words *"American continent,"* the *"United States," "European Powers"* be replaced by *"a particular region," "the dominating Power," "other Powers"* respectively, there emerges a perfect definition of the Feaji principle.

It would hardly be necessary to say that the Monroe Doctrine was foreshadowed by President Monroe nearly a century ago, discountenancing the interference of Europe in matters relating to the American continent. It has since passed through various phases of metamorphosis. In particular,

during the World War, it has gone through eruptive convulsions giving rise to wild, arrogant interpretations. Strange to say, however, with the signing of the armistice, it settled down in its primordial significance, in which sense it appears in Article XXI of the Covenant of the League of Nations. As to its future, if we are allowed to push our imagination beyond the barrier of sensible possibility, we may build a castle in Spain of South America having in some remote days her own Feaji doctrine, squeezing Panama between it and the Monroe Doctrine which will then be confined to North America. Incidentally we may add that the new President of Brazil, not long after he received a warm reception as President-elect at New York, is alleged to have gone so far as to say that the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the League of Nations covenants is a domestic question of the United States alone. Mexico's contention that the Monroe Doctrine as recognized by the Peace Conferenec is intended to be forced on all the American countries, irrespective of their views, and that she would not recognize the doctrine, since it injures her sovereignty and independence, would not be worth any serious consideration, although its contrast with the Brazilian declaration may be amusing to a leisurely observer.

III

Let us now throw a hasty glance upon the Feaji doctrine of the British Empire. I do not know why,

but somehow I was led to think that Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Northcliffe, and Lord Reading were the three men at the helm, who, in the darkest hours during the World War, directed the fortunes of the British Empire. As a monument to the invaluable services they have done in reaching the safe shore, the thought flashed through my mind to name it the Lloyd George-Northcliffe-Reading Doctrine. However, I had to give up this idea, as the name sounds discordant in view of the recent vehement rupture between the first-named two. Dispensing with the recital of other similar failures, I go straight to the point and propose to call it the Sun-Never-Sets Doctrine.

For the British Empire with dominions, colonies, dependencies, settlements, protectorates, and what not, scattered all over the face of the globe, in which the sun never sets, safe high-sea routes are necessary for binding the fragments into an organic whole as well as for intercommunication just as much as interstate railways are indispensable for the well-being of a continental federal country. That these ocean routes should be protected by the biggest navy in the world of the two-powers-standard gauge will require neither elucidation nor justification. It has nothing to do with the so-called *freedom of the seas* in the sense in which hypocritical Germany used to speak of it in pre-war days, provided it will not be used for unjust aggressive purposes. The guarantee for this is to be sought not in verbal declarations, but in the British character

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which never turns a deaf ear to the call of chivalry and which is ever ready for self-sacrifice in upholding the cause of real justice and humanity. Great Britain has been a genteel mistress of the seas; she will never be an arrogant master of the seas. "Rule Britannia, Britannia rules the waves" should henceforth resound "Reign Britannia, Britannia reigns o'er the waves." The British Empire lives by the sea. The power of the British fleet to command the sea was the mainspring of the allied victory, and the chivalry with which it has wielded that command is worthy of the highest sympathy and admiration of all those who know what chivalry means.

Numerous and divers causes worked together to bring about Germany's downfall. It is only to be expected that every cause should claim that it began to become effective just in the nick of time, thus contributing most to the breakdown of Germany. Indeed, a few of these causes were certainly instrumental in accelerating the hour of reckoning for German brutality. But the main fact remains indisputable that it was the ever tightening grip of the British Navy that sealed the most sanguine hope of Germany and counted the most toward bringing about its final collapse. If mankind knows what gratitude is, we should all feel grateful to the primary cause which freed us from the oppressive breathing from which the whole world has been suffering for over a generation of the "armed to the teeth peace," ever since Germany struck upon an idea of crushing France more thoroughly than was done in 1870. There re-

mains the vital question: Will there ever be a chance of seeing the British Navy on the side espousing a cause harmful for the aggregate welfare of humanity? The answer to this question, necessarily imperfect by its very nature, can be sought in considering how far we may rely upon the British character already spoken of and in examining the record of its past.

So far as my meager knowledge of history goes, there is but one instance of the British Navy's having been brought into play for a purpose tinged with a slightly aggressive shade, and that is the Crimean War. Here, however, I have to discount my own common sense. My first touch with the chronicle of this war was the perusal of Tolstoy's "Sebastopol" which caught the fire of my puerile enthusiasm. Subsequently I was made aware of fanatic exaggeration verging on mad fantasy which pervades Tolstoy's writings. But alas! It was too late. It is hard to shake off one's first impression of anything, even if his own inquiry tells him that it is not entirely correct. Ever since Florence Nightingale left the Crimea, the pacific character of the British Navy has remained unmolested under all circumstances.

Here may I be permitted to make a slight digression bearing on personal reminiscence. Early in 1883, I, a lad of little over twenty, on my way to Europe, happened to touch at Ceylon shortly after Arabi Pasha had settled there to spend his remaining years as an exile. Somehow I took pity on him, and this led me to look upon the bombardment of Alex-

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andria by the British fleet in 1882 as a measure infringing on the rights of other people. This I cite only as an instance of the prejudice rooted on spasmodic compassion surviving long after the feeling has vanished altogether. Wild rumor has it that there was underhand bargaining between Lloyd George and Wilson until they came to recognize each other's attitudes in regard to the Monroe Doctrine and the British protectorate over Egypt. Now, once the Sun-Never-Sets Doctrine is openly recognized, all this must become a straightforward, broad-daylight business. The British protectorate over Egypt is imperatively necessary for the safety of the Suez Canal route.

In spirit and tradition, the British Navy differs from its vanquished antagonist just as a heron is unlike a crow. It would be almost superfluous to add that the supremacy of the British Navy which is concurrent with the Sun-Never-Sets Doctrine is naturally subject to limitations, inasmuch as it should not interfere with the operation of other Feaji doctrines, just as the Monroe Doctrine does not cover Canada.

IV

For the Feaji principle which should guarantee the maintenance of order in Eastern Asia, I propose, for the time being, the name Ishii-Lansing Doctrine. At the same time, I hope that the day will not be far off when China will be able to restore order and stability within her own borders and to co-operate

with Japan for the free and unmolested furtherance of progress and civilization in the Far East. And then it will naturally and properly be called the Japan-China Doctrine. The doctrine embodies the spirit of the Ishii-Lansing agreement of 1917 on a wider basis than the literal construction of the name of the agreement would suggest. The Ishii-Lansing Doctrine announces for the Far East just what the Monroe Doctrine proclaims for the American continent. If this doctrine was proclaimed prior to 1897, and recognized by all the great Powers, Germany would not have been able to extort from China the lease of the fine port of Kiaochow with the flimsiest excuse in the world, just as she failed to get a footing in South America on the occasion of the Venezuelan complications when she was rebuked sharply by the United States in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. And there would have been no Shantung question now.

It was in 1817 that James Monroe succeeded to the American presidency, and the mystic rhythm of time has brought about exactly one hundred years later an agreement between America and an Oriental Power, heralding the birth of a regional principle which is an exact copy of the doctrine bearing Monroe's name and which applies to the region on the opposite shore of the Pacific.

The Ishii-Lansing Doctrine provides that the world shall look to Japan as a trustee and guardian of peace in the Far East. Japan's exertions and the tradition of her unblemished past entitle her to this

worthy position. That there exist preconceptions in some quarters giving rise to the false impression that Japan is an aggressive Power is not to be denied. That they are, in many instances, due either to casual misunderstanding or to studied misinterpretation will be made clear elsewhere within this essay. Japan has never broken a promise. This is not a self-appreciation. An impartial American writer was so good as to say frankly that Japan has the rare distinction of never having broken her word in international affairs. As in the past, Japan will always remain true to the bold utterance of Senator Williams that, unlike Christian nations, Japan has never broken her word. A scrap of paper, as soon as it is signed by Japan, becomes a sacred document which she will scrupulously observe at all cost. International morality and the sanctity of treaties find their stalwart champion and staunch custodian in the nation which has its home in the Land of the Rising Sun. Not only has Japan always kept and will ever keep her promise, but she will never effeminately regret or peevishly grieve over anything she might have promised. We must not confound those who are ever ready to make any promise, because they think nothing of breaking a promise, with those who hesitate to make a promise because they are conscious of the grave responsibility of never breaking a promise.

Japan desires to help and befriend China in the future as in the past and to act with China in unselfish co-operation. Japan is ever ready to discuss with

China openly and in a mutual confidence and genuine frankness any pending question between the two countries. It is much to be regretted that China, or rather those who represent China in a mistaken way, though most likely unconsciously and unknowingly, should take such an attitude as will convey the false impression that she is trying to laugh in her sleeve by taking a short cut and appealing to other Powers instead of addressing herself directly to Japan for any grievance China may have to complain of. Just imagine a hypothetical case of one of the South or Central American states appealing to some European Power, or, possibly, to Japan, for redress on some matter which had solely to do with the United States and thus flouting the Monroe Doctrine. China's salvation is not to be sought in blindly following the mischievous advice of men like Mr. Millard who appears, as seen from a far-off corner, to be an expert in intriguing of super-German type, trying to embroil the United States in trouble with Japan, and who seems to know how to supply oil and fuel to the inflammatory twaddle, which was unfortunately going on for some time among the anti-Wilsonian group of the American Senate. Just imagine Mexico magnified two and a half times in area and twenty times in population, and the United States compressed in area in the ratio of twelve to one and diminished in population by about twenty per cent and stripped of the surplus part of the heavenly gift of its over-abundant natural resources, and you have a vivid image of the Far Eastern condi-

tions. In the case of a nation, just as in the case of an individual, it is hard to deal with a character which oscillates between lethargic lassitude and fits of spasmodic activity. The peace in the Far East, as conceived by the primary idea of the League of Nations, can only be assured by the unbiased recognition of the Ishii-Lansing Doctrine and by the firm resolution of all the great Powers to present an impregnable front to astute maneuvering and clever intrigues which try to undermine this doctrine.

V

With France and Italy as a core, let a region of the European continent be so circumscribed as to include all the countries contiguous to the core and also those which, even if not actually contiguous, may be placed in the same category in view of territorial propinquity. It is a mysterious coincidence that the region thus defined is almost the same as the region in which the rôle of Augustus was paramount in the old, old days. The Feaji principle for this region, which I propose to call the Franco-Italian Doctrine, recognizes the predominance of French and Italian influence in all questions concerning the countries within this region. As a matter of course, such a recognition carries with it the noninterference of other Powers in the same spirit as that which makes it unthinkable that any Power should ever dream of contesting the Monroe Doctrine, or of disputing the supremacy of Great Britain on the high seas, that is, the Sun-Never-Sets Doctrine.

This region has a past of appalling complexity and bewildering entanglement. If, on moot questions pertaining to this region, an ideal justice of scientific accuracy be insisted upon, we must go back to the very beginning of the days of hordes and tribes, and trace the sinuous, mystifying course of right and justice through all the multifarious changes—invasions, wanderings, intrusions, conquests, revolutions, confusions, concessions, unions, federations, disintegrations, partitioning, and what not. Such a task would require more than an ordinary human intellect. If there be a science which deals with such problems, it may not inappropriately be called humanistic paleontology. And until such a science comes into existence, it would be well-nigh impossible to foretell the direction in which the endlessly vacillating needle of right and justice would be brought to a standstill. Any principle which aspires to govern human activity will work only by compromise the moment it descends from the realm of theoretical discussion to the domain of practical application. Any attempt to insist that it shall be exclusively the one way or the other is certain to be abortive and doomed to utter failure. Here on the side of the weak, something seems humane and benign; there on the side of the strong, the same thing appears austere and gruesome. It is sometimes even difficult to ascertain whether something is a compromise or a straightforward piece of business. We are apt to speak haphazardly of theoretical this or ideal that; but a little reflection will very often convince us that, in most cases, the

conception itself requires some sort of a compromise one way or other to become definite.

The peace settlement as a whole is surely a great work of liberation, but the tangle of nationalities in this region is a source of infinite dissatisfaction. There are weaknesses on all sides, which may easily and naturally lead to utter disruption. Wherever there is a mixture of races, there will be endless trouble. To cope with such trouble, even such a means as taking a plebiscite would be of no avail, as the result will vary in manifold ways and from time to time. To the troubles which are at once manifest must be added the crop of political troubles arising from the misconception or egoistic misinterpretation of President Wilson's famous "fourteen points." Indeed, it is by no means an exaggeration to say that all the world is astir with frenzied excitement at the newfangled doctrines preached. Perchance we may be able to stop war properly so called, but we may be powerless to prevent the occurrence of civil wars, guerillas, commotions, raids, tragedy, internecine competition, *coups d'état,* anarchy, assassinations, massacres, and what not. And, after all, the future may admire the wisdom of the paradoxical prophecy that peace is going to destroy that which war has failed to destroy. This is particularly true with respect to the region under consideration.

Order must be maintained at all cost and under all circumstances in this region, and particularly in that part of this region which is often called the second Balkans, extending from the Danube to Fiume and

Kragenfeldt. Some sort of authority, but not the authority of meddlesome, priggish dictatorism, is indispensable for vindicating the stability of peace. Let the countries situated in that part of this region, about which no thinking man can meditate without perceiving war clouds still hanging over the horizon, be reminded of what would have been their fate, had Germany emerged victorious out of the World War. We cannot even this day recall without trembling the nightmare of their being crushed under the punitive yoke of German world domination. They have also to bear in mind that it was France, and, next to France, Italy which bore most the burden of the war. A large part of their most beautiful and rich territory was laid waste with a desolation which centuries of peace will but partially efface. They have, furthermore, done their utmost in bringing about the final breakdown of brutal Germany, involving the heaviest toll on their man power and almost exhausting their economic resources. Is it not, then, but natural that authority should be vested in the joint voice of these two countries? Moreover, it lies deep in the noble character of the French and Italian people that they are more ready to sacrifice their own convenience, when raised to the position of trustee and guardian, than when forced by external coercion.

It may be argued that it is in such a region as the one under contemplation that the League of Nations may promise to be most effective. Superficially, it may appear so; but there are some serious consid-

erations which tend to contradict this apparent optimism. Just think of a case of some dispute which, under the pre-war conditions, might lead to war somewhere within such a region. Imagine a nation so much more clever than its antagonist as to succeed in misleading public opinion in some powerful foreign countries far from the disputing states by skillful maneuvers and mischievous propaganda. Recent experiences show that such does happen sometimes. Public opinion of a country is not seldom a rather slippery thing, particularly when it has to do with some question with which that country has no direct interest or perchance a one-sided interest. It is hard to find any rational excuse for leaving open the possibility of a dispute in a corner of the world which should be confined to its proper limit, creating a chance of world-wide embroilment, in spite of the ignorance of the major part of the world as to the real nature of the dispute. Chances of the short-cut processes shelving France and Italy should be annihilated not only in the interest of these two countries, but also for the sake of all the neighboring countries. As long as we have to do with the realities of incontrovertible actualities, the Franco-Italian Doctrine is not only requisite as a component factor of the guarantee for the world peace, but is, at the same time, beneficial to the smaller states within the region over which this doctrine holds its sway.

There still remain Russia and a few smaller regions which come under the supervision of none of the Feaji doctrines already enumerated. As to

Russia, no one knows when and how that country will settle down. However, it is certain that the present state of anarchy cannot last forever, and some day Russia will settle down somehow. Countries other than Russia must first of all return to their normal condition before we can profitably think what to do with Russia. Anything we may do for Russia at the present moment would be merely a trial of doubtful nature recalling the spectacle of a near-sighted person searching for his lost eyeglasses. It may either accelerate or retard the settling of Russia in a manner which may be good or bad for the peace of the world. And yet we cannot help feeling instinctively that we must do something for Russia. However, the most optimistic conception of the League of Nations is utterly powerless to do anything for Russia. This is equally true of the Feaji principle. So we cannot do otherwise than leave Russia untouched, so far, at any rate, as the Feaji principle is concerned.

VI

We will now speak of the Feaji principle in its relation to the League of Nations. Article XXI of the revised Covenant of the League of Nations adopted at the plenary session of the Peace Conference of April 28, 1919, reads: *"Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace."*

Even to a casual observer, it will be manifest that the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine is the *ipso facto* kernel of this article. The phrase immediately preceding "or regional understanding" is brought in for the sake of covering incongruities and facilitating the introduction of the words which follow. How strenuously the composer of the draft of this article must have labored in order to give a harmonious appearance to something which is not wholly in harmony with the general trend of the Covenant will not escape detection. How cleverly he succeeded in this difficult task is indeed a marvel and is worthy of the highest admiration and will long serve as a model of literary exertion.

The spirit of the times demands that we should be frank and squarely face any difficulty without attempting to stave off its solution by roundabout wording or by some such means as postponement of a crisis. Let us try to be explicit and speak out with Rooseveltian frankness. Then the article in question would read: *"The regional understanding in accordance with the Feaji principle recognized by the Members of the League are the Monroe Doctrine for the American Continent, the Sun-Never-Sets Doctrine for the British supremacy on seas, the Ishii-Lansing Doctrine for the Far East, and the Franco-Italian Doctrine for France and Italy and the neighboring countries."*

What I am going to propose is after all extremely simple. Article XXI of the Covenant, formulated as above, should be made the cardinal feature and not

something of the nature of an appendix or a corollary of the whole affair, and all other forms subordinated to it. On the other hand, as we nowadays hear so often and so much of reconstruction, there will be at least no harm in just imagining such a thing as a reconstructed Hague Tribunal. The unbiased recognition of the Feaji principle coupled with the reconstructed Hague Tribunal will give the effective and practical means of ensuring the peace of the world for the reasonable duration of time prescribed by the limit of human wisdom and foresight. Those who attempt too much and venture to go too far should be reminded of the veritable truism: No mortal is infallible nor omniscient; human weakness is coexistent with, and coextensive to, the human society.

There are men and women who pay the supreme sacrifice for their country and for the sake of their ideals. Why should not capitalists give all they have inherited or accumulated, not to say their lives? But the golden days when it becomes transparently manifest that capitalists will be willing to invest their capital for no reward but the consciousness of doing good, and when the world commerce will be carried on for the sole purpose of uniform distribution of foodstuffs and other daily necessaries, seem to recede ever so far into the realm of fairy tales.

The conception of the Feaji principle is by no means an entirely novel idea. Without doubt, it was in the mind of Roosevelt when he, shortly before his death, said with his characteristic frank-

ness and impartiality: "The American people do not intend to give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at their threshold." Herein is contained in a concise and compact form all that is essential in the principle which I have been advocating. Incidentally we may observe that the word "Asia" in the above quotation can only mean Japan as a sort of guardian for the Far East.

In one of the presidential declarations of Roosevelt will be found a passage which merits our present attention. It reads: "It is a mere truism to say that every nation which desires to maintain its independence must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it." A weak and disorderly country always quarreling within its own borders, or two or more such countries addicted to causing troubles and disputes among themselves, thereby causing damage to adjacent countries, should be policed by a big Power which knows and does the duty as an independent nation. If, however, all the big Powers, of which, I believe, there are five at present, strive, each one of them, to pose as the guardian, then it will give rise to rivalry which may lead to grave consequences. In allotting a certain region to the policing of a big Power, geographical considerations are the only criterion which is unequivocal and has the least chance of leading to ambiguous interpretations and consequent confusion.

I, for one, sincerely wish that the report is not true, but rumor has it that Senator Lodge said: "The real power of America is such in international politics that anything may be accomplished by her. Any opposition raised by America will be equal in its effect to that of all other Powers combined." Such effusions reveal a psychological state of a world dictator under cover of democracy. As a matter of course, among this "all other Powers" will be included Great Britain, and there is no wonder why some of his political friends should have wished to make it known that the tone of the current debate in the American Senate may have a dangerous effect on Anglo-American relations, but that their real intention is not to "twist the lion's tail," having been forced to take such a regrettable position by the President's course of action. However, notwithstanding all their regret and anxiety as to British susceptibility, the tone and attitude of these American politicians imply a desire for world domination by America, an ambition dreamed by Germany in the pre-war days and so strongly detested by America herself, the champion of right, justice, and fair play. For, after all, what is world domination? Is it not the predominance of a single Power over all other Powers and this single Power behaving in international politics just as she pleases, without heeding what all other Powers may think or do? It is not an aspiration, as was the case with the *ante bellum* Germany, but a dogged assertion of hegemony of the world.

The same group of American politicians seems to be inclined to putting the Monroe Doctrine high above the League of Nations. Well, I have no objection to that. But if they mean to monopolize this privilege for America alone, that is but a disguised form of a world domination of the Prussian spirit. There is no rational reason whatever why this privilege should be exclusively enjoyed by one and only one Power. All the Powers which speak words accompanied by deeds in international politics and are worthy of having this privilege, should be entitled to the same position. And the result is no more or less than the adoption of the Feaji principle as elucidated above. Once the true significance of the Feaji doctrine, as rooted in the indisputable character of human nature, is realized, I am optimistic enough to think that it will eventually meet with the hearty approval of Mr. Lodge—perhaps not of Senator Lodge who might be overheated in party feuds and strifes and whose thought glides over the surface of the happening of the hour, but of ex-Senator Lodge of some odd twenty years hence, who will then have the satisfaction of having served his country to the best of his ability as the senior senator from Massachusetts for nearly half a century, and will be enjoying his remaining years by speaking and acting in an Oyster Bay fashion, following the dictates of his free conscience and conviction in harmony with the true spirit and noble traditions of the New England States.

Before I close this article, I wish to add a few more remarks. A posthumous article entitled "The League of Nations" by Theodore Roosevelt, appearing in the *Kansas City Star,* January 13, 1919, is a memorable, precious document which will shine more brightly as years roll by. It is an instance which justifies an old saying:

"A bird sings most melodiously just before it dies;
A man speaks his best on the eve of his passing away."

Every word of this article is a gem, if I may be allowed to say so. The article contains in a compact, crystallized form almost all that which I have been striving to explain in the preceding pages.

A thing or, perhaps better expressed, an idea, which, in the words of Roosevelt, "is still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric," has been forcibly pushed into the arena of practical working by the overwhelmingly preponderant influence of the United States and by the overbearing zeal of her illustrious President at the Peace Conference. In this connection, I cannot do better than quote the words of Roosevelt somewhat in full:

"So Mr. Wilson's recent utterances give us absolutely no clew as to whether he really intends that at this moment we shall admit Russia, Germany with which, incidentally, we are still waging war, Turkey, China, and Mexico in the League on a full equality with ourselves. . . . Would it not be well to begin with the League which we actually have in

existence—the League of the Allies who have fought through this great war? . . . Then let us agree to extend the privileges of the League as rapidly as their conduct warrants it to other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a guiding part in the League and the weak nations who should be entitled to the guiding voice in the councils."

Perhaps the most remarkable passage in this most memorable document which appeared during the most critical period of human history is the sentence which reads: "Finally, make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a position of an international Meddlesome Matty." Roosevelt's contention that the future prospect of the League of Nations is *foggy,* as we all know, finds a consenting echo in the hearts of many eminent men best qualified for judging such affairs, including, among others, some who have a bitter experience of the London fog, and some others who, for long, weary four and a half years fought so strenuously with the North Sea fog.

It is beyond doubt that Roosevelt had in his mind the Feaji doctrine as I conceive it, or, if not, something very much like it. I cannot better conclude this article than by saying with him that the effort for making the world recognize the Feaji doctrine, made moderately and sanely but sincerely and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be productive of real and lasting international good.

CHAPTER III

Mikadoism: A Résumé of Professor Uyesugi's "Shinsei Nippon no Kensetsu"

By Dr. R. Oda

This article is a résumé of Professor Uyesugi's book in Japanese entitled *Shinsei Nippon no Kensetsu,* or the foundation of the True Japan. Dr. Uyesugi is Professor of Constitutional Law in the Imperial University of Tokyo. In opposition to the liberalism of Professor Yoshino, whose article appears elsewhere in this book, Dr. Uyesugi is an advocate of a political doctrine which may be called Mikadoism or Imperialism. Along with his Imperialism, he advocates the abolition of the peerage and the adoption of universal suffrage; only these liberal innovations must not follow popular agitation, but must be adopted by the gracious will of the Mikado. His book, whose authorized résumé by Mr. Oda follows, has elicited much comment and discussion in Japan, the conservatives hailing it as an expression of Japan's political ideals, the liberals denouncing it as reactionary and as the dying echo of an exploded dogma.

THIS book by Professor Uyesugi has the title of *Shinsei Nippon no Kensetsu* (The Foundation of the True Japan). Its keynote is the faith that Japan has the potentiality of great national expansion. In the present conditions of the empire, however, the author clearly reads signs of decline; he even fears that if things are left as they are, Japan may fall in no distant future. Will she fall, or rise? Now is the critical moment in her national existence. In his opinion, all this is because the

foundations of the "True Japan" are not securely laid, because the fundamental character of her polity is not developed as it ought to be. The central idea of the book is this: Japan, in order to achieve full development, has no need of adopting new institutions from Western countries, but all she has to do is to develop the best qualities of her national constitution.

In his preface Professor Uyesugi says: "Japan, which ought to be on the rise, shows a declining tendency. To my mind, this phenomenon is to be accounted for by the fact that the glory of the fundamental character of the empire has not been fully exhibited. Thus we must remove all obstacles to the development of our polity and found Japan on a true basis, that we 70,000,000 people may unite as one man and fulfill our national mission by dint of co-operation. How is this to be done? In answer to this question, I have written the present book." Then Professor Uyesugi enumerates the following six measures which he thinks must be immediately adopted:

(1) Unify National sentiment by suppressing all ideas which are inconsistent with the healthful existence of the State;

(2) Found a Greater Japan by "mobilizing" the whole nation, in order to secure peace and independence for the Orient;

(3) Encourage militarism and a system of universal conscription by every possible means;

(4) Devise measures to reconcile Capital with

Labor and develop Japan's industrial power to a maximum;

(5) Establish the Japan-for-Japanese principle and revise the present Civil Code, which is based on individualism, in accordance with the criterion of the nationalistic ideals proper to the Japanese, and also *abolish the peerage;*

(6) Overthrow the democratic form of parliamentarism and bring "centripetal Mikadoism" to its full play in national politics, and *also adopt a universal suffrage system.*

At the bottom of Professor Uyesugi's ideas lies the faith that the Mikado is descended from the *Kami* (God) and that the Mikado himself represents the *Kami.* According to the professor, the Japanese people must be united by the common faith that the all-governing *Kami* holds sovereignty. By acting in absolute obedience to the Emperor's commands, every Japanese may attain the ultimate object of his or her existence and derive the greatest amount of happiness from his or her individual life. When the whole people believe and act thus, an ideal polity will have been realized.

No man exists by himself. He *coexists* with innumerable others in his relation to space and time. This is what Professor Uyesugi calls the space- and time-relationship of human coexistence. That all his philosophy of State and Law centers on this idea may be readily seen from a perusal of his other works. Briefly, he thinks that the development of the dual relationship of human existence and

that of the individual ego condition each other. This correlativity of the two groups of phenomena he calls morality. In the State, the development of the space- and time-relationship of human coexistence must attain the greatest possible degree, and our professor would say with Plato that the State is, and ought to be, the highest form of morality. Another fundamental principle in Professor Uyesugi's philosophy is that the development of the dual relationship in the State is caused by its "organization will." Sovereignty exists as a means of giving expression to this "organization will." In an ideal polity, he reasons, the sovereign expresses its exact "organization will," thereby developing to perfection the space- and time-relationship of human coexistence.

The professor goes into details in his critical discussion of the democratic systems in the West, and arrives at the conclusion that the ideals of democracy can never be realized through government by the people. Again, he finds a great failure in the monarchism in Europe. He considers the essential character and historical development of European monarchism, and shows that it is not fit for the realization of an ideal state. It is only natural that it should be on the decline. He declares that only the Japanese race ruled over by the Mikado can hope to construct an ideal polity.

The Emperor, according to Dr. Uyesugi, is a *Kami* in the racial creed of the Japanese. As such, he is capable of unmistakably expressing the "organ-

ization will" of the whole nation; hence, the Japanese word *Shiru* (literally, *to know*), which signifies *to rule*. The will of the Mikado is the "organization will" of our race. If, therefore, the people act in obedience to the Imperial orders, the space- and time-relationship of their coexistence can be developed to perfection, which is a condition necessary for the realization of an ideal state.

In this country, the will of the whole, which can never be expressed through majority vote, is expressed by the Emperor. The interests of the nation, in perfect unison with the interests of its individual members, are promoted by the exercise of his sovereign powers. This can not be expected in any country where sovereignty vests in the people. Thus, the true ideals of democracy can be realized only in Japan. Only in this country can the interests of the individual coincide with those of the public, and this because the Mikado, who is revered as a god, holds sovereignty. Only in Japan can the will of the individual consistently be the will of the whole nation, for every Japanese believes that his or her individual ego can be developed to a maximum through obeying the Emperor.

The *Kojiki*, which was compiled in 712 A.D., is the oldest annals of Japanese history and the scripture of our national faith. According to that document, Dai Nippon is an extension of the ideal state in Heaven. So believed our ancestors; so do we still believe, and this faith is the foundation stone of our racial unity. The author of the *Kojiki* tells how

Amaterasu-O-Mikami, the sovereign in Heaven, sent his grandson down to this country for the purpose of founding another ideal state on the earth, and how he willed that his direct descendants should be emperors of Japan from generation to generation. Hence, Japan ought to be the ideal state on the earth. By absolutely obeying the Mikado, who is a descendant of the *Kami,* every Japanese could perfect his or her "self" and attain to the ideal virtue. Japan should be a state representing the highest form of morality in the truest sense. The empire was founded, not by conquest, but on the basis of morality. The famous Rescript on Education issued by Emperor Meiji is the canon of Japanese moral philosophy, and says at the beginning: "Our Imperial Ancestors founded Our Empire on a basis of broad and everlasting and deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have generation by generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education." Thus, Japan was founded by implanting virtue, certainly not by conquest.

The community of interest and purpose between the Emperor and the people is the glory of our national polity. The former does not possess a particle of selfishness. His interests are at one with those of the people. Nor does his will conflict with the people's. The Japanese believe that the best way of self-protection is by acting in absolute obedience to their Emperor, and they are willing to sacri-

fice their lives for his sake. Japanese history is full of noble instances of self-sacrifice both on the part of emperors and on the part of subjects.

All Japanese are loyal subjects of the Emperor. In being Japanese they are all equals. For this reason there should be no class distinction in the country.

The Japanese people, the Japanese state, and the Japanese Mikado are an inseparable trinity. The three were born at the same time. If they must die, therefore, they must die at the same time. As long as the race exists, the Japanese state will exist under the sovereignty of the Mikado. Without him, there can be no Japanese state, nor the Japanese nation. When he founded the empire, Amaterasu-O-Mikami said: "The *Tenno* (Mikado) shall be permanent as heaven and earth." And his words were true. The line of our emperors has come down unbroken for more than two thousand and five hundred years. Foreigners may wonder at this; they may call it a miracle. To us this is only a matter of course.

Boasting of a polity, the fundamental character of which makes it possible for the ideals of humankind to be realized therein, the ultimate desire of the Japanese is to see the whole world unified according to their standard. This desire was well expressed in the words of Jimmu Tenno, our first Emperor, who ascended the throne in 660 B.C. He said, "The world shall be our metropolis; the universe shall be our realm."

Japan in her true color is such an ideal state.

Her polity is calculated for the attainment of the ideals of man. In Japan, the space- and time-relationship of human coexistence can attain to perfection; here morality can be developed to the highest stage; here the ideal of liberty and equality can be realized; here, in fact, real peace can be promoted, both spiritually and materially.

Professor Uyesugi, after proving this by facts in Japanese history, emphasizes that half a century ago, at the beginning of the reign of Meiji Tenno, Japan seemed to follow a course very favorable for the establishment of the nation on a true basis, and that the fundamental national policy was fixed by the late Emperor and his advisers, who co-operated in successfully preparing the nation for great expansion.

Through the Restoration, there was established a system calculated to remove all obstacles to direct Imperial rule and for increasing the Mikado's powers to a maximum. A plan was also formed for co-ordinating the Mikado's powers with the powers of the people so as to promote our national glory. Since then we have carried out the plan for more than half a century. It was with this object in view that the Constitution was established and that wars were waged with China and Russia, which marked Japan's entering the stage of world drama. By her own exertion, she secured an important position in international politics. At last there came an opportunity of realizing in the world the ideals of the Japanese race, of the Founders of the Nation.

Professor Uyesugi is one of the most enthusiastic

Japanese expansionists. He tries to open the eyes of his fellow countrymen to the actual state of things in Japan. He declares emphatically that Japan has deteriorated. By way of warning the people he points out certain of her diplomatic failures. The last half century of Japanese history is called by him the period of passive diplomacy, during which Japan has shrunk from every obstacle she encountered in the path of national expansion. Thus, things have come to a very sad plight. According to this patriotic scholar, it was not by Japan's independent will, but by the pressure brought by certain Western Powers to bear upon her, that the country was opened to foreign intercourse some fifty years ago. Their real object in coming to knock at our doors was evidently to subjugate Japan, or capture a part of her territory. Fortunately she escaped what would have been the greatest national calamity. But then she learned to fear Westerners, whose pleasure she began to consult in a very timorous manner. Given such a start, it was only natural that her diplomacy should be the reverse of firmness throughout the half century that followed. In the earliest days of the Meiji Era, every foreign representative who came over here acted most arrogantly toward our government and people as if he were a governor-general resident in some colony. I will not trespass upon my readers' patience by undertaking a full explanation of those facts which in the professor's judgment constituted Japan's diplomatic failures; but I shall confine myself to giving only two of them.

Though we were victors in the Japan-China War, yet we were obliged to retrocede Liaotung by the forced intervention of Russia, France, and Germany. Again, in spite of the great victory we won in our later war with Russia, which had deliberately provoked conflict, we could not obtain even a cent of indemnity.

Professor Uyesugi thinks that the anti-Japanese agitation going on in China is a result of our weak-kneed diplomacy. We were the first to declare the "open door" principle and to espouse the cause of its territorial integrity. Our policy toward China has remained unchanged to this day. In plain English, it is in the interest of our own independence that we wish our neighbor a healthful development. We believe that Japan and China have common interests in endeavoring to promote peace and freedom in the East. Had China been divided among the Western Powers, Japan's national existence would have been endangered. China has escaped ruin because of Japan's efforts and Japan has maintained her independence because of China's continued existence as an independent nation. So it has been in the past. So will it be in the future. The two must join hands and try strenuously to secure peace and freedom for the Orient. Why, then, has China come to be anti-Japanese? Merely because she does not fully recognize her friend's power. So the professor emphasizes the necessity of impressing upon China Japan's ability to maintain the peace of the East, in order that the Chinese may see the wisdom

of co-operating with her, and he argues that Japan ought to complete her armament for the preservation of peace in the Orient, and for no other purposes.

It is a matter of great regret to him that the struggle for administrative power carried on in various forms since the beginning of the Meiji Era should result in a waste of national energy, which otherwise might have been directed abroad. Professor Uyesugi dwells upon this internal struggle during the past fifty odd years and warns the people to awake to the urgent need of co-operation for their country's sake. Especially emphatic is he in his disapproval of political parties. He complains bitterly that the Japanese nation lacks the sense of self-importance, the importance of the virtues, the culture, the civilization, the institutions indigenous to Japan. He does not deprecate the beneficial influence imparted to Japanese civilization by Western jurisprudence and political science introduced into this country, but expresses his deepest regret at the fact that the national spirit has thereby lost vigor, that among the Japanese the idea of nationality has weakened considerably, and that their national pride has waned. All this has been caused by the influence of individualism, materialism, Christianity, etc., which were introduced into Japan from the West. Thus, the last fifty years have been fifty years of apish activities. Professor Uyesugi urges that the Japanese must now cease imitating and set to work for the re-foundation of their state on a true basis.

Japan must be re-founded on a true basis. Other-

wise she would be drowned in the vortex of world movement and lose her *raison d'être*. Time has come for us Japanese to make the greatest efforts. If we do not awaken to the realities of national deterioration and restore to ourselves the spirit of the Founders of the Nation, we are a doomed people.

But Japan must not fall. If she is not to fall, she must become a greater Japan. In view of the situation of the world, Japan could not continue to exist as she is. But she has in her the qualities of an ideal state; she must not sink into ruin, but must rise. If she is to save her Asiatic neighbors, if she is to maintain and promote peace in this part of the globe, Japan must establish a hegemony of Asia and become strong enough to hold her stand against the Western Powers.

But the attainment of this aim is by no means easy. Our country is limited in area; our population is small; our natural resources are meager. In spite of all these limitations, we are to aspire for the hegemony of the Orient. Our only resort is the firmness of national purpose. Some day Japan may find herself standing alone amidst the Western Powers. But if we are afraid of that eventuality, no great things can be achieved.

The physical powers of 70,000,000 Japanese must work with the greatest efficiency. It is necessary for the whole nation to become united, to be "mobilized" for the purposes of expansion. Thus, Professor Uyesugi advocates militarism, sings the praise of warlike spirit, and emphatically preaches that every

male Japanese ought to share the honor and responsibility of serving the State as a soldier. And he has formed a practical plan for making the universal conscription system effective.

The wealth of the people must be utilized also in a nationalistic spirit. Every individual's capital essentially forms part of the State's capital: private ownership can only exist in the interests of public good. The larger the capital available, the larger its efficiency. Therefore, Japanese capital, which is comparatively small in its total amount, needs to be organized in a suitable way so that its efficiency may be increased to a maximum. This theory holds good also with regard to labor. The individual should not work actuated by selfishness, but, as a member of the State, must always look to its general interests. No strife between capital and labor ought to take place in Japan. In view of this, adequate measures must be adopted for reconciling capital with labor and making them serve broader national purposes.

Professor Uyesugi believes that real progress presupposes conservatism and is very emphatic in defending it. Since the system of laws now obtaining in Japan is a mere imitation of the Western one based on individualism, it must, he insists, be thoroughly reformed according to the requirements of nationalism. The present law of property pays too much respect to the rights of the individual and exaggerates the freedom of contract. The law must be superseded by a new system founded on a nationalistic basis. He argues for a radical reform of the

system of local self-government as well as the laws of family relations and succession. Especially worth mentioning is his attitude toward the institution of peerage. In former times, all the people were placed on an equal footing in this country, and it was by imitating the European system that peers were first created in our country during the Meiji period. The State of Japan is a co-operative society the members of which should be equals. While the Emperor is an august personage, all his subjects should be compeers. To maintain any privileged class among them means a violation of the fundamental principles of our polity. Therefore, the professor concludes, the peerage must be done away with.

The measures proposed by him with a view to the revival of the true Japan are too many-sided to be enumerated here; but the fact that he espouses the cause of universal suffrage must not be omitted. The professor holds a unique position among the advocates of the popular movement now being conducted in this country. For he argues in favor of universal suffrage from a standpoint quite different from that of others, which is democratic. Professor Uyesugi believes that the adoption of the system is in accordance with the fundamental character of the empire. Let all the people participate in the business of promoting national development; let them co-operate and serve their beloved Emperor.

CHAPTER IV

Japan's Defective Constitutional Government

By Yukio Ozaki

Mr. Ozaki, the leader of political liberalism in Japan, was born in 1859 in a village near Yokohama. In his early twenties he became famous as a journalist. In 1879 he was appointed Junior Secretary to the Board of Statistics. In 1881 he resigned this post and became one of the leaders of the Kaishinto, the progressive party, just organized by Count Okuma. When Okuma formed a Cabinet in 1898, Ozaki accepted the portfolio of Minister of Education, but he was soon obliged to resign because of his alleged advocacy of republican ideas. From 1903 to 1912 he was Mayor of Tokyo. Mr. Ozaki is an eloquent speaker as well as a forceful writer. He has been criticized severely for his frequent change of party affiliations, but he insists that principles are more important than party allegiance. This article is a part of a long essay written in Japanese by Mr. Ozaki and published in 1917 in a Tokyo newspaper in installments. The whole essay was translated by Professor J. E. de Becker, of Keio University, Tokyo, and was published in book form by Messrs. Kelly and Walsh of Yokohama in 1918. Perhaps he had in mind his unfortunate resignation in 1898 in making obvious attempts in this article to vindicate his loyalty to the Imperial House.

UNDER the present political system in Japan a military or naval man is entitled to assume any official position in addition to military duties which are properly attached to his profession; that is, he is qualified to be Minister or Vice Minister of Education, Finance, or Agriculture and Commerce—

branches of administration which are far removed from things military; while at the same time, a civilian is absolutely disqualified for the post of Minister or Vice Minister of War or the Navy, and the Governor-General of Korea, Formosa, or Kwangtung. [Since 1919 the last named three posts have been open to civilians.] In this manner, an inequality like that which exists between the conqueror and the conquered has been established between civil and military officers. In the civil service, officials who are personally appointed by the Emperor are so few in number that they can be counted on the fingers of both hands; but in the military service there are several scores of such, including Governors-General of various colonies, Commanders of Divisions, Commanders of Naval Stations, etc.

In view of the very nature of his official position, the Minister President ought not only to have knowledge of all affairs of state, but their general control as well. As a matter of fact, however, military and naval officers are authorized to approach the Emperor upon affairs of state directly and not through the medium of the Minister President, and obtain decisions thereon from the Throne. For example, the project for a great expansion of the army and navy subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War was first decided upon by the military and naval authorities, who then obtained approval thereof direct from the Emperor; and it was only later that the matter was referred to the Minister President. Thus the Minister President had no part whatever in the decision of

schemes of national defense which are intimately related to the most important of affairs of state, diplomacy, and finance, but had the honor [*sic*] of being notified of the result only after the question had been finally disposed of! Besides, the War and Navy Departments are empowered to issue "military ordinances," which are administrative acts unrecognized by the Constitution; (down to 1907 the matters dealt with by such ordinances were provided for by Imperial Ordinances). They have also a Board of Marshals and Admirals (*Gensui-fu*), and a Military Council (*Gunji Sangi-in*), etc.—organizations which are all intended to afford special protection to the military power. These are only a few of innumerable and clear proofs showing the rampancy of the military clique and the inequality of the civil and military services.

From these few instances, it will be realized how the alleged equality of all classes of the people is a mere hollow phrase intended to deceive fools. And with such an unfair institutional disparity between even the civil and military services—which are alike parts of the same government—can it be wondered that a similar state of things should exist between the bureaucracy and party politicians?

The examples quoted above merely indicate unfairness and inequality in laws and ordinances, but when we come to consider how such laws and ordinances are enforced, the partiality displayed is simply astonishing. Even among military officers, all recipients of special protection, those who belong to the

privileged clans, or have been "naturalized" in them, are promoted over the heads of their equals and enjoy many other favorable distinctions, while those who have no connection with such clans have little opportunity for proving their abilities, and not a few promising young officers belonging to the latter group are dismissed in the course of their career. It is a reprehensible practice engendered by the long tenure of power by certain clans; and although it is gradually on the wane, yet it is far from being extinct; for what wonder is there if, after they have dared openly to set up such inequality and unfairness in the legal system, these privileged clansmen should clandestinely bend and twist the laws to suit their own ends?

The remnants of the group of politicians representing certain clan influence have transformed themselves into a military and bureaucratic clique, their policy being to maintain by legal means the power remaining to them. The strife between the civil and the military service, represented by Princes Ito and Yamagata, respectively, resulted in the special protection which is legally accorded to the military clique. But when it came to a struggle between officialdom and the people, both were found on the same side and the same clan, with interests almost in common. Thus, the *Ordinance Concerning the Appointment of Civil Officials, the Civil Service Regulations,* etc., were enacted, and special protection was extended to persons of bureaucratic origin, while party politicians were placed in an exceedingly

unfair and invidious position. I will here give just one example of the fact.

According to the present system, all officials of each department, from Vice Minister down, must be men of certain official experience. Such being the case, a party leader, who is ordered to organize a cabinet, is first confronted with the difficulty of finding Ministers of War and the Navy, as well as Vice Ministers and so forth. He is thus obliged to recommend men, who have for many years been supported by the military clique, as candidates for Ministers of War and the Navy, and to fill the posts of Vice Ministers and many minor offices with men of the same class, so that a statesman of party origin who finds himself at the head of a department is a Minister of State in name only; as a matter of fact he is a veritable prisoner in the enemy's camp, his secretary being the only official he can trust. No matter how able such a statesman may be, what can he possibly achieve when he finds himself surrounded by a Vice Minister and other subordinates who have for many years received favors from his political enemy —the group of officials representing certain clan or bureaucratic influence, arrayed against him both in ideals and sentiment?

A clan or bureaucratic politician, however, can fill the posts of Ministers of War and the Navy as well as those of Vice Ministers and other officials with men whom he has favored and befriended during many years. Is not this a glaring inequality and unfairness in our institutions? And it has all been set

up for the purpose of protecting certain clan influence and crushing political parties.

Such is the present state of the political stage in this country. The stage is not one which has been arranged for the statesmen of the empire in general, but for those politicians who represent certain clan cliques and the bureaucracy—a very convenient arrangement for the latter, but a most inconvenient and disadvantageous one for the statesmen of the country at large. What I hope and struggle for is a stage on which *all* Japanese subjects can equally enjoy the same facilities.

I do not demand absolute equality between the civil and military services. These services would be on a truly equal footing if a civilian was qualified to be Chief of the General Staff or Commander of an Army, just as a military or naval officer is qualified to become Prime Minister, but I do not ask for this. Also there would be true equality between the two services, if affairs of state, other than military, were dealt with exclusively by civilians, while military affairs are, as is actually the case, left entirely in charge of military men; but I do not demand this either.

I do not object to military men having charge of affairs of state other than military, even though civilians may be excluded from any share in military affairs. All I say is that the posts of administrative chiefs and second chiefs of the Departments of War and the Navy should be open to civilians as well as to military men. I only maintain that the prohibitive notice "No Admittance to Civilians" now hung on

the gates of these administrative offices should be taken down. Even though the notice in question be taken down and civilians and military men placed on an equal footing in regard to these administrative posts, it follows as a matter of course that if a military officer should be found to be the better qualified for any such post, the appointment would go to him. I only object to putting administrative affairs other than military legally and exclusively in the hands of military men. I do not insist upon the total abolition of the present *Ordinance Concerning the Appointment of Civil Officials* and *Civil Service Regulations,* etc., but only that a distinction should be drawn between political and routine affairs, and that while political officials may change with the Cabinet, routine officials should remain in office for life. This is necessary not merely for the purpose of abolishing the special-protection system set up in the interests of certain clan cliques and of bureaucracy, but also for the maintenance of the dignity of officials and the prevention of delay in administering affairs of state. It was for this reason that the Okuma Cabinet organized a system by which a Chief and Vice Administrator were appointed in each department. These administrators were "political officials" who came in, and went out of, power with the Cabinet. Though this system left much to be desired, yet it produced the following results:

(1) It put an end to the unseemly practice of Vice Ministers and chiefs of bureaus being appointed government commissioners in Parliament, and being

forced to defend a policy often opposed to that which they had supported under a previous Cabinet;

(2) Subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War, the Vice Ministers of departments usually went out whenever there was a change of Cabinets, yet on the occasion of the resignation of the Okuma Cabinet, a majority of the Vice Ministers remained in office and thereby showed they were regarded as permanent officials;

(3) As a consequence, the daily routine of the department was not obstructed by the change of Cabinet;

(4) Prior to the Okuma Cabinet the Vice Ministers and chiefs of bureaus in each department having been obliged always to be in the House during the sittings of the Diet, caused delay in the execution of departmental work. The appointment of Regular and Vice "Administrators" was the first step in removing this evil.

The Terauchi Cabinet, however, has not merely failed to improve this laudable system, but has appointed party members to the posts of Vice Ministers. On the occasion of the last general election governors of prefectures and chiefs of districts were involved in the whirlpool of a political contest, to the utter confusion of political and routine affairs. Should this evil not be remedied now, the displacement of a large number of permanent officials, and the consequent paralyzing delay in daily and ordinary affairs of state, will follow as an unavoidable result of a change of Cabinets.

But it is not the object of this work to discuss the matter in detail. I will now return to the topic under discussion—the present condition of the political stage of this country. We have already seen how unfairly it is constructed. In the contest between the civil and the military, special protection is legally accorded to the latter; while in that between the bureaucracy and party politicians, special protection is legally accorded to the former. It is therefore impossible for civilians and party politicians to fight and deal with their opponents on the stage of politics on an equal footing. Civilians and party politicians must face military men and bureaucratic politicians, who enjoy many special privileges, and thus the principle of the survival of the fittest has no chance to operate; a Cabinet does not stand or fall because it is intrinsically strong or weak or because it has or lacks administrative ability. Even incapable and unworthy men may win the day if they belong to certain clan cliques and enjoy special legal protection; while those who are not so privileged must always be beaten though possessed of greater ability than that of their opponents. It is due to this fact that during the past fifty years all the rest of the country together has found itself no match for merely two provinces, Satsuma and Chōshū. It has been my constant aim to reform this illogical and unfair condition so as to enable all subjects of the empire to fight in the political arena on an equal footing, so that the fit may win and the unfit lose, and persons endowed with superior political sagacity may assume

the reins of government, while the inferior will withdraw from office. In this way, the conduct of the affairs of state will always be in the hands of able and superior men. How much happier would this be for the country, as compared with the present condition where we find special protection extended to weak and inferior men who monopolize political power simply because they belong to certain clan cliques. My contention is that free competition is always a source of improvement and progress, while special protection is a cause of stagnation, rottenness, and corruption.

Some people are apt to emphasize the seriousness of the present international outlook, and suggest the advisability of deferring to deal with this fundamental question until a later and more convenient time; but this is a mistaken view. A workman who desires to do his work well must first of all sharpen his tools, and I maintain that on such an unjust, partial, unequal stage as the present it is utterly impossible even for the greatest statesman to do justice to his abilities.

The third article of the Imperial oath on the Restoration (1868) reads: "All persons, from officials down to the common people, shall be enabled to carry out their wishes for all good purposes, and the national mind prevented from growing weary and dejected." When we reflect upon the inequality existing between the civil and military sections of the administration, the oppression to which party politicians are subject, the rampancy

of certain clansmen, and the weariness and dejection weighing heavily upon the minds of the people as a consequence, I cannot but feel inspired with great awe and admiration for the Imperial oath to which I have just referred.

If the present state of political parties in this country is compared with what it was thirty odd years ago when they were first organized, the progress in organization, training, discipline, and influence is extraordinary. But much is still to be desired. The following may be mentioned among the existing defects:

(1) Little importance is attached to principles and political views;

(2) They are too deeply influenced by historical and sentimental considerations;

(3) They are apt to lose sight of their main object in their eagerness to gain power;

(4) They are, as political parties, devoid of the sense of justice.

But these remarks of mine must not be quoted as pleas for the defense of certain clan cliques. I make them simply because I have spent all the best years of my life for the development of party government which I love deeply and sincerely, and I desire nothing better than to see its perfect realization. I freely admit that political parties have many defects, but they are few, indeed, compared with those of clan cliques and a bureaucracy.

I am often asked by visitors from Europe and America as to differences between the programs

of the various political parties of this country. On every occasion I feel ashamed and know not what answer to make, for what difference is there between the programs of the Seiyū-Kwai and the Kensei-Kwai, the two principal parties at the present day? It is not merely foreign visitors who are puzzled over the matter. For even the leaders of the parties themselves must find it far from easy to answer the question. Much more so must be the case with the rank and file. One party knows only how to denounce and attack the other, as if they were the foes of their own fathers, and that merely on historical and sentimental grounds. But they are not to blame for this. The fact is that there is no clear distinction between the party programs. Not only is there no clear distinction between them, but in desiring to pull down the clan cliques and establish a party government, the objects and interests of both parties have always been identical. But they cannot take common action even for this common object; they have alternately joined forces with their enemy and attacked each other, thus benefiting the clan clique, their common enemy. The two great parties in this country have—from the time they were known as *Jiyū-tō* (Liberals) and *Kaishin-tō* (Progressionists) to this day, when they bear the names of *Seiyū-Kwai* and *Kensei-Kwai* respectively, that is, for the long period of thirty-six or seven years—invariably repeated this foolish proceeding, and that is the reason why the clique still contrives to retain power in its own hands. Should the two parties take

common action for the achievement of common objects, it would be the easiest thing in the world for them to crush the clan clique and inaugurate a new era of party government. After the remnant of that clique has been driven out and a fair and equal political stage erected, the two parties may compete under the banner of their respective fixed principles and views, the fittest winning the day and the less fit losing. Under this new system the winners will form a Cabinet according to Imperial command, while the defeated will retire and plan for resuming the fight. Is not that a manly task for manly men? How much wiser and more advantageous will it be for the parties to act in such a way, instead of alternately taking sides with the clan politicians and weakening the very foundation of the political parties?

The hereditary policy of China has been to keep on friendly terms with distant countries and attack its neighbors—a policy that has always caused the downfall of her dynasties one after another. The two principal parties in this country have followed the same foolish policy for more than thirty years; and even now they are not fully awake to the mistake, and to the necessity of retrieving it. How can they laugh at the foolish policy of friendship for distant countries and hostility toward neighbors, as pursued by Chinese statesmen? Here in the Orient we have had political factions but no political party. A political party is an association of people having for its exclusive object the discussion of public affairs

of state and the enforcement of their views thereon. But when political parties are transplanted into the East, they at once partake of the nature of factions, pursuing private and personal interests, instead of the interests of the state—as witnessed by the fact of their joining hands by turns with the clan cliques or using the construction of railways, ports and harbors, schools, etc., as means for extending party influence. Besides, the customs and usages of feudal times are so deeply impressed upon the minds of men here that even the idea of political parties, as soon as it enters the brains of our countrymen, is influenced by feudal notions. Such being the case, even political parties, which should be based and dissolved solely on principle and political views, are really affairs of personal connections and sentiments, the relations between the leader and the members of a party being similar to those which subsisted between a feudal lord and his liegemen. A politician scrupulous enough to join or desert a party for the sake of principle is denounced as a political traitor or renegade. That political faith should be kept not toward its leader or its officers but toward its principles and views is not understood. They foolishly think the proverb *"A faithful servant never serves two masters; a chaste wife never sees two husbands"* is equally applicable to the members of a political party. In their erroneous opinion, it is a loyal act on the part of a member of a party to change his principles and views in accordance with orders from headquarters, while in the event of headquarters

changing their views it is unfaithful to desert them. The ideas governing the relations between a feudal lord and his vassals, or those between a chief of gamblers and his following, call for blind obedience to commands without regard to right or wrong or good or evil. No wonder that, trained and disciplined by such a conception, a political party should be turned into a personal faction, and devote itself exclusively to the extension of its own influence, heedless of principles and views!

It is said that the citron tree which grows south of the Yangtze becomes a *karatachi* (*Aegle sepiaria*) when transplanted to the country north of that river. In like manner, is it in the nature of things that a political party, acting in accordance with the dictate of principles, should, when transplanted to the Orient, become a personal faction which pays no special regard to principles and views? There are among members of a party many who strenuously denounce any assistance rendered to another party by prefectural governors and other officials, but defend the practice when directed for the benefit of their own party. Think of the danger of having the affairs of state controlled by men whose mental attitude is so unfair! Political parties are, however, organized by the people. No party can exist apart from the people. So if the parties are defective, it shows there are defects in the people. If the nation is rich in political wisdom and virtue, it will be impossible for bad political parties to continue their existence. While the voters inflicted a severe blow

upon the Seiyū-Kwai at the general election of 1915, the same voters dealt a signal blow upon the opposite party at the general election two years later, and enabled the Seiyū-Kwai to regain much of its lost ground. The only apparent reason for this is that at the time of the former election the Seiyū-Kwai was in the opposition, while in the latter it was on the side of the government; and from this fact, it will be seen what a hold the idea of slavish respect for the government and contempt for the people still retains upon the minds of the masses. It is small wonder that political parties, as well as other institutions and bodies, should have failed to achieve any marked development. At this rate of progress, the realization of a true constitutional government seems to lie in the dim and distant future.

CHAPTER V

Liberalism in Japan

By Professor Sakuzo Yoshino

Dr. Yoshino is Professor of Political Science at the Tokyo Imperial University and is generally regarded as a leader of that section of Japan's rising generation which is imbued with liberal ideals. He is an exponent of liberal political theory in Japan as opposed to the conservative school. He is comparatively young among the professors of the Imperial University, being only a few years past forty. This paper was read before a meeting of foreign residents in Tokyo in the spring of 1920.

MY purpose is to speak on the thought life of the students with whom I constantly come in contact. Since the problems most often discussed these days concern Japan's relationship with China and Korea, I shall begin with these questions.

It is evident that the strain between China and Japan is very great. As a Japanese, I deeply regret that Japan is not well thought of in China and Korea. I realize that the Japanese Government has been in the wrong in some of her dealings with China and Korea. The students as a rule recognize this. The excuse that is made for the regrettable things that have taken place in China and Korea is that it is the outgrowth of militarism. Yet another thing that must be recognized

is that the opposition to such policies by the people of Japan has been very weak.

Although we criticize the militarism of the government and also the weak attitude of the people in opposing what the government is doing, we have to recognize that there are historical reasons for that militarism as well as for the weakness of the people in opposing it. If we look back over the history of the past fifty years we can not fail to see these historical reasons.

The Japanese nation has had in the main an isolated existence. Its contact with foreign nations has been the exception rather than the rule. Whenever Japan has come into contact with foreign nations she has imitated such nations. She has imitated especially such things as may seem most important in the country with which she may come in contact. When Japan came into contact with China, she was impressed by her literature and various institutions. These were the things that Japan immediately imitated. Later, when Japan came into touch with the Western world, the thing that stood forth most prominently was militarism.

At the end of the Tokugawa period when Japan opened relations with the foreign world, it was the power of militarism which impressed her most forcibly. The ships that came from the south were warships. The ships that came from America were warships. The ships that came from Russia were warships. The idea that the Japanese got was that militarism was the only thing worth while. To

them, militarism and foreign countries were synonymous. If one reads books that were published at that time introducing the West to the Japanese, that was the point of view from which they were written and that was the impression given to the public. Their minds were made in that groove through reading the books which were available at that time. The men who at that time went abroad to study, the men who are the older men in political and military life to-day, came back stressing the need of making Japan wealthy and strong, not from the spiritual but from the material point of view, in order that Japan might be able to withstand the pressure from the West along militaristic lines. This came to be a national ideal that was pressed home upon the people by her leaders at every opportunity. Therefore, we must acknowledge that there are good reasons for the stand of the government, and for the weakness of the people in their opposition to militarism. It was thus that the development of a wealthy nation and a strong army became the highest political ideal of the time.

It, therefore, follows that the type of men considered most useful for those times differs from that of to-day. It is sad to have to say this, but the young men of Japan to-day who have high ideals find among the old leaders very few men whom they can respect when they consider their moral character and their moral ideals. The fact that these older leaders were successful in the lines which they took up blinded them to their weak-

nesses. Take for instance the war with China, the Boxer disturbance, and the war with Russia. It was through the efforts and the policies of these men that Japan won in these three struggles. These men were successful. They made Japan rich; they made her strong; they brought her to the place where she could stand beside the nations of the West. For the same reasons that Germany's militarism brought about her collapse and turned out in the end to be the greatest calamity that could possibly have occurred to her, the success of these men has been a calamity to the Japanese nation.

Among the politicians, however, there have been men who have held advanced views. Such men as Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye belong to this class. Looking back at them from a moral standpoint, there are things which we wish they would have done better, yet when they had power and influence they were fighting against the reactionary feeling of their times. To-day Prince Yamagata is a leader of the conservative forces. When you consider the men who occupy actual places of power to-day, you find them men who were educated at the time when militarism was at its height. Their minds were formed in the groove of that time. Their whole outlook on life was formed along those lines. When I was in the primary school, we were taught that the missionaries were here to take Japan for the West. In a song that was sung by the children it was said that even if there was such a thing as international law, it amounted to nothing. The thing that

counted was strength, and the policy was to get the best of those with whom Japan was coming into contact from without.

To-day there is a partial awakening, but it is only an awakening in spots. Some of the politicians have awakened to the fact that if they carry out a high-handed policy in China it will react against them. Others have awakened to the fact that if they carry out a high-handed policy in Korea there will be an uprising. It is an awakening in spots only, not a real, broad, extensive awakening.

What I have been speaking of thus far is the bureaucratic class. When you come to consider the people, you find that there has gradually grown among the people a reaction against the bureaucratic class, and a reaction also against its despotism—a reaction which has become apparent in various forms. Then gradually, and perhaps unconsciously, this changed to a reaction against militarism. The reaction, which first appeared as a reaction against despotism, has gradually changed until to-day we can recognize it as a reaction against militarism, that is, speaking of the people at large.

The earliest evidence of this reaction occurred in the political movements in the early years of Meiji, when the people began to want relations with foreign nations, and began to organize political movements to obtain such relations. Then they wanted a constitutional government. When you come to about the 20th year of Meiji (1887) this took the form of a demand for a more democratic form of

constitutional government. These were the two outstanding political movements which were an evidence of this reaction. During and after the war with Russia this reaction against the despotic form of government became so evident that there developed a still stronger desire for democratic rule in Japan and the people began to organize political movements to obtain that end.

Of course Japan was greatly influenced by changes that were taking place in the West at the same time. If you study Western history you find that at the close of the nineteenth century militarism was giving way, and this strongly influenced Japan. Especially along the line of social studies tremendous changes were taking place in the West, and this reacted immediately upon Japan. The new attitude in the West toward political affairs and the new study of social questions also struck a responsive note on this side. Instead of simply opposing the bureaucratic government a new thought became manifest in Japan tinctured with these new social and political ideas of the West. This was a real contribution from Western countries to the life of Japan.

When you study the early history of constitutionalism in Japan, change of Cabinets was simply a change among the bureaucrats themselves. It was not a change that gave any evidence of the voice of the people having anything to do with it. One bureaucratic Premier simply followed another. A change of Cabinet meant very little so far as the people were concerned. In the 31st year of Meiji

(1898) there came into being a Cabinet which represented the people for the first time, a Cabinet which did not represent the bureaucrats. From that time it has been a bureaucratic Cabinet *versus* a people's Cabinet. When a people's Cabinet falls a bureaucratic Cabinet comes into power. This is an evidence of progress. To the outsider the progress may seem very small, and yet, when looked at from the inside, it stands for progress of a very real nature. It shows that public opinion has begun to be felt in the life of the nation.

This growing power of the people brought on a great question, especially among the conservatives. We must acknowledge that the problem which this brought to the conservatives proceeded from unselfish motives. That question was the question of military defense. Even to-day Prince Yamagata believes this to be the biggest thing to be considered in the life of the nation. Compared with this question all other questions are small. If the people get in power and a people's Cabinet holds power in its hands, the danger is that sufficient funds will not be provided to maintain a proper military machine. The people have always grudged money that has gone to building up a military machine and to maintaining military defense. The result is that in the 42d year of Meiji (1909) the bureaucratic Cabinet took the position that this question of building a military machine and maintaining military defense were entirely different from other political questions. They cannot be considered in the same class. While the

people may be able to deal with other political questions, it takes militarists to deal with military questions. The result was that in the 42d year of Meiji (1909) a law was inaugurated which separated the two and put the matter of military defense in a class by itself. It is this distinction which has brought upon Japan many difficult questions which she is now called upon to solve.

This military ordinance that was passed in Meiji 42 (1909) brought on a great change. Up to that time administrative matters were divided into two classes. Certain questions must be brought to the Diet, submitted to the Diet, and passed by the Diet. Others need not be submitted to the Diet for action, but questions could be asked by members of the Diet and answers must be given. Ministers of different departments were compelled to give information asked by the Diet.

But the military ordinance of 1909 provides that in certain matters plans could be carried out by appealing directly to the Emperor. It was not necessary to submit them to the Diet. Neither had members of the Diet a right to ask questions on such matters. The Minister of the Navy or the Minister of War could, without consulting the Premier or other members of the Cabinet, carry out a plan over the Premier's head and bring a law into effect. The reason was that as long as the Cabinet was in the hands of the bureaucrats there was nothing to fear, but when government came into the people's hands some safeguard like this was necessary. Hence

this military ordinance was issued, in the minds of the old school, to protect the military power of the country against the day when popular opinion might demand retrenchment.

There are even among scholars those who plead for such a system as this. Among Japanese scholars there are two varieties—true scholars and timeserving scholars. The plea which the timeserving scholars put forth is that this is the age of specialists; and that in the conduct of the affairs of the nation a scheme should be adopted in which the militarists, including the army and navy and their administration, compose one side of a triangle, while on the other side is the Cabinet whose business it is to look after ordinary administrative affairs. The Emperor who is at the top of the triangle is the unifying force The result is that we practically have two governments. On the one side is the militaristic class, on the other the people, and at the top the Emperor.

The outgrowth of this matter has been that certain things were taken out of the hands of the Cabinet and put in the hands of the men who are in charge of military affairs. Not only that, but absolute secrecy was kept as to the actions of that group of men who were in charge of military functions. Under such a system no one, not even the Premier himself, knows what is going on inside the military circles. This tendency to keep military matters in one group and to keep them absolutely secret, has grown since the Okuma Cabinet.

Of course this scheme of a double government is

not constitutional. It ought to be easily broken up. As a matter of fact, in the government itself, certainly in the present (Hara) Cabinet and among the people, the opposition to this scheme is very strong and very pronounced. But the reform is very difficult to undertake. The stronger the opposition among the people, the stronger the resistance of the militarists. Their whole attitude is that whatever is best for Japan is the thing that is to be done no matter who or what is to be sacrificed. The aim is to make Japan powerful and ensure her influence as a nation. If that means that China or Korea is to be sacrificed, it is unavoidable. This policy is making itself evident in Japan, Korea, and even in Formosa. The result is that Japan has two representatives in China; the consuls representing the Foreign Office and the men who are over there in large numbers representing the General Staff. When the consuls point to the right, the men representing the General Staff point to the left. And so the Chinese are saying, "What is Japan doing, anyway?" Of course there has been a change somewhat for the better in Korea and also in Formosa. Inevitably great mistakes have been made. Naturally people say, "Why is it that the Premier cannot control the General Staff, and the Ministers of War and the Navy, who are members of his own Cabinet?"

There are several things that ought to be mentioned here. One is that the General Staff has an abundance of money. Another is that it has a perfect machine for propaganda which is working

overtime. Another matter we must recognize is that while the Japanese among themselves are careful not to torment each other, some think there is no harm in tormenting a foreign nation. Especially is this true of the old type. Another thing is that the people at large are satisfied at the progress Japan has made. They look back and see what Japan has accomplished and that makes them indifferent.

And yet there is a growing number of young men, mostly students, who are influenced by the world tendency. They are influenced by the world spirit. They are more and more taking these things to heart. This is apparent in national questions. Take, for instance, the labor movement. Students are going out and living with the laboring people in order that they may study the question at firsthand and get information. This shows the new spirit which the young men of Japan are manifesting to-day. There are a number of students who are coming to know that they must take a different attitude toward the Korean and Chinese students in Japan. They are trying to understand their thought life and to become one with them. These students with wider sympathies and world vision are the students that the militarists and the conservatives in the government look upon as men with dangerous thoughts. And so wherever a group of these students congregates a new police box appears on the other side of the street. Not only that, but they are traced to their doors and watched when they go out. To the police these are the young men who are dangerous. But

from our point of view these are the young men who are awakening. These are the young men who are the hope of the future. These are the young men to whom we look to accomplish the things that must be accomplished to bring about the desired change.

Out of many illustrations there are one or two which I would like to call to your attention. Since last summer some of us have been getting together with the Korean and Chinese students, talking things over and trying to get a mutual understanding of each other's views. In these little conferences the language used was Japanese, but some of the Japanese students have begun to feel that to ask these students to adopt our language in these conferences is not treating them on a basis of equality. It is making them adopt our language and putting them on a level below us. So there has been an effort to get a language in which they can converse on an absolutely equal basis. Since September they have been meeting once a week studying Esperanto in order that they might have a common language in which to converse with absolutely equal freedom. It simply shows the new atmosphere.

Another instance is afforded by the attack made on the Cabinet in the House of Peers as a result of Mr. Lyuh's visit. Mr. Lyuh, who is connected with the provisional government established in Shanghai to bring independence to Korea, was invited to come to Tokyo to confer with members of the government and other publicists. The Peers took the attitude that since Korea was a part of the Japanese

Empire, the Koreans were Japanese subjects, and that this man, because of his opposition to the Japanese Government, was a criminal and ought to be treated as such. To invite a criminal to come to Japan and even to invite him into the gardens of the Imperial Palace is something that cannot be tolerated. This represents the attitude of some people and a few students. At a gathering a student got up and took the same attitude as the Peers, but he got no sympathy. Many students took the stand that even though he is opposed to Japan, if his moral precepts are right we ought not to look upon him as a criminal, but ought to be sympathetic. The students who take that attitude are ninety in a hundred.

If the question were put to the students as to whether or not we should withdraw from Siberia, ninety out of a hundred would stand for withdrawal. If the question of giving Korea independence or complete autonomy were submitted to the students, ninety in a hundred would say, "Give her independence or autonomy!" If the question were put to the students, "Shall we withdraw from Shantung and give it back to China?" ninety in a hundred would say, "Yes."

A certain university professor says that because of these two contending forces we may in the future look for a revolution; but I cannot agree with the professor's view for the following reason: The young men, the forward-looking men, will go on to victory on the road which they have chosen. There will be no retreat. They will go right on advancing.

That is not true of the conservatives. The young men have an inner confidence that they are right. But it is different with the conservatives. They are not sure of their ground, and the whole history of Japan shows that, when it came to the critical time, the conservatives gave way. When they found it was inevitable they gave ground. That is what is going to take place in the future. Take for instance the matter of universal suffrage. The conservatives will fight until the thing is inevitable and then they will give in. The evolution of Japan toward democracy will be like that of England. There will be no violent overturn as in Russia. Our conservatives will gradually yield to the new impulses. But as to the outcome there is no doubt. It will take time, but the men who know that they are right and are sure of their ground are going to win. Japan's future is bright with hope.

CHAPTER VI

Japan's Navalism

By Vice Admiral Tetsutaro Sato

Vice Admiral Sato was born in 1868. He was for many years a professor in the Naval College at Tokyo, and has recently been made President of that institution. This article was written in English by the Admiral himself for the March, 1920, issue of the *Asian Review,* a magazine in Tokyo.

BEFORE the war, when Germany expanded her armaments on a large scale, she was held up to the odium of the public as the champion of militarism, a dangerous principle jeopardizing peace in the world. Even President Wilson declared that the object of America's participation in the war was to destroy German militarism in order to make the world "safe for democracy."

During the war, those ill-disposed to our country held up Japan as another nation espousing militarism, and argued that there would be no peace on earth until and unless her militarism were crushed after the destruction of German militarism. Now that Germany has been beaten and her monarchy has been replaced by a republican régime, the ill-wishers of Japan are haunted with another bugbear. This time it is not militarism, but navalism. They allege that Japan has taken warning from

Germany's failure, and is bent upon realizing her ambitions by her big naval program, and by replacing her militarism with navalism.

Especially obsessed seem the English and Americans, particularly the latter, with this preposterous idea. But what is navalism? I for one cannot see any basic difference between militarism and navalism, both being intended for the defense of the state. Militarism is designed for the defense of the country by means of an army. And it prevails in such countries as Germany, Austria, Russia, and France which, situated, as they are, on a continent, are constrained to depend upon armies for their defense. On the other hand, such island countries as England and Japan are forced to have recourse to navalism. Because surrounded with the seas, they must defend themselves against their enemy on the seas. Thus it will be seen that, considered from the viewpoint of national defense, both militarism and navalism are one and the same thing, there being nothing objectionable in either of them. They are odious only when they are prostituted to a base purpose. For instance, when Germany tried to dominate the world with her militarism and provoked the enmity of the world, she was abusing her militarism. Indeed militarism has degenerated into a doctrine of conquest in the hands of Germany.

If militarism and navalism are to be criticized at all, then military expansion, as planned by France and Italy, or naval extension, as proposed by England and America, are to be equally denounced. It

must be remembered that Japan is not the only nation constructing warships. England and America, too, are building warships, in spite of the fact that they have far stronger navies than Japan. Therefore, if any nation in the world is guilty of navalism, it is not Japan, but rather England and America.

But it is inevitable for England and America, for the sake of their national defense, to push forward their naval-construction program and maintain big navies. By doing so, they do not mean to conquer other nations. Thus they can not be criticized. Likewise Japan has done and is doing nothing to provoke unfavorable criticism; for her naval program is intended only for national defense, and not for aggressive purposes. So it is preposterous to say nothing against the big navies of England and America, and to hold up Japan's small navy, and accuse her of aggressiveness.

Our national-defense policy is to safeguard our unique nationality forever, and prevent any foreign enemy from invading our own country. Our armaments are maintained solely for self-defense, but never for aggressive designs. We are under the firm conviction that Japan is created for the sake of the Japanese nation, and think it our mission to live up to the teachings of Amaterasu-O-Mikami, the supreme Goddess of the Japanese, by conscientiously following the path of justice and humanity, so as to set an example to the outside world and glorify our Goddess. In other words, the Japanese mean to enjoy a happy life, as well as their traditional na-

tionality in their own country, by making adequate armaments to defend it.

If a nation is to maintain its territorial integrity, safeguard its nationality, and promote its own welfare, it must pay attention to three factors. One is justice; another, wealth; and the last, military force. When a nation is equipped with these three things, it will be able not only to secure peace and happiness for its country, but further to ward off foreign contempt, and thereby to settle international issues amicably without seeing a rupture. On occasions, even the possession by a nation of two of these factors will enable it to escape contempt in dealing with foreign Powers. For instance, suppose there was a nation, who, possessed of ample wealth, conscientiously trod the path of justice; it would be able to maintain peace and safeguard its rights and interests, although its military force might be inferior to that of its adversary. The case in point is France on the Morocco question. When the Morocco issue was raised, Germany could not attain her selfish object by making France yield, though she had a superior military strength. Another case is America. Since the foundation of her republic, America has had no great military force. And yet she has occupied an important position in international relations, because she has possessed the two factors, justice and wealth.

But wealth is a negative factor, after all, in maintaining peace, being powerless against foreign foes. Just suppose a wealthy country was invaded by an

ambitious, wicked nation; it would be another Belgium, and its wealth would prove a safe unlocked and with no watchmen. Belgium possessed ample wealth and her contention was unimpeachable, being in strict accordance with the international laws. And yet the first weeks of the war saw her downtrodden by Germany. Does this not remind us that military force is of supreme necessity for national defense? However, force, not backed by wealth, will prove good for nothing, just as there is no difference between a heap of stones and a 20-inch gun manned efficiently, if there is no ammunition to feed it with. Thus it is clear that military force must be accompanied by wealth. But it must also be borne in mind that justice adds weight to them. Indeed, a nation cannot hope to be safe and secure until and unless it combines in itself *justice, wealth,* and *arms.* For then no other nation will dare to despise it or invade its country.

In the past, Japan had ample resources with which to feed her nation. The increase, however, of her population has been so remarkable since the middle of last century that the Japanese have now outgrown their resources. During 1870 and 1880, Japan's population was said to be between 30 and 50 million, but now in 1920 it has exceeded 60 million, and is fast approaching the mark of 70 million. In order to make up the shortage of supplies, consequent upon this phenomenal increase in our population, it has become necessary for us to buy raw materials from foreign countries. For this purpose it has also become

necessary for us to sell something in return for things bought abroad. This has encouraged the development of maufacturing industries in our country, and the export of manufactured goods. In future we shall find it increasingly necessary for us to develop our export trade. Otherwise, we shall be unable to buy raw materials abroad to feed and clothe our rapidly increasing population.

The other countries have ample room for any increase in their population. Take England for instance. She has such vast colonies as Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which will support all her people for centuries to come, even if her population increases twice as fast as ours. America also has a vast territory. Besides, she has her influence firmly established in Central and South America, For centuries she will have no fear of suffering from a shortage of resources, however great her increase of population may be. France, Italy, and other European nations, too, have large colonies abroad; indeed so large that they will not suffer from any increase in their populations. Besides their rate of increase is not so great as ours. Therefore there is nothing that justifies pessimism on their part. As regards our country, however, she has no colony worthy of the name. Even if she tries to send emigrants aboard, America, Australia, and South Africa refuse them entry by means of rigid immigration laws. Such being the case, there is only one way open for Japan to feed her rapidly increasing population. That is to import raw ma-

terials from foreign countries. Indeed there is no course left to Japan but foreign trade, if she is to feed her ever-growing population.

And foreign trade cannot prosper without naval protection. Commerce, not backed by naval force, is always destined to dwindle. However flourishing a nation's trade may be, it will be stopped in an emergency, unless it has naval strength to fall back upon. It was entirely due to the strong naval protection it enjoyed that the foreign trade of Portugal, Spain, and Holland so prospered in the fifteenth century. And the moment it was deprived of naval protection it began to decline. The present prosperity of England is also due to her naval supremacy. For this reason, Japan is confronted by the necessity of extending her navy, so as to maintain due balance of power with the other nations.

Like England, Japan is an island empire, surrounded with seas on all sides. Therefore she must prevent external aggression on the seas. Should the enemy be allowed to land, it would spell ruin not only for Japan, but for her nationality too. This is the reason why the Japanese think it necessary to have national defenses at all costs. Japan has no aggressive designs in expanding her navy, her prime object being to safeguard her nationality, protect and promote her trade so as to feed her nation.

If critics of Japan denounce her naval program as navalism, what should they say about the naval program of England and America? If Japan is guilty of navalism, does not America stand con-

demned of still greater navalism? All creatures have weapons to defend themselves with. Why then can the state not have defensive weapons? Japan's naval extension is entirely intended for self-defense. Those who criticize it as navalism must have interested motives.

It may be contended that it is well to defend a state with a navy, but that there is no need of expanding it. Yes, if the other nations refrain from naval extension, Japan will follow suit. But will America, not to say England, give up her naval program? According to information at my disposal, America's construction of ships, as well as her naval program formulated last spring, cannot be regarded in any other way than as naval extension, pure and simple. The comparison of the American and Japanese navies is as follows:

WARSHIPS

Battleships

	America	Japan
The new type	19	9
Under construction	10	4
The old type	23	6

Note—The new type includes the dreadnoughts and other latest battleships. The old type includes other battleships.

Battle Cruisers

The new type	—	4
Under construction	6	—
The old type	9	3

Notes—(1) The old type includes those of the *Tsukuba* class.

(2) Those American battleships under construction are all of 35,000 tons and 35 knots class.

Cruisers

The new type	23	21
Under construction	10	5

Destroyers

The new type	72	90
Under construction or under contemplation	270	—

Note—America has 300 destroyers of above 1,000 tons, whereas Japan has only 15.

The above table will show how big the American naval extension is. Can we, then, neglect our extension and lose our equilibrium with America?

Next we must consider the relations between England and America. It is hardly necessary to say that the biggest Powers after the world war are England and America. Indeed without their

friendly co-operation peace could not be maintained not only in Europe but in the Pacific. Fortunately, friendly relations now prevail between them, and the Pacific enjoys its traditional tranquillity, since they are united in their efforts for the sake of world peace. But no one can tell how long the political atmosphere will remain calm and free from any disturbance. Should any involved question arise between them, can any one predict that it would never lead to their armed clash? Should things come to such a pass, the result might be more disastrous to humanity than that of the recent world war. Needless to say that the Far East will be involved in the calamitous whirlpool. Upon Japan, who has to safeguard peace in this part of the world, a most important duty would devolve, that is, mediation between the two contending nations so as to ward off a most disastrous war. And, should she possess no real power worthy of a mediator, her mediation might end in a miserable failure. On the contrary, if she had sufficient strength to bring pressure to bear upon the two nations, neither of them would declare war without taking into consideration her mediation. Then and only then humanity would be spared a war unprecedented in scale and in violence. Such indeed would be the beneficial effect of Japan's navy if it were strong enough for a casting vote in a quarrel between England and America. And for this purpose Japan sees the necessity of expanding her navy.

In short, Japan's naval extension is intended (1)

for national defense to safeguard her unique nationality; (2) for protection of her overseas trade; and (3) for holding the casting vote in any serious dispute between England and America, so as to avert their armed clash, and thereby to ensure a lasting peace for the world. A campaign now going on against our naval extension, holding it up as navalism, is a campaign conducted by those foreign nationals who leave nothing undone in libeling Japan's fair name, and damaging her interests, with a view to reducing her to a third-class Power. Should Japan be disqualified to maintain peace between the two great nations of England and America on account of her weak navy, she should be held responsible for her failure to safeguard peace, at least in the Pacific. Our navy is for ensuring a lasting peace. During the world war, what navy kept the Pacific clear of German influence and made the Allies prosecute the war to a glorious issue? The answer to that question will be nothing more or less than an explanation of the true object of our naval extension.

The Japanese *samurai* never unsheathes his sword unless circumstances force him to do so. He holds it beneath his dignity to draw it for promoting his selfish motives. The Japanese sword is intended to cut nothing except in safeguarding the cause of justice. Should an occasion arise in the future for testing the Japanese sword, I do not hesitate to say that it would be precipitated by unavoidable circumstances and nothing else.

CHAPTER VII

Militarism and Navalism In America

By Henry Satoh

This article was written in October, 1920, for the *North China Standard,* a daily newspaper in Peking. It is included in this book, because the idea is prevalent in Japan that America, criticizing militarism and navalism of other nations, is herself aspiring to be a great naval and military power in the world. This article is especially interesting when read in comparison with recent utterances made by Secretary of War Baker and Secretary of the Navy Daniels. In the light of such utterances, many Japanese believe that America has deliberately deceived the credulous masses of the world by holding out during the war many high-sounding promises, chief of which was a promise for disarmament. They also believe that this vast armament which America is now building is directed against no other nation than Japan.

NONE of the American publicists who charge Japan with militarism troubles himself with a glance into what is actually taking place in his own country in the way of carrying out in practice a militaristic policy on a very comprehensive scale. Even what is known here in this respect is enough to convince any outsider how America is bent on strengthening her military equipments.

The following facts are patent to those who have followed militaristic tendencies in the United States at present:

I—ARMY

Before the European war the regulars of the American Army on peace footing were 175,000 strong, as fixed by legislation, but due to the insufficient amount of appropriations allowed for the army and the difficulty of getting men for the service, the actual strength was always below the legal standard, and was generally limited to some 120,000 men. Just before American participation in the Great War, which occurred immediately after dispatch of American troops into Mexico, the actual strength of the American Army was 67,000 men.

According to the estimate of the current year, however, the regulars consist of 18,000 officers and 280,000 noncommissioned officers and men, showing a total of 298,000 strong. When the State regulars of 175,000 strong are added to them, the strength of the United States Army must be placed at 470-480,000 strong.

But owing to difficulties of getting men, the actual strength of the regulars in July, 1920, was 208,000 and that of the States or National Army, 50,700 strong, making a total of some 260,000 men.

II—NAVY

According to the naval program extending over three years, the first expansion scheme of the American Navy as published in May, 1916, comprised ten battleships (dreadnoughts), six battleship

cruisers, ten scout cruisers, and one hundred and thirty others, making a total of 156 ships. The second expansion program published in October, 1918, comprised ten battleships, six battleship cruisers, ten scout cruisers, and one hundred and thirty others, making a total of 156 ships.

On the completion of the above program, the United States will have in 1921 a formidable navy of the latest type as follows:

Battleships and battleship cruisers	32
Cruisers	20
Destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, and others	260

The Secretary of the Navy, Daniels, in explaining the need of this naval expansion before the Congress, laid stress on the necessity of keeping the naval strength of the United States on the same footing as the greatest single navy in the world.

Secretary Daniels further stated that owing to the delay of ratifications by the United States, the naval program remains unaffected by the Versailles Treaty. He said that work is now going on for building great naval docks in Charleston and elsewhere, and that there are now in course of building eighteen dreadnoughts and battleship cruisers, as well as twelve more of powerful warships. With the completion of the fleet composed of these new ships he said that he expected to see the American Navy taking no second place in the navies of the world.

The present actual strength of the American Navy is as follows:

Battleships	29
Cruisers	36
Gunboats	15
Destroyers	233

The above forming a nucleus, there are now about 500 ships in the American Navy.

There are, besides, eighteen dreadnoughts and battleship cruisers and twenty-two more warships now actually in course of construction, as published by the Secretary of the Navy.

What might be considered the Oriental policy of the United States made it necessary for her to have a strong navy in the Far East. The opening of the Panama Canal and the aftermath of the Great War served as an occasion for the United States to send out a large fleet to the Far East. In June, 1919, Secretary of the Navy Daniels said that a fleet of about the same strength will hereafter be stationed both in the Atlantic and in the Pacific. This decision was followed by sending out to the Pacific in August, 1919, a fleet of 14 dreadnoughts and 185 other warships.

III—FINANCIAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR MILITARISTIC EQUIPMENTS

The estimates of the United States Government for the army and navy commencing with June, 1920, show:

The War Office Appropriations	$392,558,365
The Fortifications	18,833,442
Military Cadets' School	2,142,213
The Navy	433,279,574

Of the total estimate of $4,859,800,000 covering all departments of the government, the appropriations for warlike measures constitute about one fifth. Again, these appropriations constitute one third of ordinary national outlays estimated at $2,300,000,000 in round figures after deducting extraordinary disbursements necessitated on account of war finance and the deficit of the preceding year.

IV—MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

There are now 570 training institutions for army officers in conformity with the national defense act of 1916. The number of men receiving military training reaches 170,000. These institutions are under the jurisdiction of the War Office, and the instructors are specially sent from the General Staff. For any school having more than 100 students above fourteen years of age going through military training, the War Office provides free of charge arms, camps, and other necessary equipments.

In New York a weekly military training in schools for boys over fourteen years of age is compulsory. Even physically weak boys are liable to punishment when failing to attend school on training day.

Very strong efforts are being made all over the United States for training men for military service.

V—THE ASSOCIATION OF VETERANS

The Association of Veterans or the American Legion, which has its headquarters in New York with 8,964 branches distributed all over the United States and its dependencies, has a membership of one and a half million which is expected to be doubled in the near future. The association was founded after the conclusion of the Great War and is known by the name of the American Legion.

This association held a convention in Cleveland, Ohio, on September 28, 1920, and passed a resolution for the cancellation of the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan, the legal exclusion of the picture brides, and the rigorous exclusion of Japanese as immigrants.

This association is a patriotic organization evidently aiming at keeping the martial spirit in proper trim. It has a women's department with 668 branches scattered throughout the country. There is a branch of the American Legion in Japan with a membership of some seventy men. It is located in Yokohama.

VI—ENCOURAGEMENT OF WARLIKE SPIRIT

There are several kinds of encouragement offered to young people to keep up martial spirit among

them. The latest instance of the kind was prizes offered for essays on the "Benefits and advantages of being enlisted in the American colors." Two hundred thousand schools with ten million pupils were invited to join the contest. The Secretary of War, Baker, and General Pershing were appointed judges for the essays submitted. The first class prize was won by a boy fifteen years old, the second by a girl fourteen years old, and the third by a boy sixteen years old.

These prize winners were paid their traveling expenses to Washington, including those of their parents, enabling them to attend the ceremony of conferring prize medals upon successful contestants by the Secretary of War himself.

Another notable instance is the speech of Dr. David P. Barrows, Chancellor of the University of California, addressed to the freshmen of that university. In it he lays the strongest emphasis on the absolute necessity of every male citizen shouldering the responsibility of maintaining national defense on an efficient basis. He pointed out that the military system of the United States being neither compulsory nor mercenary, each and every male citizen must keep himself well prepared and ready to respond to the call of arms against the country's enemy in time of necessity. He condemned evasion of such responsibility as the greatest shame.

Such instances of encouraging the martial spirit are almost constantly found in various parts of the wide dominions of the United States.

Secretary of War Baker, in his speech at Columbus, Ohio, in July, 1920, said that if the United States should cope with the world situation single-handed, she can do so only with strong hands. Should the United States remain outside of the League of Nations, armaments sufficiently strong for preserving peace must be maintained, and for that purpose a big navy must be kept up. The improvement of arms, he said, must never be lost sight of. He further pointed out that to be up to date with the latest improvements was the secret of keeping national defense on an efficient footing.

VII—DEPENDENCIES AND THEIR FORTIFICATIONS

In conclusion, let me present an idea of the formidable fortifications established by America at the Pacific outposts of her vast territories:

A—THE PHILIPPINES:

(1) Regulars:

Infantry	3 Regiments
(One of them is stationed in China)	
Cavalry	1 Regiment
Field Artillery	1 Regiment
Sappers	1 Battalion
Aviation Corps	2 Companies
Balloon Corps	2 Companies
Communication Corps	1 Battalion
Field Hospital	1
Commissariat Corps	1
Coast Batteries	1,000 men

According to the new program, the Regulars are to be increased to one Division.

(2) Native Scouts:
Infantry.....4 Regiments and 2 Battalions
Mountain Artillery..... 1 Regiment

(3) Police Force:
93 Companies.

(4) Military Stations:
The Regulars are stationed in Manila and vicinity.
Most of the Native Scouts are kept in Luzon. The Police Force is distributed all over the Islands.

(5) Fortifications:
Batteries fortifying the entrance to Manila are placed on the islands of Corregidor, Cabayo, Enfraire, and Calabao.
The entrance to Port Subig is fortified with batteries.

B.—GUAM FORTIFICATIONS:

(1) Military Strength and Stations:
Naval Commandant's Headquarters has 3 companies of marines on the Band. They are stationed near Port Apla.

(2) Fortifications:
Batteries are placed at the entrance to Port Apla.

C.—HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

(1) Regulars:

Infantry	4 Regiments
Cavalry	1 Regiment
Field Artillery	2 Regiments
Sappers	1 Battalion
Communication Corps	1 Battalion
Aviation Corps	2 Companies
Balloon Corps	2 Companies
Coast Artillery	13 Companies

They are stationed on Oahu Island.

By the new program the Regulars are to be increased to one Division.

(2) Native Guards:

They are composed of four regiments of infantry.

(3) Forts:

Batteries cover the entrance to Pearl Harbor and protect the naval rendezvous.

D.—PANAMA CANAL ZONE:

(1) Military Strength and Stations:

Infantry	3 Regiments
Cavalry	1 Battalion
Field Artillery	1 Battalion
Coast Artillery	14 Companies
Sappers	2 Companies
Aviation Corps	1 Battalion
Sanitary Corps	1

Stationed at the strategic points in the Canal Zone.

According to the new program, one division of Regulars is to be stationed here.

(2) Forts and Fortifications:

Strong batteries protect both entrances of the Canal on the Pacific and the Atlantic.

. . . . . .

The above is only a brief review of American preparedness for war. Minuter details of American forts and fortifications are known here, but as they are of little interest except to experts and specialists, they are withheld from publication.

THE EDITOR'S NOTE.

The above article was written in October, 1920, and the data used therein are not quite up to date. Mr. Satoh's figures are those for the fiscal year, July, 1920—June, 1921. If he saw the stupendous armament program of America for the fiscal year, July, 1921—June,1922, what indeed would he say? The following few extracts from various documents made public in the past few months will be read with alarm by the liberals of both Japan and America.

I

The *New York Times* for December 16, 1920, said editorially as follows:

"Secretary Baker wants $699,275,502 for the maintenance of the army in the fiscal year ending

June 30, 1922; for the present fiscal year ending June 30, 1921, Congress allowed the army $394,700,577. Secretary Daniels has turned in an estimate of $679,515,731 for the navy in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922; Congress allowed the navy $433,400,998 for the present fiscal year ending June 30, next. Estimates are one thing, appropriations another. If the heads of the War and Navy Departments, who will retire on the coming March 4, are right about the needs of the two services for the coming fiscal year, the country should spend upon them the enormous sum of $1,378,791,233. It was not very long ago that total appropriations for all government purposes were thought to be large at a round billion dollars. Now, in post-war time, they must greatly and unavoidably exceed that amount. Nevertheless, the people are not reconciled to the idea of spending almost a billion and a half of dollars on the military establishment alone."

II

On December 12, 1920, Secretary of the Navy Daniels gave out to the press the substance of his annual report to the President, approving a new three-year naval building program. As condensed by the newspapers the salient points of this report are as follows:

No specific recommendations for appropriations for new construction during the next fiscal year are included in the Secretary's report, but his estimate

of the cost of maintaining the naval establishment for the coming year is $679,515,731, exclusive of any sums Congress may add for new building. This is $240,000,000 more than was appropriated for the present fiscal year. Mr. Daniels says that the sum "is not really an increase," but is "necessary to carry on the construction of ships already authorized and the completion of shore establishments already begun by direction of Congress."

The most pressing problem confronting the nation with regard to the national defense, the Secretary continues, is the immediate necessity for increasing the naval shore-establishment facilities on the Pacific coast.

"The day will never come," Mr. Daniels says, "when a powerful fleet will not be based in the Pacific, and it is essential that ample provision be made not only for the Pacific fleet, but for the whole American fleet in its stated periods of tactical exercises on the west coast."

Along the new Pacific coast projects now under consideration for which Congress has been or will be asked to provide funds are a deep-water docking and repair base, a submarine base and other developments at San Francisco; an aviation base at Sand Point, King County, Washington; a submarine, detroyer, and aviation base at Port Angeles, Washington; a submarine base at Los Angeles; a submarine and destroyer base at Astoria, Oregon, and a very extensive development of harbor and repair facilities in Hawaii. In all, the report

declared, projects that ultimately will reach a cost of about $160,000,000 are urgently needed for the Pacific coast proper.

Characterizing Hawaii as the "crossroads and key to the Pacific," Mr. Daniels recommends the creation there of a fleet-operating base capable of accommodating the entire American Navy with all auxiliaries. Facilities for a fleet of 1,000 vessels could be developed in Hawaii, the report asserts. It adds that "the strategic location of Hawaii is realized, its possibilities have been carefully studied and set forth by naval experts, and its development on a broad scale as a fleet-operating base cannot be too strongly recommended."

III

On December 14, 1920, Secretary Daniels, appearing before the Senate Naval Committee, made this statement:

"Our country cannot afford to take a holiday in naval construction or in aircraft or in the carrying forward and taking the lead to make our navy the strongest in the world in these days of chaos, differences, and disagreement.

"It would be a blunder worse than a crime for the United States to agree with two or three other nations to stop naval building. It would create world suspicion, instead of world stability. Such an agreement can be made only by all the nations of the world."

IV

On December 13, 1920, Secretary Daniels made public the report of the Navy General Board submitted to him on September 24 by Admiral R. E. Coontz of the board.

"The navy second to none recommended by the General Board in 1915," the report says, "is still required to-day. *But in addition the great war has shown the importance of unimpeded ocean transportation for commerce. If either belligerent loses the control of the sea the national fighting power and endurance is greatly affected. In time of peace a great and developing country needs a proportionately great merchant fleet of its own to insure its markets and preserve its commerce from subservience to rival nations and their business. . . .*

"Owing to the extent of our coast line, bordering upon two great oceans, our widely separated possessions in the Pacific and our rapidly extending commercial interests, the General Board believes that ultimately the United States will possess a navy equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world.

"In urging that this become the continuing naval policy of the United States, there is no thought of instituting international competitive building. No other nation can in reason take exception to such a position. In assuming it the United States threatens no other nation by the mere act of placing itself on an equality with the strongest. It is an act of self-

defense which all will acknowledge as an inherent right and cannot justly be construed as a challenge. On the contrary, the pursuance of such a policy of equal naval armaments may well tend to diminish their growth, and would certainly work to lessen the danger of sudden war."

V

On December 16, 1920, Representative Frank W. Mondell, in a speech in the House, made the following statements:

"More than $615,000,000 of this enormous increase of estimates over appropriations is for the military and naval establishments and the construction of army posts and works of defense. In other words, the administration is asking Congress for $1,414,467,768 for the army, navy, and fortifications, more than two years after the close of the war, at a time when the world outside of our borders is largely bankrupt and everybody is praying for a reduction of armaments. The sum asked is about five and one-half times the appropriation of $260,000,000 for all these services in 1916, our highest pre-war appropriation for these purposes.

"The appropriations for the army and the navy for the present fiscal year are higher than they otherwise would have been because the services were in a state of transition. The army was being reorganized; the navy was still carrying certain war burdens. The current appropriations for these services are, in round figures—army $392,000,000, fortifications

$18,000,000, navy $433,000,000, military academy $2,000,000, or upward of $845,000,000 for these services."

VI

In justice to Secretary Daniels the following statement, made by him on January 11, 1921, before the House Naval Committee, must be noted:

"The suggested alliance or holiday between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan ought not to be seriously considered. Instead of securing permanent reduction and contributing to lasting world peace, it would dig up more snakes than it would kill. Let us not be stampeded in a tripartite alliance under the propaganda of saving money to-day by affronting all other nations or notifying them that they are not in a class to be consulted upon one of the great questions which affects every nation and all the peoples of the world.

"I would not ask the world to trust the United States to be always just and unselfish if it had a navy so big it could be master of the seas. The world would not trust the United States or any other two nations having an alliance either of reduction or expansion. They would say, 'if these three nations are allied to take a holiday and reduce this year, why may they not increase next year and hold all the world at their mercy?' Let us not be a party to inviting such feeling upon the part of friendly nations willing to go into a world-wide agreement for reduction. . . .

"In 1913, I was opposed to naval holiday for one year. In 1921, I am opposed to the proposition for a half holiday by the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, or any other few Powers. Holidays indicate a cessation from work for a brief period with a view to returning to the old job when the holiday is over. The only wise course is to end competitive navy building, not for one year or five years, and not by a few nations, but for all time by all nations."

VII

On January 12, 1921, Secretary Daniels, appearing before the House Naval Committee, made detailed explanation as to the relative naval strength of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, and presented the following tables compiled by naval intelligence experts.

A—EXISTING NAVIES.

Great Britain

	Tons.	Ships.
Battleships	635,650	26
Destroyers	356,418	334
Light Cruisers	189,295	44
Battle Cruisers	175,400	6
Submarines	85,505	98
Aircraft Carriers	67,200	4
Destroyers, leaders	41,774	24
Cruisers	37,200	2
Total	1,588,442	538

United States

	Tons.	Ships.
Battleships	435,750	16
Destroyers	308,260	260
Light Cruisers	none	...
Battle Cruisers	none	...
Submarines	35,163	54
Total	779,173	330

Japan

	Tons.	Ships.
Battleships	178,320	6
Destroyers	26,926	27
Light Cruisers	25,350	6
Battle Cruisers	110,000	4
Total	340,596	43

B—AUTHORIZED BUILDING PROGRAMS

Great Britain

Battleships	None
11 Destroyers	14,390 tons
5 Light Cruisers	38,780 tons
Battle Cruisers	None
19 Submarines	21,790 tons
1 Destroyer Leader	1,750 tons

Total—36 units; 76,890 tons

United States

11	Battleships	421,900 tons
38	Destroyers	48,100 tons
10	Light Cruisers	71,000 tons
6	Battle Cruisers	261,000 tons
43	Submarines	38,100 tons

Total—108 units; 842,109 tons

Japan

3	Battleships	112,050 tons
15	Destroyers	16,710 tons
9	Light Cruisers	51,800 tons
4	Battle Cruisers	160,000 tons
10	Submarines	8,500 tons

Total—41 units; 328,460 tons

VIII

On January 7, 1921, the *London Telegraph* published a significant interview with Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador to England. In the course of the interview Baron Hayashi said:

"We have all learned the lesson of war, that is, the folly of it, and none has learned it better than ourselves. You sometimes call us realists. Well, firstly because we are realists, receptive but also critical and cold scientific observers of facts, we have duly noted that modern war is not a paying proposition, whether for the vanquished or for the victors. It may spell bankruptcy for both. Our best brains

understand that our future lies not in territorial and military conquests, but on the water in the carrying trade and on land in our commercial and industrial expansion abroad.

"We have become a big industrial power, but once more because we are, as you say, realists and as such have noted the gigantic blunder committed by Germany when at the climax of her industrial expansion in 1914, believe me we do not propose to repeat that blunder and by a mad act of aggression to miss or mar tremendously the unique economic opportunities that should be ours for a peaceable effort.

"It would be impertinence for me to suggest that the same remark might apply to our American friends. The United States have long been a great economic power, but they, too, have within their reach at this juncture commercial possibilities of a magnitude they have never known before. The full naval program now under discussion there would, no doubt, weigh, financially speaking, less heavily upon the American people than what we have in view upon our own people. Still the proposed burden, as we already see, is not cheerfully borne by all Americans.

"Thus it would appear that the threatened naval race in the Pacific—really no race at all, we have no desire to challenge and could only compete under the severest handicap—might yet be avoided by an arrangement compatible with the material safety and national dignity of both of us. Unofficial proposals to this effect already put forward in the United

States are sure to meet on the part of Japan with a ready and cordial response.

"Indeed, has not the whole trend of Japanese foreign policy in recent times been directed toward friendly agreement with America, whether within the League or without? Where, I ask you, have we failed to show a proper spirit of conciliation? Where could it be said of us that we have sought to push to their extreme limits and logically legitimate conclusions our principles and claims? Not, assuredly, in regard to racial equality, amendment of the covenant, or in regard to California, or in regard to equal opportunities of commerce and trade in the South Pacific Islands under Australian mandate. In every instance we have either accepted compromise proposed, or looked for one ourselves."

On January 23, Viscount Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the course of his address before the House of Representatives, had this to say:

"As a matter of principle, disarmament is to be welcomed for the general welfare of the human race and the Japanese Government is paying special attention to the question. The matter, however, has very important and complex bearings upon the interests of each nation, and it is to be apprehended that realization of this end may be found impossible unless all nations act in harmony and in good faith."

In the February, 1921, issue of the *Taikwan,* a Tokyo monthly magazine in Japanese, Marquis Okuma discussed disarmament and said:

"The question of reduction of armament is most welcome, as Japan is now suffering from the burden of the great increases. Japan will be second to none in reducing the minute disarmament becomes a practical issue. In the interests of humanity and for the peace of the world, the sooner the issue becomes practical the better it will be for all peoples.

"If the two greatest naval powers, Great Britain and the United States, will take the lead in settling the matter, I am sure that Japan, France, and Italy will gladly join them.

"Senator Borah has my fullest sympathy and support. Reduction of armaments, practically considered by five of the leading powers, will certainly be an epochal event, leading the destiny of mankind to its ultimate destination—peace and good will. Japan looks forward to this event. The world should not hesitate to unite to realize this great and happy aim."

IX

The armament question is being most seriously discussed by the Japanese press. On the whole, newspapers are in favor of reducing armament. For the following translations of editorials from Japanese dailies, the editor is indebted to the *Japan Advertiser*, a Tokyo newspaper published in English by an American.

The Osaka *Asahi*, one of the most influential newspapers, said on December 23, 1920:

"If the American reservation on Article 10 of the League Covenant is due to a desire to extend the American Navy, it means the subversion of the fundamental spirit of the League of Nations. As a matter of fact, there is a tendency for the Japanese and American navies to emulate each other in the Pacific. There is a considerable difference between the national wealth of Japan and that of America, but if the naval race is forced, a dangerous atmosphere may be created. Such a competition will result only in the disturbance of the world's peace. The new proposal designed to maintain peace ought to make definite stipulations on that point. We have long urged a plan similar to Mr. Borah's proposal of a naval holiday, and we support it with all our hearts."

Senator Borah's proposal for a "naval holiday" found prompt and generous response from the Japanese press. On January 7, 1921, almost every leading newspaper in Japan had an editorial on it.

The Tokyo *Jiji,* which is often called *"The London Times"* of Japan, said:

"We recently said that the only immediate cause of the threatened world-wide naval race was the naval program of America, and expressed the earnest hope that the public opinion of that country would influence the jingoes. The peoples of various countries are aspiring for disarmament, but America alone is engrossed with the construction of the world's first navy. If America abandons such a reactionary

policy, there is no doubt that a great stride forward will be made toward the realization of world-wide disarmament."

The Tokyo *Nichi-nichi,* which is under the same management as the Osaka *Mainichi* and which exercises great influence in political circles, said:

"It is not known what motive is responsible for Mr. Borah's proposal, but if the proposal is good, we need not bother ourselves about the motive. On the contrary, we should co-operate with other countries to carry it out for the sake of the world's peace and the happiness of mankind. . . . If a naval agreement is concluded between Japan, Great Britain, and America, other countries will join it as a matter of course. But the League of Nations exists and the nations are inclined to take joint action in international affairs. It is desirable that all countries, large and small, should participate in the consideration of the naval question, especially because disarmament is one of the principle questions before the League. It is but natural that an attempt should be made to include France and Italy in the proposed naval agreement."

The Tokyo *Hochi,* strong supporter of Viscount Kato's party, Kensei-Kwai, at present the opposition party, said:

"It is hard to understand why a proposal for the restriction of naval armaments has been brought forward by America, a country which has not only failed to join the League of Nations, but which

has been trying to carry out a large naval program. If only America suspends her superfluous program, Great Britain and Japan will be glad to suspend their own plans. How is it that the restriction is confined to 50 per cent, and that replenishment necessary to maintain the *status quo* is to be permitted? Why not propose to suspend new programs altogether? Whether the disarmament covers both the army and the navy, or one of them only, and whatever the manner in which it is to be carried out, Japan should support it in principle. If all other countries sincerely try to carry out disarmament, Japan will of course act likewise."

The Tokyo *Chugai Shogyo,* (Journal of Domestic and Foreign Commerce), influential among business men, said:

"It is somewhat strange that the public opinion of America, a nation which has not yet joined the League of Nations, should be eager for disarmament, but this is a pleasant thing.

"There is no knowing how Mr. Borah's proposal will fare, and it should be noted that the statements of Mr. Daniels are not in harmony with those of Mr. Borah. America is not prepared to take the lead in carrying out disarmament. She is only prepared to follow suit if Great Britain and Japan mean to restrict armaments. This is a negative attitude. As to public opinion in Great Britain, the contention seems to be that conclusive evidence of Germany's intention faithfully to carry out the terms

of the Peace Treaty will be first obtained before disarmament is carried out."

The Tokyo *Yorodzu,* less important than the above-named journals, and known to be somewhat jingoistic and anti-American, said:

"In spite of the British declaration that Great Britain will not aid Japan in case of war between Japan and America, Mr. Daniels says that while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance exists there is no hope for disarmament. What does he really mean? He is boldly repeating that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the prime cause of America's armament expansion."

X

In the latter part of December, 1920, the *New York Times* published an editorial on "Japan's Army and Navy Estimate," which reads as follows:

"A military Power with limited resources, Japan will probably spend less upon her army and navy in the fiscal year 1921-22 than the estimates of her budget, which are given in a dispatch from Tokyo. The totals are 498,000,000 yen (about $249,000,000) for the navy and 245,000,000 yen (about $122,500,000) for the army, or $371,500,000 in all. On October 25 estimates for the maintenance of the United States Army and Navy for the fiscal year 1921-22 were published in a Washington dispatch, as follows:

" 'The navy estimates are about $650,000,000;

the army figure runs up to $814,000,000, or nearly as much as it used to cost to run the entire government in the pre-war period.'

"The American estimates are approximately four times those of the Japanese budget. Labor is much cheaper in Japan, and many materials entering into construction and equipment cost less there. On the other hand, steel for the navy, most of which must be imported, is higher in that country. But compared with the United States Japan is economical in fitting out her soldiers and sailors. The American Army and Navy are the most expensive in the world; nothing is too good for the soldier and sailor, and thrift in equipping them is the last thing thought of; uniforms and everything worn are of the best material, and the cost of making it up is high; the appropriations for quarters and recreations are liberal. The Japanese get as much for their yen as we do for our dollar. All this being said, Japan's proposed outlay upon her military forces is moderate compared with ours. It must be evident that Japan is not trying to steal a march upon the United States by preparedness for war on a large scale. Furthermore, her resources being meager compared with ours, she is incapable of building up a vast military establishment. The opposition in the Japanese Parliament will doubtless insist upon a pruning of the army and navy budget, and there are signs that the American estimates will not be translated literally into appropriations."

CHAPTER VIII

Harmony Between East and West

By Premier Takashi Hara

The following article was originally written in Japanese by Premier Hara, and was published in the Japanese magazine, The *Gaiko Jiho* (*Diplomatic Review*) for December, 1920. It was rendered into English by an authorized translator for the February issue of the *Asian Review,* an English monthly in Tokyo. Premier Hara is often called the "Great Commoner," as he has more than once declined the honor of peerage proffered him. He was born in 1854 in a small town in northern Japan. After his graduation from the Tokyo Foreign Language School, he joined the staff of the *Hochi,* a daily paper in Tokyo. In 1883 Hara entered the Foreign Office and was appointed Consul in Tientsin, China. In 1886 he was chargé d'affaires in Paris, and in 1895 was promoted to the post of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1896 he was Minister to Korea, but he soon resigned this post to accept the editorship of the *Mainichi,* an influential newspaper in Osaka. In 1901 he again entered the government as Minister of Communication. In the Saionji Cabinet, 1906-1908, Hara occupied the portfolio of Minister of Home Affairs. In 1911 he was Director of the Government Railways, and in 1913 he was again Minister of Home Affairs. When in 1915 Marquis Saionji retired from active politics as leader of the Seiyù-Kwai, or constitutional party, Hara succeeded him and has since successfully piloted the party. Upon resignation of the Terauchi Cabinet in the fall of 1918, Hara organized his Cabinet which is still in favor.

IT is a great happiness to greet the third year of peace for mankind, after the great world conflict. The peace treaties are in operation, international relations are resuming their normal state, and

the misery of actual strife has almost ceased. While there remain some post-bellum problems to be settled, they are more or less local in scope, and do not menace the world as a whole, nor can obstruct the advance of man's civilization. The epoch of world peace has begun, and it is the duty of humanity to itself, I believe, to strive with the utmost endeavor that this epoch shall continue through the years to come, to ensure the welfare, safety, and progress of all nations, and that the abolition of war shall be more firmly guaranteed than ever.

While peace exists at present among the nations, keen observers, in Japan as elsewhere, are convinced that its permanency is still to be achieved.

The five years of war sacrificed about ten million lives, and if those maimed and otherwise disabled were added, the total number of human wrecks would reach between twenty and thirty million. Altogether, the populations that, in one way or another, were drawn into the vortex of the terrific whirlpool formed one third of the whole human race, while the treasure that they poured out has been estimated at 500,000,000,000 yen. This tremendous sacrifice was made during the space of a few short years in waging battles with the sole result of desolating mankind, and nothing in the way of productive achievement.

This brought about a deficiency of unprecedented proportions in both human and material resources. In the result of this tragedy, so inconceivably vast, a hiatus has been cloven in the continuity of the

thoughts of men and women. This dislocation of ideas and principles has created a spiritual malady, the unchecked spread of which is a dangerous menace.

When the war ended, the minds of all peoples, ardently longing for a new ideal and a new civilization, partly due to the desire to fill the void caused by the sacrifices of the war, and partly to the sudden rise of ideas reacting in abhorrence of war, strove desperately for something to satisfy that longing. So when an American statesman proposed new principles of peace, voices throughout the world echoed him; and when a new panacea was shouted from Russia, all eyes and ears were turned toward it. The cry for reconstruction, so-called, became the fashion, and the demand for a league of nations became insistent.

The peace conference thus began amid bright prospects and hopes unprecedented in history, and finally the treaty of peace was established on the foundation of the League of Nations, which is to enforce peace in the world. But it was impossible to concentrate the whole intellect of mankind, as the nations, both east and west, were unable to throw off the excitement of reaction. Moreover, the scheme was too new, and too vast, to allow its full scope to be brought into operation. Though the treaty is being enforced, and strife has almost ceased, the wound to the human mind has not yet healed, the commotion of thought has not yet subsided: the world is still looking for an indefinable something

and for the appearance of one who will give it that for which it yearns.

What mankind is in search of to heal the gaping wounds of the great conflict is the key to a new civilization—the foundation of permanent peace. It is not to be worked out by scholars, nor may it be a temporary expedient. It must originate in the very souls of the nations, striking a chord common to the hearts of all peoples. Such a new goal of human advance cannot be found by any limited number of men—unless, indeed, supermen could be conjured up for the task.

It is a work which the mutual understanding of all nations, the harmonization and reconciliation of the Oriental and Occidental civilizations, alone can achieve.

Hitherto, the standard of world civilization has been set by the white race, and the ideals of mankind and the preservation of peace have been in its keeping. We do not hesitate to recognize that the white race is a little ahead of us in its civilization, especially in scientific culture.

But when we consider that the great war found its origin in the defects of that very civilization, we cannot but be convinced that the future maintenance of peace is the common charge of all nations and the responsibility equally of the two civilizations, Oriental and Occidental. All nations and all peoples owe the duty and have the right to contribute their ideals of civilization toward preserving peace.

The fundamental principle of the League of Nations is justice and humanity, and universal fraternity; it exemplifies the law of casuality. Such ideas, however, are nothing new; they were taught in Oriental civilization thousands of years ago. Though we do not intend to claim credit for the origin of the League of Nations, we can easily point to the fact that the fundamental moral laws of the league, which has now been invented through the agency of the civilization of the white race, impelled by the tragedy of the greatest of all wars, are nothing other than the humanism fostered in the Orient for ages past.

So we think it will not be so difficult to discover the new ideal and the new basis of peace, longed for by the nations, by gathering the essence of Oriental civilization, and harmonizing it with Occidental civilization. Western Europe's civilization has been refined by the fiery ordeal through which it has passed. We believe it to be the duty of the present generation to combine with that culture the characteristics of Oriental culture, to harmonize the two in spirit, to weld a new civilization as one compact whole, thereby establishing the sure foundation of permanent peace.

The characteristics of Oriental civilization are not, of course, to be described in a word. In China is the most ancient culture, and pre-eminent and sublime ideals are to be found in it. Some parts of China's civilization have been perfected in Japan, while others have flowered in Japan only, their

spirit having been lost in their original home. We cannot admire too highly the French statesman, M. Painlevé, who discerned the importance of the principles of Oriental civilization and attempted to combine them with those of the West.

Without dwelling on the lofty doctrines of Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, there are other more homely examples. For long enlightened men of the West have found great interest in Japanese color prints and admired the superiority of our swords and other arms. Not only that, but recently they are giving their attention to our textile fabrics, our literature, and our theatrical art. But these are merely minor achievements of Japanese culture, and its fundamental principles, which are deeply rooted in the innermost spirit of the nation, are not in any way inferior to the corresponding elements of the West.

I ardently wish European and American nations to understand the nature of Oriental civilization by investigating its spirit, and I likewise hope that Oriental peoples, especially the Japanese, will voluntarily make clear the essence of their own culture, contributing with those of the West to the advancement of human progress and the peace of the world.

The Japanese are not adept at displaying their true selves, and their real worth has hitherto been doubted, often leading to misunderstandings. Europeans and Americans, not having been sufficiently in contact with Oriental life, have not endeavored, apparently, to assimilate its good qualities.

Just as the rivalry of nations professing civilization of the same nature has often caused war, in the same way estrangement and lack of mutual understanding between countries of different civilizations make the breaking of peace more possible. But if civilizations of different natures, on the contrary, reciprocally adopt and utilize the strong points of each other, through mutual contact and appreciation, it would not only abolish the cause of war, but would promote the welfare of the nations of both races, and enrich the spiritual life of mankind.

The present situation should not be viewed in the light of a problem of the Occident against the Orient, nor of Japan against some other country. The mind of the present generation has experienced unprecedented commotion and thoughts are brought to a deadlock hitherto unexampled, by the breach created by the war, by the reaction against war itself, by the spiritual agony of yearning for a new ideal, by the inexpressible longing for permanent peace.

It is not too much to say that future war or peace in the world depends on bridging over this breach, and fulfilling this ardent desire. The enlightened men of the world, therefore, should, without loss of time, co-operate to establish a new ideal by harmonizing the civilizations of the East and the West, making it the basis for permanent peace and the abolition of war.

Each nation of the world has its own culture. It is not to be wondered at that Japan, whose civilization has been in being for three thousand years, main-

tains a peculiar national polity, unparalleled in the world, and is proud of the pure, unadulterated spirit of the nation, the natural result of her history and polity. According to Japanese ethics, loyalty to the sovereign and patriotism are of the same principle as freedom and equality, while independence and obedience are manifestations of the same spirit.

Just as the Western philosopher has said the ideal and perfection of morality is the supreme command of conscience, so is the patriotism of the Japanese nation the supreme command emanating from the kingdom of the heart of each individual, and is never conceived as a duty compelled by external force. It is, rather, the manifestation of an instinct unalterably a part of the blood of the nation.

The Japanese are a people ruled by the principles of independence, freedom, and equality. As such a nation, the consummation of its instinctive life manifests itself in loyalty to the sovereign and patriotism, and when the supreme command, issuing deep from the bosom of each individual, is outwardly displayed, it assumes the form of the virtue of submission to the state. In Japan there is neither compulsion, oppression, nor tyranny, and, in fact, such things can never exist here. The state is the nation, and the nation is the state. The country and its people are one and the same organism, interdependent, with their lifeblood in common. There is no command or servitude between the two. The laws of the state are nothing other than the consumma-

tion of the supreme command of each individual member of the nation, and when the highest morality of the state is animated in the innermost depths of the nation, it is displayed in the rise and development of the national destiny. Therefore, the state of Japan can do no wrong; a wrong by the state must be, internally, tyranny, and externally, unjustifiable aggression. These being Japan's ethics it is absolutely impossible to obtain the assent of the whole nation to the commission of such wrongs: their intuition and intelligence would never permit it. Those foreigners who regard Japan from afar, and call her a despotic state or an aggressive nation, are guilty of too much misunderstanding of the fabric of the Japanese nation. In every fiber, Japan is, internally, a state ruled by the principles of freedom and equality; and, externally, a state adhering to peace and harmony. All political, diplomatic, economic, and social questions and measures are treated in this moral conviction. There is, thus, in the life of Japan constant elasticity, and we are not threatened, as are some other Powers, with perilous class feuds, nor are we menaced with schemes endangering the very structure of society.

The foregoing relates to only a single phase of Japanese culture, yet the majority of Europeans and Americans do not rightly understand even this simple phase. If one of the defects of Western civilization is the lack of spiritual consolidation, due to uncontrolled currents of thought, a study of Japanese

culture would surely, we think, not fail to offer things of good promise to Occidentals.

Though the characteristics of the Japanese culture lie in its ethic and solid unification, yet it is not in its nature to cling to international isolation, self-gratification, or nonassimilation. We believe that our civilization can contribute something of value to the world's civilization, and that Japan should exert herself to contribute to the world's peace and the advancement of mankind, through co-operation with and the adoption of the white race's civilization.

No one should be allowed to deny Japan's contribution to the cause of the Allies. No Power has entered the League of Nations and international conferences more seriously and earnestly than Japan.

It is Japan s sincere and heartfelt wish that the powerful ones of the world should adopt the spirit of Japan's culture and utilize it in the promotion of the common good of the world, by earnest, correct understanding and appreciation of Japan.

The peace of the world can never be achieved unless the substance of the life of mankind is improved, and its hollows filled up, through the contact and mutual understanding of all nations and through the combination of their cultures. Steps should be urgently taken in this direction, to harmonize and reconcile Eastern and Western cultures. The fundamental principles of the peace of the world are guarantees for the welfare, safety, and advancement of

each nation. To this end, I believe in the necessity for preliminary measures to study the essential characteristics of the several cultures, to abolish discriminating conceptions, caused, in the past, by mutual ignorance and misunderstanding.

That the Covenant of the League of Nations is the Magna Charta for the world, I believe to-day as strongly as ever. But in order that the League of Nations may realize its prospective ideals, through the application and cultivation of its fundamental principles, the international movement I have mentioned should be the first step and strictly adhered to, and the cultures of the world should be mobilized, thereby curing past deficiencies and mutual ignorance.

We declare that Japan has a temperament suitable to enable her to contribute to this great work, and she sincerely wishes to contribute to the world's peace by the utilization of that temperament; and we demand equality of treatment and opportunity in all cases.

CHAPTER IX

The War's Effect Upon the Japanese Mind

By Professor Masaharu Anesaki

Dr. Anesaki is Professor of Comparative Religion at the Imperial University of Tokyo. From 1913 to 1915 he was Exchange Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. He is a liberal thinker, and is also regarded as an authority on Buddhistic philosophy. He has written numerous books in Japanese. His English work, entitled "Buddhist Art in Its Relations to Buddhist Ideals" (Boston, 1916), is regarded as the most authoritative work on the subject. The following article was originally read as a special lecture at the Semicentenary Celebration of the University of California in the spring of 1918. In the light of what has since happened in international politics, some of the statements made herein seem almost a sarcasm.

THE new era of Japan was marked at its start by high ideals of humanitarian principles, as was boldly set forth in the imperial oath declaring that the "universal way of heaven and earth" should be the foundation of the national government, and that every one, even the lowest of the people, should be given opportunity to fulfill his aspirations. But when the zeal of the Japanese nation for equity in international relations had been frustrated, patriotic ardor began to take a form of vehement Chauvinism. Even after a partial fulfillment of the aspiration for equity in the revision of treaties to the abolition of consular jurisdiction had been accomplished, the

aggressive penetration of the European Powers into the Far East aroused a sense of danger for Japan and of responsibilities toward her sister nations of the Far East. This apprehensive awakening was aggravated by the cry of the "Yellow Peril" raised by the German Kaiser and echoed by some peoples of the West. Indeed, the distinction of the Yellow and White Races has been forced upon us. We have perhaps to accept the forced challenge and to care for ourselves if the Western nations should insist on their aggressive and oppressive claims. But is there no other way of adjusting ourselves to the world's conditions and of establishing a better relationship between the East and the West? This was and is the problem imposed upon the Japanese nation.

The general distrust of the Western nations with regard to their practice of international morality is a great obstacle for the Japanese, at the present crisis, in their effort to comprehend the moral claims of the Allies as directed against Germany. Some of the Japanese ask: Can British rule in India be called just? Has not the American occupation of the Philippines a strong military aspect? Has not the Far East for some time been the prey of international competition? Has not Japan often been frustrated in her legitimate claims? These impressions, either well founded or suspiciously construed or instilled by dubious agents, are pretty widely current among the people. Thus a pointed question is often asked: How could the British or the Amer-

icans have become so suddenly converted in their moral sense that they really stand for peace and justice, for the liberty of smaller nations and against German aggression?

To add another point, the only experience of the Japanese nation before the Hague Court was the question of the house tax on the foreign residents in the former concessions. The decision of the court in that case is regarded by the people as an injustice to us. Japan has always been scrupulous toward treaties with foreign nations, but her treaty right has been much disregarded by the California legislature. Whether right or not, these are the bitter impressions produced by those events. These events have been responsible for the distrust toward the British appeal to the sanctity of treaties and an uneasiness about the social and political leaders of the allied nations.

In order that the Japanese people may understand more fully the claims and pleas of the Allies, fundamental readjustment should be made in the relation between the Orient and the Occident. This means not simply a better co-ordination of international relationships throughout the world, but a more candid exchange of opinions and sentiments, and especially the decided advancement of a common moral platform on the basis of humanity. It seems to me that a great era is opening up before us, in spite, or rather because, of the war, and that many of our people are keenly realizing the need of international conscience among all nations.

The constitutional government of Japan is still in its infancy and the appeals of political leaders to the people are never so important as in England or America. In judging through the analogy of their own situation the people can hardly grasp the significance of the declarations, speeches, and messages of the allied statesmen. Very imperfectly or erroneously understood is the purpose of those declarations, the call to the people for national and international causes, the effort to illuminate their minds and to awaken their conscience to the ethical significance of the war. There are some publicists who would not take those claims for the cause of humanity and international justice at their face value, but as mere means of winning the world's sentiment or as ostentatious pretexts. In short, so long and so far as the Japanese people misunderstood or undervalue the moral intent and political significance of public declarations in constitutional and democratic countries, they will be unable to understand the meaning of the public declarations on the allied war aims.

On the other hand, the number of those who have grasped the significance of these declarations is rapidly rising, and they understand that the appeal of statesmen to their own peoples as well as to the world binds them to their measures in and after the war. Some of these utterances, as, for example, Lloyd George's speech before the Parliament in February, 1918, in response to the German Chancellor, or the response of President Wilson to the Pope and his speech of February 11 before the Congress

stating the terms of peace—these cannot but impress many Japanese with the candidness and boldness of the statesmen. Many of the leading papers of Japan published editorials pointing out the significance of these speeches and contrasting the ambiguity and timidity of the utterances of our statesmen. The *Tokyo Asahi,* the largest metropolitan paper, praised the speech of President Wilson as a new departure in the history of peace negotiations, in the sense that at least the preliminary discussions have thereby been transferred from the talks of envoys and the green table to an appeal to the judgment and sentiment of the world at large.

Let me cite from an important study in a lengthy article by Professor Onozuka of the Imperial University of Tokyo, entitled "The Views on the War as stated by the British, French, and American Statesmen," published in the *Kokkagakukai Zasshi* of last January. He says in part:

"One thing clear even now is the significance in the war of the moral and spiritual factors beside the physical and economic. The gaps of sentiments caused by the difference of national characters and historical backgrounds among the warring nations are important and powerful. Though the conflicts in this respect can never be neglected and minimized, a balanced valuation of these moral forces is extremely important. Moreover, we see that these sentimental factors are not very highly emphasized by public men, while special emphasis is laid by many publicists on the principles of justice, liberty, right,

etc., and the war is regarded by them as a fight for life or death on these principles. . . . These are the views expressed by statesmen, including those in responsible positions, and hence we must expect that their utterances will not be limited merely to the sphere of ideas and ideals but are destined to control practical policies, both national and international. More especially, since England, France, and America are pre-eminently democratic countries, their statesmen as a rule carry out their policies by appealing to, and striving to form, public opinion. Thus their appeals, direct or indirect, to the nation carry with them their own individualities as well as an aspect of national determination. For utterances of statesmen are reduced to nothing unless they touch the national inclination and are backed by public opinion. In addition, these public statements are furnished with the form and content of an appeal to the opinion of the civilized world at large, as well as to the people of the country concerned. Thus there are international aspects in these utterances, besides the individual and the national. How can it be otherwise than that most of them are dignified in expression, sound in argument, and lofty in ideals?"

After this introduction the writer gives a résumé of many public statements by Asquith, Grey, Lloyd George, Poincaré, Viviani, and others at the opening of the conflict, down to President Wilson's note of June 9, 1917, to the new government of Russia, by analyzing the most essential points expressed and implied therein. He concludes thus:

"Although the policies of nations in these several decades have chiefly been guided by purely national interests, we must notice that there has been also a decided growth in the tendency of international co-operation. Apparently this latter has been much broken down by the outbreak of the present war, and the dignity of international law has been greatly impaired. But all this is a superficial aspect, while the minds of the warring nations are demanding a decided advance in the harmonious relationship among nations, being deeply dissatisfied with the actual conditions of international relationships. The rise of this tendency and demand has been shown, immediately after the outbreak of the war, by the expressions of many scholars and thinkers in the allied countries, and by the subsequent organization of several influential bodies for the attainment of international aims which are now approved by the responsible men in the divers governments. The country where movements of this kind are most extensive is the United States, and the one who stands most firmly for these principles is its Chief Executive, President Wilson. His words and acts have ever been a great guiding power in leading up the public opinion of his country to this point, while the support by public opinion is the ground on which his bold and firm statements stand. The cause of international co-operation has officially been accepted in principle by all of the allied nations, of which the Allies' note to the United States of January 10, 1918, gave a public utterance. No one interested in politics after the

war can afford to miss these points of the international currents."

Monarchy or democracy is an important point involved in the issues of the war. An apprehension is felt that the Allies' condemnation of German autocracy may develop into a wholesale denunciation of monarchy, which is the state structure of Japan. This is shared alike by some progressives who have been fighting for a truly constitutional government and by conservatives who identify their own clique or clan spirit with patriotism and loyalty. The latter comprises militarists, expansionists, and bureaucrats, who have been afraid of any rise of democratic spirit in the nation, even apart from a strong democratic tendency consequent upon the war. They now see in the explicit declarations made by allied statesmen and publicists that the allied aim is to exterminate German autocracy and militarism; and naturally the bureaucrats see in the rising tide of democratic ideas the world over a formidable march of their own foes.

The sentiments and opinions of the progressives are not so unanimous as those of the conservatives; but not a few of them apprehend that an indiscriminate denunciation of monarchy on the part of the Allies may lead to a moral isolation of Japan. Moreover, even apart from the international aspect of the issue, their opponents, the conservatives, may strengthen their stand against democracy or constitutionalism; or the radicals may derive their incentive from the plutocratic anarchy shown by the

Russian Bolsheviki, and undermine a wholesome development of our own constitutionalism. Thus an apprehension is entertained pretty widely that the democratic tide may mean a serious danger to Japan's own internal affairs, though the grounds of the apprehension are rather opposite in the cases of the two camps.

There are some impressions in the West that Japan is a highly centralized autocracy of the Prussian type. But entirely false is the alleged likeness of the militaristic structure of the Prussian state and the monarchical system of Japan. There may be some similarities in form, but there are fundamental differences between the two states. To cite only one illustration out of many, the Prussian monarchy is a result of fierce racial struggles. Without the wars of aggrandizement Prussia could never have attained its unity and expansion. On the other side, Japan attained her unity and solidarity in the peaceful isolation of an insular nation of which its time-honored monarchy is the emblem. This is not a mere geographical difference, but it has created a marked difference in the temperament of the two peoples, and in the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.

The tide of democratic ideas, however, is steadily advancing in Japan. Its onward movement can be illustrated by the writings of such influential political thinkers of the younger generation as Professor Oyama of Waseda University and Professor Yoshino of the Imperial University of Tokyo. They

demand a democratization of Japan on the monarchical basis, because it is the sole means of reaping the best harvest of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism has always been an inspiration to the nation, and without its free development the vigorous growth of the nation cannot be expected. For the bureaucratic rule and the corruption of the political parties are both a manifestation of the politics based on class interests, against which a wholesome development of the individual and the free expressions of the people's judgment and conscience are the only remedy. Herein lie the moral and social aspects of politics, while the government, however efficient and well intentioned it may be, can never achieve a vigorous and steady growth without the backing of public opinion or without succeeding in the leadership of public opinion.

On these points these two thinkers, Professors Oyama and Yoshino, express themselves in consonance; and they have many followers among the younger generation and are perhaps destined to rule the future of Japanese politics. Their influence upon practical politics seems to be still a matter of the future, but the people, sadly disappointed with the bureaucratic government, as well as with the existing political parties, are steadily awakening to the necessity of reconstructing their political institutions from the bottom. In this the leadership of these academic thinkers is becoming an important factor and has manifested its influence in some cases of general election.

Professor Oyama emphasizes the moral basis of political views and measures, and stands against class monopolies of any form. He says:

"The principle of the survival of the fittest in its sheer material aspects has no doubt been an important factor in the past and present, but ought not to be the only measure in determining the future. The sole aim of state management ought to consist in bringing both the privileged and the unprivileged classes into a harmonious relation of good will, by emancipating them from the conflict of class interests, and thereby causing them all to co-operate in the great task of enriching the national life in its material and spiritual aspects and of realizing a real unity of the nation."

Contrary to this ideal, as Professor Oyama further says, the governing class, both the clan bureaucrats and the political parties, have appealed always to the means and end of material successes, and the inevitable consequence is the degeneration of politicians and the sense of despair in the nation's mind. In this sense we demand democracy which is in no way incompatible with the monarchical constitution, because the clan oligarchy is detrimental both to monarchy and democracy. Monarchy may be symbolized in the apex of a pyramid, with democracy as its basis. While the nation has been engaged in internal struggles and factious strifes, the world is undergoing a momentous change through the war; and this cannot but have its effect upon the practical politics as well as the currents of political ideas in

Japan, the signs of which are now visible. In short, the critical issue in Japanese politics is not the question of choosing between monarchy and democracy, but the question of choosing between the harmonious combination of these two and oligarchy.

Finally, one point may be cited as one of the consequences of the war: that it has brought nearer home to many Japanese minds the irreconcilable issue between right and might, between the will to power and the will to justice. The issue is to be viewed from the point of human nature. Indeed, human beings are furnished with hate and greed as well as with conscience and heart. The problem of human life, then, amounts to how human life can be so controlled that the instincts be elevated and purified to the higher planes of life. The instincts of self-preservation and the perpetuation of the race are not base and mean in themselves, but can be, and ought to be, so refined and enlarged as to make of them the foundation of harmonious life for individuals and for nations.

Herein lies the gravest problem of human life. The present war has brought forward the necessary consequences of the idea that life consists solely in the ruthless struggle for existence, in competition at the expense of others. Is it not this nightmare under the disguise of Darwinism that has guided, or misguided, nations, perhaps without exception, and many individuals to a life of greed and arrogance? If there is another aspect and factor of human life, and if the evils and disasters of war

are not to be a permanent fate of mankind, can we not act to accelerate the harmony of life through the control of the baser aspects of human instincts and by fostering the elevating and purifying influences? In fact, Darwin has emphasized the rôle of sympathy in human life, and the war, in spite of its horrors, is working to arouse in human minds compassion toward the suffering, sympathy among the nations fighting for the same cause, and a sense of human solidarity in the face of the power threatening humanity. Seen in this light, the problems of individual life are intrinsically correlated with those of national and international life. Not only should similar standards of moral judgment and conduct be brought to bear upon individuals and upon nations, but national and international life should ultimately be based on the noble aspects of human nature, as this may be trained and elevated by the consciousness and by the influence of human solidarity.

This point brings us to see the fundamental correlation between the dignity of individual personality and the principle of international justice; because the wholesome development and perfection of the individual personality presupposes the realization in its life of universal humanity, which can never be worked out without a free social life and a peaceful co-operation of nations. The moral life of the individual cannot be perfected apart from his social relationship, and a harmonious community of free and independent individuals demands a democratic

society, in which everyone lives for himself and at the same time for others, and saves others in order to save himself. Democracy, in this sense, is not only a political and social principle, but a moral and even a religious ideal. It means a harmonious development of human life in the individual, in the family, in the state, and in humanity at large. Just as there is a democracy in one community, there ought to be a democratic community of nations, in which each and every nation ought to be free and independent and at the same time ought to serve others, and co-operate with others. Thus the principle of democracy brought to clear light through the war is an individual principle as well as national and international, for which we may perhaps coin a phrase, "international democracy."

To take one instance, "social reconstruction" as discussed in England is, in fact, an ethical as well as a social problem; and it amounts to a reconstruction of human life in all its phases—individual, national, and international. "Social" reconstruction without a fundamental reformation of individual character will be as ineffective as a political democracy without moral foundation in the individual character; and similarly, a reign of international law or justice will ever remain a mere form of conventions, to be pulled down at any moment by any nation strong and atrocious enough to do so, so long as various nations and their component citizens base their life on the principles of might and wealth.

We see thus the problems of human life reduced

to one and the same foundation, to the elevation of human instincts, to a realization of harmony in life, which may be summed up in one phrase, the principle of humanity. This has become clear to us, in spite, or rather because, of the war; and there are not a few in Japan who are realizing the significance of the war in connection with the problems which confront us as regards the future of humanity and civilization. To cite one group, the Association Concordia of Tokyo has been working for inter-religious, international, and interracial understanding and harmony; and some of its members are working eagerly for elucidating these points as connected with the issues of the war.

Let me conclude this paper by a summarized survey of the opinions on the "war aims" expressed by twenty prominent men published in the March (1918) issue of the *Taiyo,* one of the largest monthlies. Roughly dividing those opinions into two groups, we find that nine of them stand for the principle of might or of self-interest as regards Japan's attitude toward the present war, while the remaining eleven stand for international co-operation, i.e. more or less for the principle of justice. This may not be a conclusive representation of Japanese opinion; and yet it is a fairly good indication of the conflict of ideas brought forth by the challenge and appeal of the war.

As to myself, I believe in the future of humanity, in a new era of the world's civilization to be inaugurated by co-operation of nations and of their leaders,

provided that the individuals and the nations be human enough to derive lessons from the war, the consummate result of the reign of might and wealth. To express the same thing in another way, I denounce the reign of competition, or of "international anarchy" which ruled the world throughout the nineteenth century, especially in its latter half, and which has culminated in the present conflagration. Human beings are neither pure angels nor mere devils, but a combination of both. The ruthless manifestations of devilish nature are not limited to brutal warfare alone, but nations and individuals have exhibited the same disposition in commercial competition as well as in international rivalry.

As history teaches us, many a great war has rung the knell of a reign of confusion and conflict and has opened a new era of human civilization. Suffice it to recall the Thirty Years' War, out of which a new Europe emerged, the Europe of rationalism; and the American Civil War, which has consolidated the Union more firmly than before on a national and moral basis. In the present war every belligerent is fighting for its interests, and is claiming a moral justification and advocating some ideal principles. Let us not be skeptical toward those claims, but hope that each and every nation engaged in the war will hold to its ideals, closely examine its own conscience, purge itself from its former sins, and step toward a higher reconstruction of humanity with clean conscience and lofty aspirations. If this shall not occur, the world will have no alternative to the

reign of devils. Yet I shall never lose confidence in the rule of humanity, but trust that the calamitous war will prove a step toward the purification and elevation of human life, in all its aspects, the individual, the family, the nation, and will perfect international relations and human solidarity. Let the United States and Japan, together with all the allied nations, consolidate their joint efforts for the reconstruction of the world.

CHAPTER X

Illusions of the White Race

By Marquis Shigenobu Okuma

Marquis Okuma, the "Grand Old Man" of Japan, was born in 1838. In the span of eighty-two years, he has seen his country rise from feudalism to modernism, himself a chief factor in the process of this transformation. From 1870 to 1897 he has at various times filled the portfolios of foreign affairs, finance, and commerce. In 1898 Okuma, as the leader of the Progressive Party, organized his own Cabinet, the first Cabinet in Japan based upon party principles. It proved short-lived, and for fifteen years after its resignation Okuma was a private citizen, devoting his energies to the education of the masses in the constitutional principles of government. But in 1914 he was once again urged to accept the premiership and organize a Cabinet, which lasted until October, 1916. Though eighty-two years old, Marquis Okuma is still vigorous and keen. This article was written for the January, 1921, issue of the *Asian Review*, Tokyo.

WHEN the race-equality proposal was rejected by the Peace Conference at Versailles, Viscount Makino, the Japanese delegate, made it known to the conference that Japan would seize every opportunity of reintroducing the same measure. Therefore, I expected that at the recent meeting of the League Assembly, Japan would present the same proposition. But Viscount Ishii, Japan's delegate, has declared that Japan would not introduce any race-equality proposition in any concrete form now, but would await a favorable opportunity.

What is meant by the so-called favorable opportunity is not known, but I can not help regretting that Japan has failed to introduce the proposition at the Assembly.

It is needless to say that this question is a momentous issue for the sake of humanity and the peace of the world. Japan, whose chief concern is the welfare of humanity, considers it her mission to put forth her best endeavors for a happy solution of the question.

In view, however, of the current situation in the world, it cannot be expected that Japan will succeed in realizing her object by introducing the proposition only once or twice. If we are to see racial equality prevail in the world, we should devote ourselves to this lofty cause with unswerving faith until success is attained.

In discussing here the question of the abolition of all racial discriminations, I urge the government to keep up a hard fight, and take every possible opportunity of furthering the cause, instead of assuming a half-hearted attitude as shown by Viscount Ishii. It should also counsel the people in general to be firmly united in carrying out the humane campaign to a glorious conclusion.

Confucius, the ancient sage of China, taught that all peoples of the earth were brethren; Shaka Muni, the founder of Buddhism, preached that all human beings were equal, while Christ emphasized the necessity of philanthropy. They were the founders of the three leading religions. They came into the

world at different times and in different places; yet their teachings unquestionably centered upon the truth and the necessity of human equality. God makes no discrimination against any race or any man. Men are created equal and have equal rights.

With the steadily increasing propagation of mankind the struggle for existence has been growing keener and keener, tending toward the dominance of the stronger over the weaker, who is groaning pitiably under inhuman oppression. The strong having step by step come to occupy an advantageous position in society, the class system has gradually been established; and it is through such processes that nobles, commons, and slaves have come to exist.

Every reader of history is familiar with the oppression and exploitations of the slave classes. The founders of the great religions tried to remove these flagrant evils—preaching cosmopolitanism, equality, and humanity. The minor religions have also taken up the keynote of charity based upon the equality of the human race, which is the will of God and the fundamental principle of the universe.

Although classes have been created in the society of men by the struggle for existence, the true origin of the slave system is doubtless due to internecine wars—the conquerors claiming the conquered as their slaves.

We may read with pride the pages of our Japanese history, in which slaves do not figure. There are circumstances which make us doubt whether our ancestors, in their conquest of the Korean Peninsula,

did not bring the vanquished warriors of the Ye and Myaku tribes to Japan and force them into the occupations which were held in contempt by the natives, such as footgear makers, butchers, and janitors, but the authenticity of this fact remains to be proved. The history of Europe is black with its barbarous records of reducing the vanquished warriors to slaves. The capture of Babylon was accompanied with horrible tales of cruelty. The slave system met with approval in Europe. Socrates and Plato recognized the necessity of this system, discovering in it a vital by-product of social life.

The ancient Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans brought forth ample excuse for its survival. Even modern Europe did not develop a conscience strong enough to bring about the abolition of this baneful system; and not until the slave system became a fitting tool to force a civil war in America, did we see its end even there. The measure of a man's power and influence was the number of slaves in his possession.

In spite of the support given to the slave system by Greek philosophers, it was unequivocally denounced by Christ who tried to loosen the galling chains. Thus in pursuance of the teachings of Christ his followers waged war on Rome. Here it may be mentioned in justice to Great Britain that she was the first to launch an anti-slave movement, the law for the emancipation of slaves having been enacted in 1807 and promulgated about a quarter of a century later. However, it may not be out of place here

to express doubts as to whether the true emancipation of slaves has yet been realized in this world.

Leaving aside the ancient Greeks and Romans, the slaves of modern times were mostly the negroes of Africa, although it is known that they at times captured both white and non-white men in the Orient. There is a great difference between the Europeans and the African negroes, not only in the color of skin, but also in physique, constitution, standard of living, customs, and manners. It seems that the intellects and abilities of the negroes are much inferior to the Europeans, but this is entirely due to the fact that their material civilization still lingers in a backward condition. Therefore nobody can say that under scientific civilization their intellects and abilities may not improve and become as developed as those of the Europeans, to say nothing of outstripping the Europeans of their fine physique.

There is no difference whatever in the human nature of the white, the yellow, the brown, the copper-colored, and the negro races; the differences in the color of their skins have been brought about through the environs in which they found themselves. The peoples migrating to Europe were affected by the glaciers; hence their white skin. Likewise, the peoples in central Asia and the Far East were affected by the yellow soil and they became yellow. Africa is under a scorching sun, and the Africans became dark. This process has been intensified through heredity. Other races have also been affected by their surroundings.

The negroes in America, now numbering more than eleven millions, are not yet emancipated in the true sense of the word. The American law prohibits all invidious discrimination against the negroes; yet they are subjected to constant persecutions by the Americans whose prejudices against them are too deep-rooted to be removed by the mere promulgation of laws. Worst of all, the negroes in America are frequently lynched, a vindictive method the parallel of which cannot be found in the history of even the barbarians of the world. It is sure that the day will come when the negroes may enjoy perfect freedom in America, but it may be well for the Americans to remember that the lynching system will leave a tarnish upon the American scutcheon.

There may be many reasons why these people are despised by the white races. But one of them, and perhaps the strongest, may be the fact that the negroes have had no country of their own. They failed to organize a body politic.

As for the Asiatic races, the Persians, the Huns, the Turks, the Tartars, the Mongols, and the Arabs incessantly invaded Europe for centuries to the great annoyance of the European peoples. Especially active were the Arabs who, under the guidance of Mahomet and his successors, cleared western Asia and northern Africa of the white people and penetrated into Europe. Jerusalem, the holy place of the Europeans, fell into their hands. To recover it, the Europeans organized the Crusades which lasted

about a century. The Crusades only served to exhaust the strength of the Europeans, who failed to recover the holy places notwithstanding all their best efforts. What was worse, the Crusaders were attacked by pestilence which dealt a deathblow to their enterprise. The Saracens were later replaced by the Turks who founded the Ottoman Empire, establishing their influence not only in Asia, but in the Balkans. They crossed the Bosporus Straits, conquered the Balkan Peninsula, and carried their triumphant banner as far as Hungary and Austria. Thus the white peoples were harassed by the Asiatic races for more than two thousand years. This is the reason why they dread and abhor the latter.

The Renaissance during the Middle Ages stimulated the progress of the material civilization in Europe and helped the Europeans to grow richer and stronger than the Asiatic races who kept on slumbering in their old civilization. Being seized by an insatiable, aggressive desire, the Europeans took full advantage of their lethargy and swooped down on India and other parts of Asia. They either conquered the Asiatic people by force, or dominated them by dint of superior economic organization, or cheated them out of their territories. The ascendancy of the white races is due to the fact that they came into the possession of material civilization a little earlier than their non-white brothers.

The whites are obsessed with the mistaken theory that they are superior to all other races. This is

the most serious obstacle in the way of the realization of racial equality.

Now the Japanese, the Chinese, the Mongolians, the Turks, the Indians, the Afghans, the Persians, the Arabs, the Malayans, the American aborigines, and the African peoples are all non-white. They are all held in contempt by the whites. And it is the common belief among the whites that the darker the skin, the more inferior is the race. It is based neither upon science, nor upon any positive experience. It is a mere superstition backed by historical prejudices.

The whites are of the conviction that they are too superior a people to be governed by their non-white fellows. Therefore, they demand the privilege of extraterritoriality in the countries of the Asiatic races. They establish their own courts and trample under foot the laws and courts of Asiatic countries. Not only Japan, but Turkey, Persia, Siam, and China have suffered—and some of them are still suffering—from the iniquitable operation of this law. This is unreasonable, to say the least; but the Asiatic peoples were forced to recognize it, simply because of their weakness.

Of the non-white countries, Japan had taken the lead in adopting the best parts of European civilization—including its military side. She codified her laws, and reformed her police and judicial systems, her military and naval forces, thus placing herself almost on an equal footing with that of the European countries. Therefore, the Europeans were

compelled to withdraw their extraterritorial rights from Japan.

For some time after the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan, the whites regarded with some misgivings the judicial operations in this country. But later events fully demonstrated that there was no cause for anxiety concerning the judicial system of this country. Nor has the culture of Japan been found inferior to that of Europe.

The example set by Japan has convinced the other Asiatic races of the possibility on their part to be on an equal footing with the white races, if only they reform their political system and adopt the needed portion of European civilization. In other words, the rise of Japan and the consequent abolition of extraterritoriality have exploded the superstition that the world is to be ruled by the whites.

In this connection, the whites at first believed that Japan's civilization was a mere imitation or a mere veneer, and that it was only fine in appearance, but entirely hollow in reality and void of sustaining qualities. The result of the Sino-Japanese War, however, was a great surprise to the Europeans. Again the Europeans were taken aback by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, in which Russia, one of the strongest white nations, with a most powerful army, was beaten by a non-white nation of the Far East. They then thought Japan's victory a miracle, and consoled themselves with this reasoning: "It is true that Japan is strong in military strength, but she is poor. She will be ruined eco-

nomically, because of her indiscreet attempt to maintain a large army. The Japanese cannot possibly be on an equal footing with the white peoples, after all."

But what happened after the Russo-Japanese War came as a miserable disappointment to the whites. Since the war with Russia, Japan's industry witnessed phenomenal development. Hitherto, she was entirely dependent upon other countries for the supply of machinery and industrial products, but after the war she began to export her industrial products and machines to the outside world, thus changing her status from that of an importer to that of an exporter. Previous to the war, the foreign trade of this country was transported in foreign bottoms, but now Japanese ships began to transport Japanese goods as well as the manufactures of foreign countries. Vessels under the Japanese flag are at the present time making their appearance in all parts of the globe.

Just as Japan's successes in warfare testified to her military strength, development of her industry, shipping, and commerce accounts for the growing national wealth. In consequence, the white peoples have been obliged to give up their mistaken idea about Japan.

Later the substantial contributions made by her to the allied cause in the great European war placed her among the Big Five. Thus Japan has demonstrated the possibility on the part of non-white races

to take rank with the white peoples if only they exert themselves.

Some whites regard the development of Japan as an unjustifiable encroachment upon their own rights. They either instigate a non-white race against Japan or plan to organize a league of the white nations to perpetuate a white supremacy in the world. Be it remembered, however, that no unjust and unreasonable agitation against this country will ever succeed, as God never sides with an unjust cause.

It is, of course, true that there are still peoples in this world who are so backward in civilization that they cannot at once be admitted into the international family on an equal footing. But it will never do to give discriminatory treatment to them. What is needed by them is proper guidance and direction. And when they have reached a certain stage of civilization, they should be given an equal place and rank in the comity of the nations. Although most Asiatic nations are fully peers of European nations, yet they are discriminated against because of the color of their skin. The root of it lies in the perverted feeling of racial superiority entertained by the whites. If things are allowed to proceed in the present way, there is every likelihood that the peace of the world will be endangered. It, therefore, behooves all well-wishers of mankind to exert their utmost to remove this gross injustice immediately.

CHAPTER XI

The "White" Problem in Asia

By An Anonymous Writer

The author of this outspoken article calls himself "A Student of World Peace," and claims to be a Japanese. The extreme radicalism which is manifest throughout the article makes one suspect that the author is not a Japanese but probably a Hindu nationalist. The idea advanced herein that the hope of Asia's deliverance from the white peril lies in the alliance of the Asian nationalists and European Bolshevists is too extreme to be accepted by any considerable number of Japanese. The article is, however, included in this book because it presents certain views of the white question in Asia which are shared by many Japanese. The objection raised by the writer is not, of course, to free, non-political immigration of individuals from Europe or America, but to the military conquest of Asiatic territories by Western Powers and placing Asiatic peoples under Western political control. The article was first published in the *Asian Review,* a Tokyo monthly, for November, 1920.

THE New Asia can discover two forces of a diametrically opposite character in the world politics of to-day. These are manifest, first, in the conditions of international diplomacy brought about by the "Peace," and secondly, in the spirit of universal unrest focussed and embodied, for the time being, in the Bolshevik Soviets of Russia. The one, represented by the association of the victorious Allies, miscalled the League of Nations, has reproduced the reactionary régime of the Congress of

Vienna, the Holy Alliance, and the dictatorship of Metternich, the arch-protagonist of absolutism. The other has for its counterpart, to continue the analogy from the past century, the revolutionism militant, which, born in the "ideas of 1789," maintained its checkered career by combatting the powers that be in 1815, 1830, and 1848. The problem of world reconstruction of our own times is therefore bound to repeat, maybe during comparatively shorter intervals, the great conflict between revolution and *status quo* on well-known historic lines. It is in and through the fire baptism of this new war or series of wars that Asia seeks her liberation from the imperialistic and capitalistic domination by Europe and America.

This is not the first time in human development that grandiloquent phrases and sonorous shibboleths have been invented to camouflage the old Adam. The present generation of intellectuals and statesmen have but taken the cue from their great-grandparents of the Napoleonic era. Who, indeed, could have been more emphatic in proclaiming from housetops the principles of a "lasting peace," the "just division of power," etc., in their schemes for the "reconstruction of social order" than those diplomatists of the early nineteenth century? Nor has human nature been remade overnight to warrant us in believing that we are far removed from the age of scramble for spheres of influence. In the new doctrine of self-determination of peoples that has been employed with vigor against the Germanic and Turkish interests one

can easily recognize the old statecraft of the balance of power, only writ large. From the standpoint of allies it is in fact the same thing turned inside out. As such it bids fair to be the greatest disturber of the tranquillity of Europe. The bunch of new buffer states that have been conjured up to lie between the Germans and the Russians is in reality a row of live storm centers where the great Powers will have to encounter a legion of old Balkan problems. And at least half a dozen Alsace-Lorraines have been manufactured by recklessly giving German populations over to Italy, France, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Jugo-Slavia. One great hope of the enslaved nations of Asia lies in the activities of these German "irredentas" each of which is pregnant with the seed of a new war.

It is obvious in any case that at the present crisis the New Orient can contribute to the Occident only a most paradoxical offer. The one serious question that is worth considering to-day is the question of the evacuation of Asia by the armies, navies, and air fleets of Europe and America. The expulsion of the West from the East is the sole preliminary to a discussion of fundamental peace terms; for the greatest problem before the statesmen of the world reconstruction in the interest of durable peace is that of the freedom of Asia. Not until this has been solved satisfactorily are there any chances for the genuine social-industrial democracy of man hoped for by the international socialists or for the conventional

League of Nations championed by the capitalists and the capitalist-bossed intelligentsia.

Humanity is in the sorest need of an emancipated Asia. Every inch of Asian soil must be placed under a sovereign state of the Asian race, no matter whether sovietic-communal, republican, monarchical, democratic, or autocratic.

Is the political consciousness of Europe and America alive to these demands? Certainly not. For the one fact that has been systematically ignored both by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is that the last war arose neither out of the nationality problems in Europe nor out of the class struggle in the Western world, but essentially out of the keen rivalry for dominating the lands and seas of Asia. And yet where did Asia stand at the peace conference? Virtually nowhere. The Congress at Versailles had practically no problem as to the reconstruction of Asia left for solution to the diplomatic tug of war; for the fate of Asia had already been sealed. Asia was doomed months before the humiliating armistice was swallowed by the Germans, long before the ignominious surrender of the Germany Navy.

Asia was reshaped almost automatically through the Bolshevik unmaking of the Russian Empire. The collapse of military Russia left Asia absolutely to the tender mercies of British imperialism. The hegemony of England over the Asian continent was thus brought about not more by the war itself than by one of its by-products, the Russian Revolution.

In 1914, the equilibrium of Asian politics rested

on three important props. The first was the Anglo-French treaty of 1904, the second the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 1906, and 1911, and the third the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. These three arrangements had served to stabilize for a decade the balance of power in Asia.

The Entente was a final confession of defeat on the part of the French in their imperialistic race with the English. Since the loss of Egypt in 1882 and the humiliation at Fashoda in 1898, France had been used to pursuing a pin-prick policy with her rival wherever she could. But to shunt her off from the Asian tracks England gave her a free hand in Morocco. French mastery in Indo-China, however, was not questioned in any way. The French sphere of influence in Siam, moreover, was clearly delimited, and of course, like that of every other Power, France's finger in the Chinese pie remained undisturbed.

Having eliminated France from the Asian game, or rather having localized French ambitions within fixed areas, the British proceeded to strengthen the new friendship of Japan on the morrow of her victory at Port Arthur and on the Tsushima Sea. For Japan was the strongest of the Powers likely to compete with her in China and the Chinese waters. The British overtures could not but be welcomed by the Japanese themselves, as the line of least resistance was the only advisable course for Japan. She needed, furthermore, the backing of a first-class European Power. She agreed, therefore, to help

England and glibly proclaimed the policy of the open door in the Far East. England was thus assured of the *status quo* in southern and eastern Asia.

The next great force to reckon with was Russia. But the loss of her navy in the Japanese War, the humiliation abroad, and the revolution at home had deprived the Bear of its claws and nails. England, therefore, had nothing serious to fear from the Northern Colossus, against whose solid advance in Siberia and Manchuria through the concession of the Chinese Eastern Railway (granted by the Cassini-Li Hung Chang Convention, 1896) she had been forced to contract the Japanese Alliance in 1902. The rising German power, on the other hand, was threatening to be a portentous menace to the British world dominion. Consequently Great Britain managed to put in abeyance the traditional Russophobia, and by a sudden change of front successfully pooled her interest with her greatest enemy in Asia since the Crimean War of 1854-56. The upshot was the Anglo-Russian Convention leading to a friendly settlement of claims in Persia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The Middle Eastern Question was thus closed satisfactorily for the British Empire.

That question, like all other questions in Asian and colonial politics, was indeed reopened by Germany's ultimatum to the established Powers in 1914. But for all practical purposes there were no changes in the situation as long as there was a fighting Russia. The extinction of her military power, however, since

November 9, 1917, created a huge vacuum in the politics of Asia. The consequence was a violent shifting of its center of gravity. For one thing, the equilibrium of China, so far as the Powers are concerned, has been completely upset. Its stability cannot be restored until and unless the issues are finally decided in the Yangtze Valley between England advancing through the south and through Tibet and Turkestan, and Japan advancing from the east and through Manchuria and Siberia. In every other sphere of Russian influence, however, England has stepped in as a matter of course. To-day she is thus the sole arbiter of the fate of the entire Middle East, and the so-called Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 has only legalized the *de facto* robbery.

Even without the Great War the Russian Revolution would have bequeathed to the British Empire the undisputed suzerainty over Persia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Tibet, and the lion's share in the control of central Asia and China. Add to this the results of the war. Mesopotamia has been conquered from Turkey, Arabia and Armenia are British protectorates, the Palestine zone is in Franco-British hands. With the exception of French complications in Syria and Japanese in Kiaochow, England finds herself the exclusive master of the situation. The entire sea front from Suez to Singapore is British. And over the whole land mass, between the south Asian seas and the series of mid-Asian water partings, the Caucasus, the Karakum Desert, the Hindu Kush and the Tianshan, Great Britain's

will is law. Verily, this single-handed domination of Asia is the greatest peril the world has ever known. Never was British imperial and colonial power more formidable than it is to-day. The triumphs of England over the Spanish Armada and over Louis XII after the reconstruction at Utrecht or even her expansion since Waterloo are but insignificant beginnings of world subjugation compared with what is in store for her from now on after the eclipse of Russia and Germany as Powers. The British Empire has, besides, been insured for a few decades at least against the challenge of a powerful enemy. The last and only rival of England has been brought to its knees. The united militarism of the Allies has now made the world safe for Pax-Britannica.

Nay, democracy has thus been granted a safe asylum among the children of men! For, in sooth, is not the expansion of Britain in naval power, commerce, colonies, and protectorates, or those new-fangled "mandatories," tantamount to the conquest of liberalism, liberty, and law on earth? This is how the average American has been taught to regard the end of the war, thanks to the idealism of President Wilson! Even the combined intellect of the United States has not seen any further than this. How could it? The mind of man even in the twentieth century, even after the event of November 7, 1917, is as indolent as in the days of Duns Scotus and Galileo. It is tremendously afraid of new standards in international ethics. And the brain of America, used as it is to the comfortable atmosphere of a thoughtless

optimism induced by the century-old seclusion of the Monroe Doctrine, is naturally too timid to rise to the height of the occasion. Men and women inured to the unquestioning dogmatism of Browning's "All's right with the world" since "God's in His Heaven" are the least expected to look facts squarely in the face. When, therefore, the bullion power of the United States determined to enter the lists of the Armageddon as the St. John the Baptist of world democracy, on what other political psychology could the quixotic adventure be based except on the postulate that the world is safe for democracy, civilization, and humanity as long as it is safe for the British Empire?

But even America, pragmatic as she is, cannot long remain blind to accomplished facts. She cannot help asking the question now that the war is over: "How is the world to be delivered of the British peril?" France has long been a nonentity, at best only a second fiddle. For the time being Russia is pulverized and enfeebled, although her message is quite powerful all the world over. The Germans can hardly raise their head for a generation. And Italy, although growing, is not yet a formidable power.

The only protests can come from Japan in regard to eastern Asia, if at all. But they are bound to be too feeble. Little Nippon is dazed by the extraordinary changes that have taken place. Even her own independence may be in danger. She cannot any longer look for self-defense in the mutual competition among the great Powers, for virtually there are

no great Powers left. The complete annihilation of German influence in the Pacific and the Far East is certainly not an unmixed blessing to the Japanese people or to the Chinese, nay, for that matter, to the Asians as a whole.

Is then the American merchant marine and navy destined to contest the British monopoly of world control? Or is an Anglo-American Alliance going to be the terror of the second quarter of the twentieth century?

Every cloud, however, has its silver lining. The Orient is not blind to the fact that so far as Europe is concerned, the achievements of the war are already great. Notwithstanding the problem of German irredentas and other minorities, Europe is certainly going to be a far more decent place to live in than before. The nationality principle for which Kosciusko died and Kossuth fought, and to which Bismarck and Mazzini gave a recognizable shape, has at length been thoroughly realized. It has in fact been carried to its furthest logical consequence. The slogan, "one language, one state," may not in all cases turn out to be as convenient in practice as it is mystical and romantic in theory. Europe may need federations and Zollvereins in order to modify the extremely atomistic organization of the new ethnic politics. The causes of friction, besides, between neighboring tariff or administrative unions may long continue to be at work. But, on the whole, the anachronism of race submergence and race autocracy that prevailed on a large scale between the Jura and

the Urals and between the Baltic and the Black seas has been rung out once for ever.

Not less fundamentally than the problem of nationality has the foundation of sovereignty been reconstituted. Through public ownership, municipalization, initiative, referendum, and recall the form of government in every state of Europe is tending to be far more liberal than the idealists could ever conceive. The age of Lenine's anti-property democracy, labor republic, or proletarian dictatorship is perhaps yet rather far off from universal acceptance. But the phenomenal expansion of the rights of the people or "constitutional liberties" is an accomplished fact; and "progressive taxation" as well as repudiation of national debts are bound to emerge as the principles of the "new order" in administration.

Last but not least in importance must be admitted the enrichment of European polity through the creation of a new democratic type in the Soviets of Russia. This new species of constitution is a distinctively original contribution to the social development of mankind. The almost spontaneous emergence of Soviets throughout the length and breadth of Russia indicates that these organizations are essentially akin to, if not identical with, the traditional Mirs of the Slavic peasants. Only, these village communities, or autonomous "little republics" of rural communes, have been harnessed to the new Bolshevik problem of controlling the factors of wealth production in the interest of the working class. As such, the Russian experiment is of profound signifi-

cance to the medieval, i.e. the economically and intellectually "backward" countries of the present day, where village communities in one form or another have obtained from time immemorial. For it is demonstrating that in order to evolve a democratic republic every people need not repeat the industrial revolution and capitalistic régime by which western Europe and the United States were transformed in the nineteenth century. The new nationalities of Europe and the subject and semi-subject peoples of Asia have thus got before them the precedent of a new popular sovereignty. This deepening of democracy as achieved in Russia is going to be the starting point of all nationality movements everywhere on earth.

But, on the other hand, through the impact of the war, an intense wave of militarism has enveloped all ranks of the Asian people from Manila to Cairo. The vindictive nationalism of the last two decades has been lifted up to the spiritual plane in Asia's consciousness.

This circumstance will be regretted no doubt by the liberal forces of new Europe and new America. For, from the stage at which they themselves have arrived, theirs is to-day the creed of internationalism and disarmament. But can it be expedient for the suffering races to trust themselves peacefully to the vague dreams of a millennial Utopia?

For obvious reasons Asia cannot afford to be misguided by such an hallucination, brilliant though it be, nor to have confidence in the *ignis fatuus* of

Western good will. The liberals and radicals of the new Orient have to be militarists perforce. Theirs is the natural and necessary reaction to the oppressive "white man's burden" of the last century.

The goal of nationalist Asia is, however, identical with that of internationalist Europe and America. The emancipation of mankind from all possible sources of exploitation, atrophy, and degeneracy is the common objective of both. The "class struggle" of the West thus becomes anti-alienism or race struggle in the East, because for all practical purposes capitalism is there embodied in the foreign rulers and foreign captains of industry. Until foreign domination is overthrown, the socialists and labor leaders of Asia must have to advocate the tenets of nationalism, backed by native capitalism if need be. Asia's struggle with her own capitalists is of course not in abeyance even at present, but will be accelerated as soon as the foreign incubus is subverted.

The neo-liberals and socialistic radicals of the Western world seem moreover to harbor the illusion that the form of government at home cannot but affect the colonial policy of nations. Theoretically it should, but actual history is different. Evidently the Western liberals are ignorant of the conditions of foreign commerce and empire in Asia. But can they forget the fact that justice in home politics has ever gone hand in hand with injustice and tyranny abroad? And are there any grounds for admitting that the popular governments of the Western world

are less detrimental and ruinous to the dependencies and protectorates than the formally autocratic states?

Look to France, the "cradle of liberty." Which of the colonial Powers has been a more criminal offender on this score than the French Republic? The exploitation of Indo-China by France has surpassed even the notorious repressiveness of the Dutch in Java and the East Indies. The treatment of the Chinese Empire since 1842 and subsequently of the Chinese Republic by the Powers has left no warm corner in Young China's heart for one "foreign devil" as against another. It was not possible likewise for Young Persia to make any distinction between Czaristic Russia and constitutional England, whether as regards the forceful partition of a weak people's territory into spheres of influence, or as regards the interpretation of those spheres. Italy has not displayed greater humanity or fair play in occupying the Turkish island off the southwest coast of Anatolia (against the terms of the treaty of 1912) than Germany did in seizing Kiaochow.

The inroads of America, again, although Monroe-doctrinated, through the Hawaiian and Philippine islands into the Asian sphere cannot be less dreadful in Japanese estimation than the slow but steady Russian avalanche which culminated in the event of 1904. Belgium has come in contact with Asia only in the customs service of Persia. Yet the Belgians have succeeded in earning the Persian hatred even more bitterly than the English and the Russians. The

Ottomans tried alliance with every denomination of Christianity and every species of European nationality. All have been found equally wanting. And India's long experience with Great Britain has brought into relief the fixed idea of all imperialism, viz., that be the Cabinet liberal or tory, no subject race must be dragged into the whirlpool of party politics. About every specimen of Europe and America, therefore, Young Asia is entitled to generalize to the effect that

> "His honor rooted in dishonor stood,
> And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true."

But, perhaps the neo-liberals would meet New Asia with a ready-made rejoinder: "Well, you are talking only of the chauvinists, the junkers and jingoes, the bourgeoisie and capitalists of Europe and America. They are the enemy of labor everywhere on earth. But the working classes of the different nations bear no grudge against one another. They are not committed to any distinctions of race or to any policy of exploitation." The best reply to such a position of alleged internationalism in the labor world is the systematic maltreatment and persecution of Chinese and Japanese "immigrants" by the people of the United States. In this instance, however, curiously enough, friends of Asian labor were the American bourgeoisie and capitalists. The anti-Asian Immigration Bills of 1904 and 1917 were the direct consequences of the resistance offered by the organized labor force of America.

Are the leaders of the workingmen awakened to the injustice perpetrated on Asian labor in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand? It is not surprising, therefore, that "Thou Brutus, too?" is the only remark with which the radicals of the Orient can greet their comrades of the Occident. With whom, then, is Asia to flirt? With the bourgeoisie or with the proletariat of Europe and America? It is too much to expect that Asia should be able to discriminate between the Jew and the Gentile, the Greek Church man and the Methodist, the republics and the monarchies, the employer and the laborer, while reacting to the despotism of the ruling races. Young Asia, therefore, expects the labor parties and socialists of Europe and America to demonstrate their distinctiveness from the bourgeoisie classes by championing the freedom of subject races in an effective and convincing manner.

The new Asia fully realizes the situation. It knows that the Orient has nothing more to lose. It has grown desperate in the consciousness that the only future that awaits the peoples of Asia is an extermination like that of the dodo or the bison. It has, therefore, accepted the challenge and ultimatum of Europe and America. It has also formulated its own demands in response. These are being pressed into the world's notice not indeed loud enough, for as yet Asia is unarmed and disarmed. But humanly speaking, it cannot remain armless for an indefinite period. The day of reckoning is not far off.

The time is fast approaching when Europe and

America will have to admit that their peoples must not command greater claims or privileges in Asia than the peoples of Asia can possibly possess within the bounds of Europe and America. The West will then be compelled to appreciate the justice of the demand that Asians must enjoy the same rights in Europe and America as Europeans and Americans wish to enjoy in Asia.

In the meantime the world is witnessing the dawn of a new era in international relations. The idealists of revolutionary Russia have made their début by dissipating to the winds the secret and other treaties of the old régime as so many scraps of paper, and by declaring the independence of subject races both Asian and European. This is the first instance in the annals of diplomacy and foreign policy when Europe has been honest and sincere to Asia. This is the first time in modern history when the East and the West have been treated on equal terms. This is why every intellectual of the New Orient hails with enthusiasm the birth of Bolshevism as a spiritual force. For he finds in Young Russia his only Western colleague in the task of making the world safe from economic exploitation, imperialism, and foreign rule.

The surest bulwark of international peace will, then, be furnished by an alliance of the international socialism of continental Europe with the militant nationalism of Young Asia until the new Metternichs are forced to capitulate and find their proper place in the limbo of oblivion. Simultaneously from the

insular angle let the British Labor Party, if it chooses to be sincere, warm itself up to bring out an Anglo-Saxon edition of Bolshevism and manufacture it in a shape understandable by the sluggish intellect of the newly fleshed imperialists of America. Ultimately through this grand *rapprochement* will the principles of the Russian Revolution, like those of the French, become the first postulates of a renovated humanity, and November 7, 1917, start the Year 1 of a momentous age of World Liberation. It is on such an understanding that the platform of co-operation between the "Sinn Feiners" of Asia and fighters for the New Order in Europe and America can be erected for the emancipation of the races and classes from political and economic thraldom.

CHAPTER XII

The Japanese Question in America

By Baron Shimpei Goto

Baron Goto was born in 1857 in a small village in northern Japan. He studied medical science in Tokyo and Berlin, and was in his early twenties appointed director of a prefectural hospital. In 1883 he became acting Director of the Bureau of Public Health in the central government. From 1890 to 1892 he was in Germany studying medicine. Upon his return to Tokyo in 1892 he was appointed Director of the Bureau of Public Health. From 1896 to 1905 he was Civil Governor of Formosa and laid the foundation of the colonial administration of the island. In 1906 he was made Baron. For two years from 1906 he was President of the South Manchuria Railway. From 1908 to 1912 and again from 1913 to 1914 he occupied the portfolio of Minister of Communications. When Count Terauchi organized a Cabinet in September, 1916, Goto accepted a post as Minister of Home Affairs. This post he resigned in May, 1918, in order to fill the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs left vacant by the demise of Viscount Motono. In 1919 Baron Goto, then a private citizen, spent several months in America and Europe. At present he is Mayor of Tokyo, having accepted the office at the urgent request of Premier Hara and Viscount Shibusawa. He is also a member of the Diplomatic Advisory Council created in 1916 by the Terauchi Cabinet at his suggestion. The following article was originally written for the January, 1921, issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science of the University of Pennsylvania.

FEW international questions have been so openly laid before public attention and yet so grossly misrepresented as the anti-Japanese question in Cali-

fornia. For instance, though it has commonly been called the Japanese immigration question, it is no longer the question of immigration at all (that has stopped), but the question of the treatment of the immigrants who are already there. A question of this nature, however, usually lends itself to excited and confused discussions. In order to have a fair appreciation of the problem it is necessary to disentangle the essential facts and issues involved out of the clouds of opinions.

I

The facts are simple enough. There are at present 80,000, more or less, Japanese in the state of California. Many of them are independent farmers engaged in garden and truck farming. The total acreage owned by them is about 30,000, and that of the leased land 330,000. A greater majority migrates from place to place according to seasons as harvest helpers. Between these two classes the line is not fixed. They constantly change from one to the other as their success and failure induce them. They are fairly well scattered over the state, but in such localities as the Sacramento Valley, San Gabriel, and several others where conditions are especially adapted to their work they form small communities of their own, the appearance of which can best be described as camps. They live very plainly and work very industriously and fulfill a useful and, I should say, almost unreplaceable function in the economic life of the state. Their honesty is unimpeachable,

so much so that I often hear that banks will advance them money on conditions which, if proposed by Americans, will be refused. They are, of course, entirely peaceful.

The menace of Hawaiianizing California does not yet exist as a matter of fact. It is at most only a tendency to be apprehended, if substantial numbers of new immigrants continue to stream in. Japanese immigrants seem to be rather procreative. The assertion, however, so frequently made by agitators that at the present birth ratio the Japanese of the state will outnumber Americans in seventy years is an absurd statement based on imperfect statistics. The real situation does not give one the least impression of that sort and, as the American public well knows, most investigators from the eastern states return with the feeling that America can very well take care of them, if the number is not increased by a continued addition of new immigrants. As to the alleged unlawful entry of Japanese over the Mexican borders, it is generally believed that there have been such cases, but no evidence has been established that it has been going on to such an extent as to add substantially to the Japanese population in California.

These are essential facts upon which the California issue has been raised. That issue, stripped of all its legal subtleties, is this: Japanese shall have no right to own or lease land for agricultural purposes. The ownership of land by Japanese was prohibited by the anti-alien land law of 1913, which has been a subject

of diplomatic protest by the Japanese Government. Meanwhile, Japanese have found a way to acquire land, in spite of this law, in the name of corporations or native-born minors. The proposed new legislations strike at this practice by prohibiting them to become members of corporations entitled to acquire and possess agricultural land or to become guardians of the real estate belonging to minors. Furthermore, it entirely deprives them of the right to lease land, which was limited to a period of three years in the law of 1913.

II

In 1913, when the anti-alien land law was enacted, and further back in 1908 when the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" was signed, the California agitators made much of the low economic status of the Japanese immigrants. They pictured them as underselling the white man in the "labor market" and generally degrading the social standards of the people of California. It is certainly a great advance that in the present agitation these charges are scarcely heard. As a matter of fact Japanese are now earning as much as, and in many cases more than, white laborers in similar lines of work. In these lines of work they are unquestionably more efficient. Far from degrading social standards, I have often heard Americans comment on the personal tidiness of the Japanese boys. "It is a marvel," they said, "how these boys keep well-dressed with their limited incomes." During the latter part of the war, when the

Japanese farmers were especially prosperous, the number of those who used automobiles and trucks instead of wagons phenomenally increased. I have heard many Americans speak of it in good nature but with some jealousy. Under such changed situations anti-Japanese arguments of the former days are out of place.

Whether the Japanese question in California is economic or racial has long been a subject of confused discussion. Those who claim it as a purely local issue are inclined to present it as an economic question. Indeed, if it is an economic question affecting only the standards of wages and living, they can rightly regard it as a local issue. If so, the remedy will be found simply in the improvement of the economic status of these immigrants. That has come with an unexpected rapidity. If further improvement is desired, means are not lacking; and given proper means, the prospects are bright. Most Japanese children study in American schools and their record stands above that of the average American children. As their intelligence and sentiment grow in the American atmosphere, they naturally turn away from the soil and seek more varied spheres of activity than their parents ever thought of. A sad feeling prevails among the thinking Japanese in California that these native-born boys and girls, losing the grit and patience with which their parents tilled the soil, and at the same time denied the equal right with Americans to attain higher things, will sink to the status of the servile class of domestic

and clerical sorts. All this shows that, if the question is an economic one, the remedy is simple and is just what the Japanese desire it to be. But the economic-question argument and the discriminatory measures are plain contradictions. Is it any wonder that those who hold this view appear to the Japanese wholly insincere? They are simply evading the real issue and compromising their sense of justice.

The real question is of more fundamental significance. It is racial—that is to say, racial antipathy. Much of this racial antipathy is mere prejudice. Take for instance the question of assimilability. Assimilability may mean anything from elevation of economic status and adaptation to new standards of civilization to changing the color of skin. It is no fault of the Japanese that they cannot change the color of their skin from brown to white; but in all other respects where assimilation can reasonably be demanded of them, they have shown the evidence of remarkable facility. Not only has their economic status rapidly improved, but in thought and sentiment also they have become American. It is not uncommon to hear Japanese parents in California complain that they cannot teach their children Japanese history or literature or impart to them any ideas that they have brought from their old homes. Almost all Japanese now domiciled in California have been there for more than ten years and have greatly changed from what they had been. Visitors from Japan return often astonished at their change. But they in turn, however, are surprised at

the radical change that has taken place in their children's minds. These boys and girls are Americans in all but their physical appearance. I believe that the Japanese are a race that is particularly susceptible to the influence of environment. The Japanese history is, in fact, one long series of assimilation of different civilizations. Even California agitators, in their moments of private reflection, admit the wonderful power of adaptability of the Japanese, although in public they do everything to prevent the natural process of assimilation.

Racial antipathy, however, may not be all prejudice. There may be in it certain elements which all the reason one may possess at present cannot overcome. One knows that it is irrational, but it is still there in spite of one's reason. Humanity will, no doubt, conquer it in the end; else we cannot believe in humanity. But the process will certainly be long, and requires the utmost tact and patience. Meanwhile, it is good worldly wisdom that friendship shall be kept at some distance. But it is not sound sense to complain of the difficulty of assimilation while doing everything to prevent it. If your instinct tells you that Japanese are unassimilable and must be kept at a distance, you may safely trust your instinct without resorting to arbitrary and dogmatic measures. Your instinct is your nature, and nature will take care of itself and knows its purpose better than you do yourself. But whatever your instinct may say, your reason must also speak. It must speak with all the authority it can command, that we

must be friends and fulfill the essential conditions that make friendship possible.

Here we come to the essence of the question. It is a question of treatment. Japan is not sending new immigrants to America since America does not want them. We are not trying to blend the two races, since its wisdom is in question. We are asking simply that those of her people who are already in America shall be given decent treatment that will make possible the friendship of the two peoples.

III

The California land law raises delicate legal questions. Waiving for the moment more fundamental problems involved, this measure comes at once into conflict with the spirit of the American Constitution and the treaty between the two countries. It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the question of legal technicality, but enough must be said to clear the ground for the final determining issue. The first four sections of the proposed legislation stand as follows:

"Section 1. All aliens eligible to citizenship under the laws of the United States may acquire, possess, enjoy, transmit, and inherit real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the same manner and to the same extent as citizens of the United States, except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state.

"Section 2. All aliens other than those mentioned

in section one of this act may acquire, posses, enjoy and transfer real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent and for the purpose prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise.

"Section 3. Any company, association or corporation organized under the laws of this or any other state or nation, of which a majority of the members are aliens other than those specified in section one of this act, or in which a majority of the issued capital stock is owned by such aliens, may acquire, possess, enjoy and convey real property, or any interest therein, in this state, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such members or stockholders are citizens or subjects, and not otherwise. Hereafter all aliens other than those specified in section one hereof may become members of or acquire shares of stock in any company, association or corporation that is or may be authorized to acquire, possess, enjoy or convey agricultural land, in the manner and to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the Government of the United States and the nation or country of which such alien is a citizen or subject, and not otherwise.

"Section 4. Hereafter no alien mentioned in section two hereof and no company, association or cor-

poration mentioned in section three hereof, may be appointed guardian of that portion of the estate of a minor which consists of property which such alien or such company, association or corporation is inhibited from acquiring, possessing, enjoying or transferring by reason of the provisions of this act. The public administrator of the proper county, or any other competent person or corporation, may be appointed guardian of the estate of a minor citizen whose parents are ineligible to appointment under the provisions of this section."

The particular parts of the Constitution and the treaty brought into discussion in connection with the above legislations are as follows:

The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Section 1 of the treaty of 1911 between the United States and Japan states that:

The subjects or citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease or occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential or commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native subjects or citizens.

Those who contend that the alien land law vio-

lates neither the Constitution nor the treaty base their case on the absence of the word "agricultural" or other general terms that will cover agriculture in the treaty, and they contend that the "equal protection of law" guaranteed in the Constitution applies in this case only to the rights specifically stated in the treaty. Those who hold the contrary view argue that the word "commercial" of the treaty implies agriculture as well as trade, on the ground that commerce is impossible without production. They cite also the most favored nation clause in another part of the treaty, which they interpret as the general principle and spirit of the treaty. They bring also the precedent of the supreme court of the state of Washington in 1907, in which similar legislations were declared unconstitutional.

It is not for me to say how the word "agricultural" or other general terms came to be omitted in the treaty, and there is no recognized court of justice to pronounce judgment on the case. But the significance of this omission seems to be fairly clear. The treaty is a diplomatic document and not an ordinary legal one. The omission was diplomatically made and never intended to be construed in the narrow legal sense. If it means anything exclusive at all, it means that the question is pending.

That is precisely the point. All the negotiations Japan has been conducting are for the purpose of settling this point, because on it is staked the principle of equality. If this question were already settled and diplomatically admitted, there would

have been no need for the protracted negotiations now extending for several years. It will be an ineffaceable blemish in American diplomatic history if all these negotiations, which should arrive at a rational solution, be allowed to be broken by the injudicious attitude of the California agitators. Their supposed legal interpretations, therefore, completely miss the mark. Like the economic argument it is a deliberate attempt to evade the vital point. Japanese do not want to make travesty of their innate sense of justice and fair play, for which they are fighting.

IV

Some future historian will probably record the California agitation as an unfortunate incident in the westward march of American civilization with its outposts now extended to the other side of the Pacific. Thirty years ago when the stream of Japanese immigrants began to pour into the Golden Gate, America welcomed it in the true Whitman spirit, "I am large; I contain multitude." The process has since been reversed. The stream of Oriental immigrants has not only been checked but a counter stream has begun to flow into the Orient in the shape of American capital with missionaries and publicists as its vanguards.

Nor is this all. The interference of American politicians concerning the affairs of the Far East has frequently been the cause of no small irritation to us. We have recently had a series of it; the

Shantung question, the Saghalien question, and the cable problem, to mention only a few conspicuous instances, and say nothing about the discourteous propaganda conducted by some Americans in the Far East. In all such questions America is applying to us the most perfect and saintly canons of international dealings, which are observed nowhere else in this troubled world and which America herself failed to observe in almost everything that concerns her. It is a curious reflection of the egoistic psychology of a nation that American agitators, who have said so much about the Hawaiianizing menace of California, have said not a word about the greater Hawaiianizing menace that exists in its reverse form in the Far East. And yet we do not think of discriminating against America, because we feel that after all that is the way humanity mingles and civilization advances. But you cannot expect the Japanese to think of the California question dissociated from these considerations.

At bottom, the California question is one of principle. Nothing less than the principle of equality is involved, and no other solution than the one that will preserve this principle in its essential features will satisfy us. It must, however, be remembered that it is not the intention of Japan to send more immigrants to America. Not only has Japan actually stopped the stream of immigrants since the "Gentlemen's Agreement," but she has realized that it is not to her best interest to have too large a number of her race left on the Pacific coast. Her surplus

population can more conveniently be taken care of in the East, where it will do permanent good. We are not, therefore, pressing for uncompromising application of the principle of equality in all its practical implications. We are simply asking that those of our race who are already there be decently treated and that no discriminatory legislations that violate the principle be enacted. We know that the road to freedom is long, and that much tact and patience is necessary in traveling on that road. We will, on our part, do all that is necessary from the point of view of practical expediency, but we cannot sacrifice the principle itself. The essential features of the principle must be preserved for the sake of the humanity of the world, if for no other purpose.

I cannot refrain from reminding the reader of the sanity of the "Gentlemen's Agreement." As a practical policy, the California problem is essentially a diplomatic one and can be dealt with satisfactorily in no other spirit than that of the "Gentlemen's Agreement." With a proper precaution it can safely be left to natural solution. "Unassimilable" elements, after they have performed their useful function, will eventually return home, and the native-born minors, given legitimate opportunities, will take care of themselves. I recall the impression I had a few years ago in the course of a conversation with a certain prominent Japanese in California. He spoke encouragingly about the prospect of these boys coming to the Far East or going to South America as vanguards of the American business in these

directions. It will be a graceful irony of fate if America educates them, uses them, and sends them back in that capacity. After all, God is great and His resourceful work cannot be limited by the short-spanned vision of men.

CHAPTER XIII

Can Japan Be Christianized?

By M. Zumoto

This article appeared in the *Herald of Asia,* a Tokyo weekly in English, in October, 1920. The editor of the weekly is Mr. M. Zumoto. Mr. Kanzo Uchimura, whose Japanese article in *Taiyo* is summarized and embodied in this article, is, like Mr. Matsumura, an "insurgent" Christian revolting against the missionary régime, and has multitudes of followers throughout Japan. He is generally conceded to be a profounder scholar than Mr. Matsumura.

WILL Japan ever be Christianized? This question has been asked during these forty years, but remains yet to be answered. Some thirty years ago a good many people were inclined to answer it in the affirmative. The tide of Europeanization then ran strong in all spheres of life, and it seemed as though the old religions of the land would follow the fate of other national institutions in nearly every direction and be superseded by creeds introduced from the West. But the tide was turned by the awakened spirit of nationalism which warned the people of the danger of rashly discarding the ideas and beliefs forming the basis of our history and character. The new movement which was known as *Koko-sui Hozen* (preservation of national characteristics), was in a sense reactionary, but it was

nowise retrogressive in its tendency. It was essentially a protest raised by the healthy instinct of historical continuity against the process of feverish and indiscriminate Europeanization which the nation had been conducting in its zeal to equip itself as a modern progressive state and thus liberate itself from the humiliating restraint the Western Powers had imposed upon its sovereign rights. It was an advice to look about and make a retrospective survey of the progress attained, in order to start on a fresh career of advancement along a more normal and healthy line. One result of this new movement was a setback to the spread of Christianity, and a wonderful revival of activities in Buddhist circles.

Recently the same eternal question has once more been asked with some insistency, owing probably to the holding of the World's Sunday School Convention in Tokyo [in the summer of 1920]. Has that event changed the prospect in any way? Has it been of any use in awakening renewed interest in the religion of Christ among our people? We think not. We doubt very much if *omatsuri-sawagi* (festive commotions) of this description will ever really advance the cause of religion in this country. In any case, it was not a revived interest in Christianity but the coming in our midst of a large and important body of Christians from all parts of the world, that excited curiosity and occasioned question as to the probability of our becoming a Christian nation.

The question is naturally answered differently

according to the different attitude which each person maintains toward Christianity, the Christians generally saying "yes," and non-Christians "no." It is, however, rather remarkable that even among the former there is a conspicuous absence of anything like confidence in the future prospect of Christianity in Japan. It is not difficult to detect a general tone of despondency and apathy in Christian circles. One does not find such conditions in an organization filled with hopes of advancement. The correctness of this observation is borne out by Christians themselves, notably by men like Mr. Kanzo Uchimura and Mr. Tokuma Tominaga. These two together with a third, Mr. Takagi, Principal of the Aoyama Gaku-in, have contributed remarkable articles on the subject of Christianity in Japan to the current number of the *Taiyo*. Mr. Uchimura's article is the most important of the three. He is not satisfied with the number of Protestant converts which, he says, cannot exceed 200,000, a result hardly commensurate with the labor expended in the work of propaganda for half a century. The Christian propaganda in Japan, he is forced to admit, has been in a sense a failure. Reading between lines, it is not difficult to perceive that what he really means is that the Christianity that has failed to make good is the Christianity preached by foreign missionaries and their Japanese followers, namely, a group of ideas and formulas that has grown up in the Occident around Christ's teachings. In Mr. Uchimura's opinion, these Occidental ideas and formulas are

merely the growth of conditions and temperament peculiar to European and American peoples. What the Japanese need is a Christianity divested of all these unnecessary trappings, or the Christianity as taught by Christ himself. "An independent Japanese Christianity like this," he says, "is not supported by foreigners who, if anything, dislike it." Such is the Christianity that he preaches, representing no denomination or maintaining no church organization. This sort of Christianity, he maintains, is making a steady progress in Japan, in spite of veiled foreign antagonism and persistent domestic persecutions. When Japan opens her heart, as he thinks she is bound to open sooner or later, to the Christianity that is being evolved in terms of Japanese thought and feelings, then Mr. Uchimura is confident that Japan will become the foremost Christian nation on earth.

In inviting us to believe in the ultimate conquest of Japan by a Japanese Christianity, he confesses, impliedly and explicitly, the unquestionable failure of past attempts at the Christianization of this nation. He may, of course, be right in his sanguine expectations of the success of the new brand of Christianity. It may be conceded in his favor that, in view of its Oriental origin, the true spirit of Christianity will probably be more clearly grasped by Orientals than by Occidentals. Be that as it may, Mr. Uchimura's article is interesting as a strong testimony to the failure of the attempts to transplant Christianity in Japan in any of the numerous forms in which it is

found in the West. A somewhat similar testimony is rendered by Mr. Tominaga. He is very much dissatisfied with the present state of Christian churches in Japan. He mentions various causes contributing to the adverse condition of the churches, such as lack of efficient, earnest pastors, lack of faith among converts and so forth. But the most important cause, in his opinion, is found in the fact that the religion which has been brought and which is still preached by the missionaries is one that grew up in the peculiar intellectual atmosphere of the Occident three or four centuries ago, and which is consequently unsuited to the present-day requirements, especially in Japan. In disowning the Christianity introduced by missionaries, Mr. Tominaga, like Mr. Uchimura, acknowledges the failure of Christian propaganda so far conducted. The third writer, President Takagi, of Aoyama College, is less pronounced in his antagonism to the missionary type of Christianity, but in declaring his conviction that the work of Christian propaganda in Japan can only be effectively conducted by Japanese, he in effect subscribes to the position taken by Mr. Uchimura and Mr. Tominaga that the Christianity that can possibly conquer Japan is one interpreted in terms of Japanese thought.

Thus by the testimonies, implied or explicit, of three of our foremost Christian thinkers, we are assured that the past efforts at converting Japan to Christianity have been on the whole a failure. They are, however, convinced that a new Christianity, a

product of Japanese minds and Japanese surroundings, is destined to be more successful. Mr. Uchimura, indeed, thinks that the new Japanese Christianity developed free from missionary influences has already taken roots in our soil and is beginning to bear beautiful fruits attesting to the soundness of the religious instinct of the people. In support of this statement, he mentions the fact that those who flock to listen to his weekly "Churchless" sermons are deeply interested in the direct teachings of Christ, but evince little desire to be taught in the philosophical or theological ideas, which have accumulated about Christianity in course of its historical development in the West, but which are not necessary for the understanding of the religion bequeathed by Jesus.

Now the question is whether or not the so-called new Christian faith will succeed in securing a general mastery over the hearts of this people, as Mr. Uchimura is confident it will. With all respect for Mr. Uchimura's unique authority on this subject, we are none the less constrained to remark that talk of a need of a Japanese Christianity is almost as old as the modern history of missionary propaganda in Japan. Men like Reverend Ebina, Reverend Kozaki, or Reverend Tsunashima have been preaching their own individual Christianity more or less independent of the historical teachings of any of the Western denominations. Some of them have been doing so for more than thirty years. They may possibly not be so perfectly independent as Mr. Uchimura

may wish, but there is no doubt that, like him, they have always endeavored to interpret Christianity in terms of Japanese thought and temperament. If so, the success so far attending the evangelical efforts of "Japanese Christianity," as distinguished from "Missionary Christianity," seems to be rather meager in proportion to the length of time devoted to the work. Mr. Uchimura may say, as indeed he does, that the regrettably small number of converts obtained is made up by the indirect spread of Christian influence in various spheres of national activities, such as literature, education, and social welfare work. It, however, seems to us to be erroneous to attribute all these "indirect" results to the efforts of Christian teachers, Japanese or foreign; they are mostly owing to the influence of European literature and examples. The impulse has come in most cases directly from abroad and not from Christian sources at home.

The truth, it seems to us, is that Buddhism, which is too often represented to be dying, is really reviving, and thus presents an almost insurmountable obstacle in the path of Christian propaganda. Buddhism still holds an undisputed sway over the hearts of the great bulk of the people. At one time it seemed to have almost lost all vitality, but that was only apparent and temporary. It soon began to show signs of new life, thanks chiefly to the stimulus supplied by the newly arrived rival from abroad. Most sects have now a fairly good system of educational training for their priests and even schools for

their lay members. During recent years a remarkable activity has been noticed in the publication of religious tracts with a view to popularizing the precepts of Shakyamuni or Buddha. Buddhist priesthood, as a rule, is still far from what it should be, but it cannot be denied that a wonderful improvement has recently taken place in its educational and spiritual qualifications. It is also a noteworthy phenomenon that there is an increasing tendency in educated and refined circles to take more active interest in Buddhism and study its literature. The giant is undoubtedly awakening, and as he has been in actual occupation of the field for so many centuries the newcomer will find it extremely hard to dislodge him. Fortunately Buddhism is a tolerant religion; it is ready to welcome Christianity as a colleague in co-operation for the spiritual good of the people. It is also willing to learn from the new and younger religion, as it has already done in matters relating to education and social welfare work. So if it is met by Christianity in like spirit of tolerance and friendliness, it is possible that open-minded comminglings may ultimately result in the evolution of a new creed out of the common features of the two religions. If that takes place, Christianity will have a chance of a permanent share in the moulding of the spiritual life of the Japanese race. As an uncompromising rival of Buddhism, its future prospect does not seem assured.

Now let us present more fully what Mr. Uchimura

has to say in his article in the *Taiyo*. At the outset he says:

"I was converted to Christianity in 1878, and am one of the oldest living Japanese Christians in Japan. I embraced the faith at Sapporo, Hokkaido, through the Christian teachings left behind by that eminent American, William S. Clarke. For nearly forty-three years since then I have remained a believer."

But Mr. Uchimura's Christianity, he says, is not Christianity of any church. He is an independent believer, and he is generally not welcomed by foreign missionaries. Some other Japanese Christians are of a foreign type in thought and belief and are generally the beneficiaries of foreign pecuniary assistance. Not he and the little flock under him.

Thus sketching himself, Mr. Uchimura expresses the opinion that Christianity has been a failure in Japan in one sense, and yet a success in another. Since its modern introduction, Protestant Christianity can boast of no more than 200,000 believers in Japan. A vastly larger number have, no doubt, gone through the form of conversion; but after five, ten, or fifteen years of Christian life, which they have found too exacting, they have gone back to their original faith. If a list were to be made of those Japanese who became Christians at one time or another, it would be a long one including many names prominent in official circles, especially the diplomatic service and in the journalistic, literary, and educational worlds. Particularly has Christianity been a failure among the intellectual and the upper

classes of Japan. On the other hand, there are Japanese Christians on whom time has had no unfortunate effect on their belief, and of whom any country may be proud for their sterling Christian qualities. They are found among farmers, merchants, manufacturers, sometimes among bankers, and even among government officials. From this point of view Christianity has been a success in Japan. Who says the Japanese are too weak-willed to live the Christian life?

Christianity has already spread its roots deep in Japanese soil; it has become a Japanese religion, in the same sense that Buddhism became a Japanese religion centuries ago. It is notable also that independent Japanese Christianity is really independent, receiving no foreign assistance. If anything, it is looked at askance by Western Christians and those Japanese who are on their side, while it is still regarded as a foreign religion by the average Japanese, and is made an object of attack as something calculated to undermine national foundations or injurious to the moral ideals indigenous to Japan. That a faith so little esteemed by Japanese themselves should have planted its root so firmly in Japan is an honor to Japan and demonstrates the power of Christianity.

The great question is, How is Christianity influencing Japanese civilization? Admitting that Japan has many Christian "backsliders," it is nevertheless undeniable, says Mr. Uchimura, that they are proving themselves a medium of disseminating Christian

ideals and principles in Japan. The Japanese press, Japanese magazines, Japanese newspaper fiction, and Japanese new publications all bear testimony to this fact. The prevailing popular conceptions of mankind, humanity, labor, etc., to say nothing of love and liberty, are all traceable, directly or indirectly, to Christianity. It is at least obvious that they have come neither from Confucianism nor from Buddhism. There is no refuting the fact that Japan is learning and adopting Christian ideas and ideals, not only through loyal Christians, but also through those who were once Christians, for "backsliders," as the latter may be, they can never completely shake off the spiritual and intellectual influences to which they once yielded. Take, for instance, such sayings as "man does not live on bread alone," "happier is it to give than to receive," "God is love," or the word "gospel," which are on everybody's lips nowadays. They are Christian not only in idea but in the form in which they are said.

Turning to the field of education, it is true that there is as yet no Christian School for Christian young men that can compete with Keio University or Waseda University; but that is no fault of Christianity. It only shows that Japan so far has felt no very great need for Christian education. In the education of girls, however, no one can deny that Christian institutions had a long start years ago and lead all other similar institutions. In the matter of Sunday schools also Christians have set an example which others are only

copying. Seen in this light Christianity is wielding a great influence in the education of Japanese sons and daughters. Then, practically the same thing may be said of the work of charity. True, ancient Japan was not wholly ignorant of the work of mercy and help to the needy. But it is absolutely from Christians that modern Japan has learned organized philanthropy and social welfare work. The Buddhists are trying to emulate, but they can only imitate. Or take the all-important question of the reconstruction of home and society. Divorced from Christian ideals and principles the work is impossible. There is no home in Japan in a Christian sense, and social reconstruction is possible only after the establishment of a real home. Politically speaking, says Mr. Uchimura, it is beyond question that Christian influence upon administration and upon statesmen and politicians has been salutary and in the right direction.

Coming to evangelical work, Mr. Uchimura makes a statement which probably comes as a striking piece of news to many, namely, that the demand for Bibles is inexhaustible in Japan. Go to the American Bible Company at Owaricho, Ginza, Tokyo. There you will see that they can never print enough Bibles to meet the demand. It is surely not 200,000 Protestant Christians alone who want the book, and it proves that the Japanese nation is demanding to know Christianity. Speaking for his non-church Christianity, Mr. Uchimura says that he never lacks an audience. What is more significant, his audience do

not want to listen to the mere thoughts and ideas of Americans and Europeans presented as Christianity; but Christianity pure and simple has always the ear of the most ardent audience everywhere throughout the land. Mr. Uchimura, indeed, contends that Japanese are, by nature, a very religious people. Innumerable temples and shrines scattered all over the country, and religious ceremonies daily observed by the people, bear out this assertion. To-day the Japanese as a nation appear reluctant to be Christianized through Christian ideals and principles; but once they begin to embrace Christianity from their heart, says Mr. Uchimura, Japan will become the greatest Christian country, well qualified to lead the world in Christianity.

In conclusion, Mr. Uchimura gives himself up to his characteristic train of thought and deprecates the fact that the World Sunday School Convention has allowed itself to accept help from such non-Christian laymen as Marquis Okuma, Viscount Shibusawa, Baron Sakatani, and so on. The demoralization of religion is beyond description in America; but that is no reason why Japanese Christians should imitate American believers.

THE YAP CONTROVERSY

I

The Editor's Note

YAP is a rocky island in the Caroline group. It has an area of some 79 square miles and supports some 7,000 inhabitants of the Malay stock.

Formerly the Caroline group, as well as Pelew and Marianne groups, belonged to Spain. In 1898 Spain ceded Guam, the largest in the Marianne group, to the United States. In 1899 Spain sold the three groups (excepting Guam) to Germany for $4,200,000. Under German rule Yap was the seat of the government for the Western Carolines, the Pelew and Marianne islands.

In an early stage of the world war Japan occupied these islands, including Yap.

In February, 1917—that is, before America's entrance into the war—England, France, and Italy agreed to confer upon Japan at the end of the war the ownership of the German islands north of the equator. England was to acquire all the German islands south of the equator. At that time the idea of mandatory was not advanced by any nation.

On April 3, 1917, America entered the world war.

At the Peace Conference America advanced the theory of mandatory, which was accepted by the Powers.

By the Peace Treaty Germany resigned all the Pacific islands, together with cables, to the five principal allied and associated nations.

On May 7, 1919, the Peace Conference gave the mandate for the German islands north of the equator to Japan.

On December 17, 1920, the League Council confirmed that mandate.

At the Peace Conference of May 7, 1919, above referred to, President Wilson claims to have asked orally for the exemption of Yap from the mandate conferred upon Japan. But no record of the President's utterances are found in the minutes of that conference. Besides, Japan was not invited to that conference and has no knowledge of what the President may have said. Inasmuch as the Powers, including America, had fully known that Japan was vitally interested in Yap, it is reasonable to assume that they would have invited her representatives to that conference had they intended to discuss the exemption of the island from the Japanese mandate.

II

The Japanese Government's Point of View

The attitude of the Japanese Government toward the Yap question is set forth in the following note addressed by Foreign Minister Viscount Uchida to the American Government on February 26, 1921:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the tenth December last on the status of the Island of Yap in reply to the memorandum of the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs, dated the 12th November last, and to state candidly herewith the opinion of the Imperial Government on the views of the United States Government propounded in this said note.

"I.—In support of the argument advanced by the Government of the United States the following points are enumer-

ated in your note: first, that in the course of the various discussions in the Supreme Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Peace Conference (namely at the meeting of the Supreme Council on April 21, 1919, and at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on April 30 and on May 1, 1919) the President and Mr. Lansing, the then Secretary of State of the United States, respectively, gave utterance to a view that the Island of Yap should be internationalized or that it should not pass into the hands of any one power; next, that at the meeting of the Supreme Council held on May 6, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George employed the words 'certain islands' in giving expression to what he understood to be the territories to be committed to the charge of Japan; and lastly, that according to the minutes of the meeting of the Supreme Council of May 7, 1919, no discussion took place on that day in respect to mandates and that although there exists a memorandum appended to the minutes of the meeting of May 7 which purports to be a codification of the agreement reached at the meeting of May 6 with reference to the North Pacific islands, such memorandum does not expressly include all the islands in the North Pacific.

"Of the meetings referred to it must be noted that the Imperial delegates were not present at the meeting of the Supreme Council of April 21, May 6, and May 7, and in consequence the Imperial Government have no means of ascertaining what views were expressed by the American delegates at those meetings. Assuming, however, that President Wilson did in fact give utterance at those meetings to such views as are ascribed to him, this cannot warrant the United States Government as against the Imperial Government in going beyond asserting as a fact that President Wilson or Mr. Lansing gave it as his opinion before the Supreme Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers at some time pre-

vious to May 1, 1919, that the Island of Yap should be internationalized or that it should not pass into the hands of any one power.

"In the opinion of the Imperial Government such a fact argues in no way in favor of the contention of the American Government that the Island of Yap stands outside the islands that it was decided should be held under the mandate by Japan unless they can establish at the same time the further fact that the representations of President Wilson and Mr. Lansing were accepted by the Council and the latter decided to exclude Yap from the mandatory territories assigned to Japan. In order to maintain successfully therefore that the Island of Yap is not included in the mandatory territories assigned to Japan the Imperial Government considers it necessary for the American Government to prove not merely the fact that the particular line of views was stated at the meetings but also that the meeting decided in favor of those views.

"Further, in this same connection, the Imperial Government would point out that views expressed by the delegates previous to arriving at a decision are not necessarily to be interpreted as reservations naturally attached to the decision. It follows that the question whether the Island of Yap is excluded from the mandatory territories assigned to Japan must be judged from the decision of May 7, by which the mandatory powers and their mandatory territories were for the first time and at the same time finally decided upon, and it must be concluded that whatever utterances may have been made previous to that date were only preliminary conversations that took place before the decisions were reached and in themselves possessed no such cogency as to qualify the meaning or limit the application of the decisions.

"This conclusion is the more irrefutable since the imperial delegation never expressed their agreement whether at any

meeting of the Councils or elsewhere with the above stated views of President Wilson or of Mr. Lansing. Furthermore Viscount, then Baron, Makino announced distinctly his disagreement with them at the meeting of Foreign Ministers held on April 30, 1919.

"II.—A view is advanced further in the note under reply that if Yap was meant to be included among the islands assigned under the mandate to Japan then the decision of May 7, 1919, should have been drafted in more specific language than is the case. In the opinion of the Imperial Government, however, it is more in accordance with sound principles of interpretation to say that the fact should have been set down with especial clearness if exclusion were meant, as an exception always requires to be stated expressly. To assert that the fact of nonexclusion should have been specifically mentioned in a decision of this kind could only be regarded as an extraordinary and even an unreasonable contention with which no one would be likely to concur.

"It must also be remembered that if a decision in favor of exclusion of the Island of Yap—a question of grave concern to Japan and one on which the Japanese delegation invariably maintained a firm attitude—had really been made, as is implied by the argument of the United States Government, at the meeting of May 7, at which Japan was not represented, it could not but have been regarded as an act of entirely bad faith. It is therefore inconceivable to the Imperial Government that such a decision could have been reached at a meeting at which no Japanese delegation was present.

"Since the decision under consideration says on the one hand 'German islands' and on the other does not make any exception of Yap, the Imperial Government regard it as perfectly clear that the ex-German Pacific islands north of the equator, with no exception whatever, all belong to the man-

datory territories allocated to Japan. Nor are the Imperial Government alone and unsupported in their interpretation of the decision, for they are in receipt of authentic information that the Governments of Great Britain and France, being of the same opinion as Japan on the matter, made statements to that effect in their replies to the American note in November last.

"If the decision incorporated in the memorandum appended to the minutes for May 7 be one which was really reached at the meeting of the Supreme Council held on May 6 as represented in the note under reply, then the inevitable conclusion will be that inasmuch as the meeting held on the latter date, that is, May 6, was that of the heads of delegations of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the contention of the American Government is tantamount to saying that President Wilson by himself arrived at an understanding which differed from that of all others present, a conclusion difficult to understand.

"Again a reference is made to the use of words 'certain islands' by Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Supreme Council held on May 6, 1919, as tending to prove the exclusion of the Island of Yap. Granting for the sake of argument that the words 'certain islands' occur in the minutes for May 6, the use of such a phrase is perfectly natural and easy to understand without supposing it to refer to the exclusion of Yap. There are other islands in the South Pacific north of the equator which did not belong to Germany and it does not appear how better Mr. Lloyd George could succinctly describe the islands to be allotted to the Japanese mandate in that region than as 'certain islands.' 'Certain' is a word which is far from appropriate to mean 'all but one,' and had he had the exclusion of a single island such as Yap in mind he would have been almost sure to have explicitly mentioned

it. Seeing that the British Government adopts the interpretation that it was decided at that time that all the ex-German Pacific islands north of the equator were to be assigned under the mandate to Japan it is obvious that in employing the words Mr. Lloyd George cannot have intended to signify the exclusion of the Island of Yap.

"To sum up, since in a matter of such a grave nature as the establishment of mandatory territories only what expressly appears on the face of the decisions should be accepted as authoritative, the Imperial Government cannot agree in giving an extraordinary and unusual interpretation to the decision on a vague ground that certain thoughts or intentions, not expressed in the text thereof, existed in the mind of the delegate of one Power only.

"III.—The decision of May 7th, 1919, was made public on the following day, the 8th. If the published text of the decision differed in sense from what was understood by the Government of the United States to be its meaning, the latter should have and would naturally have been expected to have entered an immediate protest. No such step was taken, however, at the time, and the Imperial Government fail to understand the reason why the American Government should have allowed more than a year and a half to pass by before electing to question the decision.

"The note under reply refers to the fact that President Wilson's statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on August 19, 1919, called forth no comment by any nations and points to this absence of contrary opinion as amounting to evidence to prove that no Power found anything in the President's view to which it could take exception. The Imperial Government are quite unable to follow contentions of this kind. In the one case we have the publication of an international agreement in which the American

representative participated whereas the other was essentially a purely domestic affair.

"As to the former, in case the published text should be found to differ from what was understood by one party it was incumbent upon him forthwith to lodge a protest and have the errors, if any, rectified. In the latter case, however, no third Power is called upon to take any refutation or correction, and consequently the fact that there was no nation which took it upon itself to make any adverse comment has no bearing whatever on the matter under consideration.

"IV.—On the strength of article three of the obsolete draft mandate covering ex-German islands in the Pacific north of the equator, submitted to the Supreme Council on December 24, 1919, it is contended in the note under reply that no definite agreement has yet been reached as to the final disposition of all the ex-German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. The Imperial Government would point out that this article was intended solely to provide a means of settlement in view of any dispute that may arise as to boundaries or the assignment of lands. Such provisions were by no means confined to the particular draft in question, but there were also found similar provisions in all original draft mandates covering other territories which were simultaneously submitted to the same meeting. If the American contention in this connection is to be upheld it must needs follow that all the mandatory territories are liable to be honeycombed by exceptions or exclusions. But such a conclusion is wholly at variance with facts and cannot be thought by any one to be convincing. Consequently the reference made to it in the note under reply tends, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, in no way to strengthen the contentions of the United States Government.

"V.—In the concluding part of the note under reply it is

observed that even on the assumption that the Island of Yap should be included among the islands held under the mandate by Japan it is not conceivable that other Powers should not have free and unhampered access to the use of the island for the landing and operation of cables. If this observation is put forth irrespective of the fact that the island is within the mandatory territory then the question seems to be one which should be freely settled by the nation which has the charge of the place, namely, Japan.

"If the meaning be, however, that owing to the nature of the mandate the island should have its doors kept open, the Imperial Government would draw attention to the fact that at the meeting of the Commission on Mandates held on July 8, 1919, Colonel House opposed Count (then Viscount) Chinda's claim that the same equal opportunities for commerce and trade should be guaranteed in territories belonging to the C Class as in those belonging to the B Class. In view of the position thus taken up by the American delegate the Imperial Government feel obliged to state that in their opinion the American Government cannot with justice contend for the open door in the C Class territories at least as against Japan, and to inform the United States Government at the same time that they cannot consider themselves bound in any way to recognize the freedom of other nations in the manner insisted upon by the American Government in regard to the landing and the operation of cables even in places where the principle of the open door is to be guaranteed."

III

Comment of the Japanese Press

The following translations of Japanese editorials are taken from the *Japan Advertiser,* an American daily paper pub-

lished in Tokyo. The editor of this book is confident of the accuracy of the translations, but is not responsible for their phraseology.—THE EDITOR.

CABLES AND NAVAL POLICY

The *Osaka Asahi,* December 4, 1920

One of the principal reasons for the deadlock reached at the International Communications Conference is said to be disagreement between Japan and America regarding the question of the disposal of the Yap cables. This report is very regrettable to us, for it has always been our earnest desire to see the settlement of not only the immigration and California land questions but all questions pending between the two countries. The real reason for the convocation of the Communications Conference was the disposal of the former German cables, and it may be regarded as an extension of the Peace Conference at Paris. From the purely logical point of view, we can only say that America's claims are unreasonable. The German cables were occupied by Japan, Great Britain, and France before America entered the war, and under the Peace Treaty Germany abandoned those cables. It is natural, therefore, that their control and ownership should go to those who have occupied them. It should be noted that like the Japanese Government, the British and French Governments are practically giving no ear to the American demands, with the result that the Communications Conference has come to a deadlock.

Under the Peace Treaty the German cables were abandoned for the benefit of the "principal Allied and Associated Powers," and this is why the Powers have been compelled to tolerate the American interference. From Japan's point of

view, however, she can only continue the stand which she has so far taken. During the war Great Britain and France owed much directly to America, yet they are opposing her claims. Japan borrowed not a cent from the American Government, and her rejection does not constitute any breach of international comity.

Again, while America has no cables in the Atlantic with which she can communicate directly with Germany, in the Pacific she has direct cables with the Philippines and China. The only ground for her claim is that she will be put to much inconvenience when her cables break down if the control of the Yap cables is secured solely in the hands of Japan.

When the question is thus considered, it becomes doubtful whether the real desire of the American Government is to share the control of the Yap cables. If America's misgivings relate only to communications, she can lay down her own cable from Guam to Shanghai or the Philippines, and the necessary funds can be secured if a small portion of the naval expansion funds is set aside. The expenditure is too small to permit of the raising of an issue between Japan and America. Is America not really concerned not only with the cables, but with Japan's administrative control of Yap? The island is to the southwest of Guam which has the possibility of becoming the base of the American Pacific os Asiatic Squadron, and is a strategical point on the line of communication with the Philippines. But what Yap is to America is what Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam are to Japan, to whose national defense these islands constitute a sort of menace. If America intends to carry through her claims, should she not do so after altering her aggressive attitude regarding the naval policy? To take without giving and blame Japan alone is, we can only say, unreasonable.

The Yap Question

The *Tokyo Hochi,* February 13, 1921

The chief bone of contention at the meeting of the International Communications Conference to be resumed on March 15 will be the Yap question. Since America is strongly insisting on her stand, it can be easily imagined that the situation will become complicated.

The reason why the settlement of the Yap question is difficult is that it concerns not only the disposal of the cable but also the question of mandatory rule for the former German islands north of the equator. This latter question was decided at the conference of the Big Three on May 7, 1919. It was very difficult to understand why Japan was excluded from this conference when she had an important interest in the problem. It is said that at that conference President Wilson reserved the disposal of Yap for future consideration, and to this effect he made an announcement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August, 1919. The records of the proceedings at the conference do not exist, and not only is it not known that President Wilson actually made the reported reservation, but it is said that the memorandum of the secretary to Mr. Lloyd George contains no reference whatever to it.

Americans say that since Mr. Wilson announced reservation regarding disposal of Yap on every opportunity after February, 1919, and against this Viscount Makino, one of the Japanese delegates, protested, it is clear where the intentions of the American Government lay, even if no announcement of reservation was made at the conference on May 7, 1919. On the other hand, the Japanese side seems to contend that it is very unreasonable that Japan was not allowed to take part in the conference, and that as there are no reliable records of its proceedings and no formal

notice has been received by Japan, she need not recognize the reported announcement of America.

At the meeting of the League of Nations Assembly on December 17 last, it was decided that Japan be given the Class C mandate for the former German islands north of the equator. At that time no country raised any objection to the decision. Is it not proper that Japan should be granted the same Class C mandate for Yap as for the other islands?

However, America aims at the internationalization of Yap, and with that object in view, she objects to Japan getting the mandate for Yap, and is trying to prevent the cables from being monopolized by Japan. In the circumstances the issues involved are very complicated and grave. With regard to the disposal of the former German cables in the Atlantic, Great Britain and France are at variance with the American stand, but since in this case the only question at issue relates to the cables, there being no other problems involved, its settlement will not necessarily be difficult. The Yap question is complicated, and as the will of America is uncompromising, there should be no optimism regarding the future of the problem. If the question involved is only one of the disposal of the cables, the settlement will be comparatively easy, as is the case with the Atlantic cables, but the fundamental object of America is to internationalize Yap. If this American claim should be entertained, there would be no use in Japan acquiring a few cables. We cannot but hope that the government will go to the root of the matter and see to it that an adequate settlement is made.

America's Obstruction in the Pacific

The *Tokyo Yorodzu,* March 4, 1921

America may have the ambition of forming the center of the world's communication, and she may intend to obstruct

the Japanese mandatory rule of the South Seas in order to meet the convenience of Hawaii and other islands belonging to herself. She refuses to ratify the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant, yet she speaks as if she were a member of the League, and tries to repudiate its decisions, basing her claims on the statements of her own President without any corroboration in the records of the League's proceedings. Is that attempt consistent with the spirit of justice and humanity? The anti-Japanese utterances regarding the South Seas are not confined to America; similar sentiment is also very strong in Australia.

The disposition of the South Seas islands is definitely provided for in the League of Nations Covenant. There is no reason why any influences should be allowed to dispute the decisions reached, but in view of the fact that since the war unreasonableness has been apt to prevail, and of the utterances in America and British territories, there is no knowing what adverse currents may occur against us. The Japanese should watch the course of events with profound care and great determination.

No Surrender About Yap

The *Tokyo Chugai Shogyo,* March 5, 1921

The Island of Yap is under the mandatory rule of Japan, and the control of its cables is also in her hands. There is no justification for the American demand for the internationalization of the island, and it need scarcely be said that there is no room for any conciliation on Japan's part.

In the present state of international relations, it may not be possible for the Allies completely to ignore the American protest, but in refusing to ratify the Peace Treaty, America severed her connections with the "principal Allied and Asso-

ciated Powers," as defined in that treaty, and it need scarcely be said that she cannot destroy the treaty merely on the ground that she made a considerable contribution to the cause of the war. It seems very clear that in saying that she cannot recognize the Japanese mandatory rule of Yap, America is not necessarily concerned with the question of the mandate over that island, but with the disposition of the cables. Telegrams are too brief to show what reply has been given by the Council of the League of Nations, but it is clear that it must have made it known that it is impossible to alter the decisions already made. But according to a foreign telegram, Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, has issued a statement to the effect that though Japan wishes to maintain her present position regarding the mandatory rule of Yap, she is prepared to make a concession to the American demands in respect of the disposal of the cables. It is not yet definitely known from what point of view Viscount Ishii has made the declaration, what concession is to be made, or even whether the report is true at all, but if the stipulations decided by the Supreme Council are to be altered by the protest of America which has not yet joined the League of Nations, it means a loss of the authority of the Supreme Council of the Allies and a great humiliation on Japan's part. Both from the viewpoint of the authority of the Supreme Council and of the prestige of this country, the course of action already decided upon should be resolutely continued.

Japan Can Compromise

The *Tokyo Nichi-nichi,* March 8, 1921

It is not yet clear whether the American protest aims at the mandatory rule of Yap or at its cables. If the former is the case, the American action means the expression of no

confidence in the League of Nations Council and will have far-reaching and fundamental effects, but if the cables only are at issue, the League Council can compromise without impairing its authority if that is rendered possible by the attitude of Japan. In this case, the key to the solution of the problem lies with Japan. It behooves the Japanese Government to shape its policy in accordance with the opinion of the people. It is regrettable that scarcely ten days had elapsed after the American protest became known when Viscount Ishii, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, issued a statement that Japan was prepared to make a compromise. Perhaps this action was taken not at his discretion but under instructions from the home government, and we cannot but attack the government for its carelessness.

At the same time, we should consider why America opposed the placing of Yap under Japan's mandatory rule. If the American stand is that in view of her contribution to the victory in the war, America is entitled to a voice in the settlement of the problems resulting from the war, why did she not bring forward a more general protest? If the Japanese rule of Yap is a geographical menace to America's position in the Pacific, the islands under the mandatory rule of New Zealand must also be a menace because of their propinquity to the Summer Islands.

When the situation is thus considered, we cannot but admit the fact that dark clouds are hovering between Japan and America. Of course, this is a misfortune to both countries. But it is regrettable that some of the statesmen and militarists of the two countries are trying to increase the clouds rather than to dissipate them. For instance, America is establishing air corps and supply depots at Puget Sound and Alameda and a submarine base at Los Angeles; she is strengthening the defenses of Hawaii and is establishing a

submarine base and an air corps at Guam. There is also a similar instance in Japan. This fact should be taken to heart by the authorities of the two countries in trying to settle the Yap question, and they should endeavor to sweep away all the dark clouds.

Yap and the Cables

The *Tokyo Asahi,* March 8, 1921

In recognition of Japan's services in the world war, Sir Conyingham Greene, then British Ambassador in Tokyo, on February 16, 1917, transmitted to the Japanese Government the promise of the British Government to cede at the Peace Conference the German islands north of the equator, and a similar promise was given by the Russian Government on February 20, 1917, and by the French Government on March 1, 1917. Of course, America did not take part in the matter, but was this not natural in view of the fact that she was still a neutral? Is it not proper from Japan's point of view to take it that America recognized those pledges in entering the war after they were made? We believe that the report that Mr. Balfour purposely concealed those pledges from America is worthy of no consideration. At the conference of the Big Four in May, 1919, in which President Wilson took part, it was decided that the mandate for the former German islands north of the equator, including Yap, should be assigned to Japan, and no mention of "American reservation regarding Yap" is found in the records of the proceedings of the conference. It may be true that before the League Council at Geneva agreed on December 17, 1920, to entrust the mandatory rule of the former German islands, including Yap, America expressed disapproval of the proposal, but the procedure of the Council was merely a mat-

ter of formality, a fundamental decision having been reached in May, 1919, and it need scarcely be said that a decision made with the participation of Mr. Wilson cannot be countermanded. In short, the American protest is incongruous and inconsequential, and the argument put forward is untenable. The protest is actuated by the cable question rather than by the question of mandatory rule. It is due to an afterthought that if the cable question is to be favorably settled, the mandatory rule of Yap should be an issue, and therefore it seems natural that the argument should be inconsequential.

It goes without saying that we need not, whether from the viewpoint of Japan or of a principal member of the League of Nations, listen to the American argument regarding Yap. But there is one thing which should be noted by the Japanese. It is that the American wish regarding the cable calls for consideration on the part of the Allies. Since the world war an evil habit of cable censorship has arisen among the governments of various countries to the great embarrassment of foreigners. As a matter of fact, American newspapers are loudly complaining of the British censorship of American telegrams. In the circumstances, the Americans who look forward to great commercial activity are clamoring for the freedom of cables, and from this point of view, they oppose the transfer of the former German cables in the Atlantic to France on the ground that their communication with Italy will be interrupted, as well as the Japanese control of the Yap cables which they say will interfere with their communication with China. This state of affairs is worthy of consideration. There can be no question raised regarding the rule of Yap and the ownership of the cables, but as to the point that the cables should be maintained fairly and squarely, we should appreciate the posi-

tion of America. We wonder whether a solution of the problem does not lie here.

Importance of Yap Cables

The *Tokyo Hochi,* March 27, 1921

A recent statement issued by the Foreign Office says that Yap is a worthless piece of barren soil in mid-ocean, except for its cable facilities. This shows that the whole value of the island depends on its cables. The disposition of these cables is now the principal bone of contention between Japan and America, and there is no knowing how the issue will be settled. Not only do cables fulfill important functions, political and economic, in peace time, but in time of war they often decide the course of hostilities. This is why the Powers are ever anxious to place themselves in an advantageous position in regard to cables. In the circumstances, neither Japan nor America is prepared to yield on the cable question, and the more insistent the demand of America, the more strongly will Japan assert herself. In spite of her importance as one of the five great Powers, Japan stands in a poor position in regard to the Pacific cables, and everybody recognizes inequality on this point. It is with reason that we are not shy of going far in contesting the cable question with America.

American Naval Concentration

The *Tokyo Yomiuri,* March 28, 1921

Even if the concentration of the American Navy in the Pacific is not immediately carried out, and even if no naval agreement between Great Britain and America is forthcoming, it may well be imagined that the concentration will be carried out sooner or later, since no Anglo-American

war is now conceivable, especially in Great Britain. A New York dispatch to the *Japan Advertiser* says that the principal new problems, which will confront the new Administration of America, will arise in the Pacific, and that the authorities are convinced of the necessity of strengthening the naval defenses of America in that ocean. This shows how America is desirous of enlarging her naval equipment in the Pacific. When the three-year naval program of America is completed in 1924, her capital ships will number 33, as against 15 of Japan, and thus the American Navy will be more than twice as strong as the Japanese Navy. The American explanation is that since the commerce and navigation of America are several times as great as those of Japan, her navy should be correspondingly stronger. But such a plea can hold good only when the American Navy is divided between the Pacific and the Atlantic; it is not applicable when the American Navy is concentrated in the Pacific. As a matter of fact, so far as the Pacific is concerned, the commerce and merchant ships of America are by no means greater than those of Japan. What diplomatic move will be made by America with a navy behind her more than twice as strong as Japan's? Where will diplomatic questions arise which involve a clash of interest between America and Japan? Many people speak of the California question, but we do not share their view. It may afford an occasion for a clash between Japan and America, but it will never constitute the cause of it. If a clash were to occur between the two countries, we fear it would occur on the Chinese questions. Would it not come from disagreement regarding the interpretation of Japan's special interests in China as recognized in the Ishii-Lansing Agreement? But for the present let us set aside such a delicate question. Even apart from it, America

looks suspiciously at the Japanese temporary occupation of the northern portion of Saghalien, and views our policy in Siberia with a jaundiced eye, while much ado is made regarding the Japanese mandate for Yap. Such a state of affairs may make the situation worse at a time when the peoples of both countries are as nervous owing to naval competition as the Britons and Germans were before the great war, and the occasions of conflict which might otherwise be unavoidable may further increase, with the result that it may unconsciously become difficult to guarantee that no fear of clash will be realized. With regard to the question of the Yap cables, America did not raise any objection when they were under the control of Germany. Japan has by proper procedure obtained the mandate for the island, and is to land the cables at the island. Yet America suddenly makes difficulty with the arrangements, and this from a strategic point of view as regards Japan. This cannot but wound the feelings of the Japanese. The proposal for the internationalization of the Yap cables is similar to the internationalization of the Manchurian railways proposed by Mr. Knox in 1910. If America goes too far in regard to the Yap question, it is not impossible that the sentiment of the Japanese and Americans may become as undesirable as it was made by the Knox proposal. In short, many causes of conflict are apt to brew, and while the Japanese should, of course, assume a cool and calm attitude, it is to be earnestly hoped, in the interest of the traditional friendship of Japan and America, that the American authorities will refrain from an extravagant and provocative attitude, and especially that they will not allow their fleet, which is to be concentrated in the Pacific sooner or later, to take up such an arrogant and insolent attitude as the Pacific squadron of Russia at Port Arthur took toward Japan in the former years.

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